Case Summary (G.R. No. 254282)
Countrywide Development Fund
Congress created a P2.977 billion fund, allocating fixed amounts per legislator and empowering members to propose local projects. The Court held that specifying project categories and allowing legislative recommendations does not usurp executive authority. Implementation remains with the President, who must verify conformity with statutory purposes and broader national priorities.
Realignment of Operating Expenses
A special provision permitted individual legislators to realign their allocated operating‐expense items, subject to approval by the Senate President or House Speaker. The Court upheld this arrangement as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to authorize augmentation from savings (Art. VI, Sec. 25[5]), provided the presiding officers ensure available savings and proper augmentation purposes.
Budgetary Priority for Education vs. Debt Service
Petitioners argued Section 5(5), Article XIV mandates the highest budgetary priority for education, yet Congress allocated a larger sum to debt service. The Court reaffirmed that the constitutional command is directory, not limiting Congress’s discretion to address pressing national obligations such as debt.
Veto of Special Provision on Debt Ceiling
Congress had conditioned any debt‐service payment exceeding the appropriation on presidential and congressional approval. The President vetoed that proviso as an “inappropriate provision” better addressed by substantive law. Citing prior precedent, the Court upheld the item veto power over provisions that amend or repeal existing statutes, treating such riders as severable “items” subject to veto.
Revolving Funds for State Universities and Colleges
Several special provisions authorized SUCs to retain and use internally generated income and establish revolving funds. The President vetoed these as inconsistent with the “One Fund” policy, absent statutory basis. The Court upheld the veto, distinguishing agencies with preexisting statutory authority for such exceptions.
DPWH Contract vs. Force Account Ratio
Congress limited contracted road maintenance to 30% of the DPWH’s appropriation. The President vetoed this ratio, preferring a 70% contract maximum per loan covenants and efficiency studies. The Court found the special provision “appropriate” to its related appropriation item and invalidated the separate veto, as conditions inseparably tied to expenditure items cannot be severed.
AFP Medicine Purchases
A special provision required AFP units to comply strictly with the Department of Health’s formulary under the Generics Act. The President vetoed it to allow a transition period. The Court held this provision directly related to the medical appropriation and thus not vetoable separately, reinstating it.
Prior Congressional Approval for AFP Modernization Funds
Congress conditioned release of AFP modernization funds on prior approval of a Table of Organization and Equipment and prohibited funding for certain contracts. The President vetoed these “inappropriate provisions,” which effectively imposed a legislative veto and impaired contractual obligations. The Court sustained the veto as properly severable items.
Use of Savings for AFP Pension Fund
A special provision authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to use savings to augment pension and gratuity funds. The President vetoed this, citing constitutional limits on transfer of appropriations and on executive augmentation powers. The Court upheld the veto, noting that such realignments must flow through the President under a specific law, not by special appropriation riders.
Condition on CAFGU Deactivation
Congress earmarked separation benefits for 11,000 CAFGU members slated for 1994 deactivation. The President deferred implementation pending peace‐process outcom
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 254282)
Case Background and Procedural History
- Four consolidated petitions (G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 and 113888) challenge the 1994 General Appropriations Act (Republic Act No. 7663) and related presidential vetoes.
- Petitioners include individual taxpayers (Philippine Constitution Association et al.), members of the Senate (Angara et al., Romulo and Tanada), and a non-stock corporation (Freedom from Debt Coalition).
- Reliefs sought encompass declarations of unconstitutionality, writs of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus, and requests for temporary restraining orders.
- The Supreme Court en banc invited former Chief Justice Fernando and former Associate Justice Cortes as Amici Curiae to brief on novel separation-of-powers issues.
Separation of Powers: Purse versus Sword
- Central conflict: the power of Congress to appropriate (“power of the purse”) versus the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief (“power of the sword”).
- Petitioners contend both branches have exceeded constitutional limits—Congress by inserting substantive conditions in the GAA, and the President by exercising vetoes or impoundments without jurisdiction.
Passage of the 1994 General Appropriations Act and Presidential Vetoes
- House Bill No. 10900 passed Congress on December 17, 1993; signed into law as R.A. 7663 on December 30, 1993.
- The President issued a Veto Message on the same day, disapproving specific “provisions” and imposing conditions on implementation.
- No attempt was made by Congress to override any of the vetoes.
Petitions and Reliefs in Each Case
- G.R. No. 113105: Taxpayers seek prohibition against (a) Articles XLI (Countrywide Development Fund), I (realignment), XLVIII (debt service ceilings) and (b) the presidential veto on provisions in Article XLVIII.
- G.R. No. 113174: Sixteen Senators question constitutionality of presidential conditions on appropriations for the Supreme Court, COA, Ombudsman, CHR, CAFGUs and SUCs, and veto of debt-service provision; seek certiorari, prohibition, mandamus.
- G.R. No. 113766: Senators Romulo and Tanada plus Freedom from Debt Coalition challenge veto of special provision on debt-service ceilings and automatic appropriation funding scheme.
- G.R. No. 113888: Senators Tanada and Romulo contest vetoes and conditions affecting appropriations for AFP, DPWH, CAFGUs and NHA; also sought provisional reliefs (denied).
Locus Standi to Challenge Presidential Vetoes
- Constitutional review requires:
- an actual and appropriate case;
- a party with personal and substantial interest;
- earliest opportunity to raise the question;
- the constitutional question as the lis mota.
- Individual members of Congress have derivative standing when their institutional powers are impaired.
- Past recognition of Senate’s institutional standing (Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452).
Countrywide Development Fund (Art. XLI)
- Appropriation of P2,977,000,000 for “infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers, other priority projects and credit facilities” as proposed by members of Congress.
- Petitioners argue grant of power to identify projects is an improper encro