Title
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon
Case
G.R. No. 81958
Decision Date
Jun 30, 1988
The Supreme Court upheld Department Order No. 1, ruling it a valid exercise of police power to protect female overseas workers from abuse, dismissing claims of discrimination, right to travel violations, and non-impairment clause breaches.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 81958)

Petitioner’s Claims and Relief Sought

PASEI sought certiorari and prohibition to annul Department Order No. 1 on multiple constitutional grounds: (1) unlawful discrimination against males or females; (2) the Order applies only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills and therefore is not generally applicable; (3) violation of the right to travel; (4) invalid exercise of lawmaking power by the executive (police power being legislative, not executive, in character); (5) failure to afford worker participation as required by Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution; (6) violation of the constitutional non-impairment clause; and (7) alleged great and irreparable injury to PASEI members.

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

Relevant administrative and procedural dates included: the Department Order (cited as February 10, 1988), the Solicitor General’s Comment noting that on March 8, 1988 the Secretary lifted the deployment ban for specified countries (Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hong Kong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland), and press reports of further lifts on June 14, 1988 (New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Spain, West Germany). The Supreme Court rendered its decision in the en banc disposition dismissing the petition.

Applicable Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

Because the decision date is 1988, the 1987 Constitution is the applicable charter framework. Key constitutional provisions relied upon by the Court included: Article III (Bill of Rights) — equality before the law and the right to travel (Art. III, Sec. 1 and Sec. 6), and Article XIII, Sec. 3 (worker participation in policy and decision-making affecting rights and benefits). Statutorily, the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442) provided the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) with its policy to “afford protection to labor” and granted DOLE rule-making authority to enforce labor policies (cited as Art. 3 and Art. 5).

Issues Framed by the Court

The Court addressed whether DOLE’s Department Order No. 1, as a police-power measure implemented by executive rule-making, was constitutional: specifically, whether the gender-based and occupation-specific classification was permissible under equal protection; whether the measure unlawfully impaired the right to travel; whether the executive improperly exercised legislative (police) power without adequate delegation or consultation; and whether the non-impairment clause, worker-participation guarantee, or freedom of contract rendered the Order invalid.

Government Position and Factual Basis

The Solicitor General acknowledged that Department Order No. 1 was a police-power measure and defended its validity under the Constitution. The government’s factual premise, accepted by the Court, was that substantial and widespread maltreatment and exploitation of Filipina domestic workers abroad had been documented — including physical abuse, rape, and torture as testified to by returning workers — thereby providing an evidentiary basis for urgent government action to protect that class of workers. The Solicitor General also reported that DOLE had lifted the suspension with respect to certain countries where bilateral safeguards or mechanisms existed.

Legal Standard: Nature and Limits of Police Power

The Court reiterated established law: police power is the state authority to regulate liberty or property to promote the general welfare, inherent in sovereignty and coextensive with self-protection. Its exercise may impose restraints on individual rights but is not unlimited; it must not be arbitrary or unreasonable, must serve the public good, and must not be used to further private interests at the expense of the community. Official acts enjoy a presumption of validity, displaceable only by clear and convincing evidence of illegality or abuse of discretion.

Equal Protection Framework for Classifications

The Court applied traditional equal protection principles under the Constitution: classifications are permissible if they (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) are germane to the purpose of the law, (3) are not confined to existing conditions (i.e., have prospective application as necessary), and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Bill of Rights does not mandate absolute identity of treatment where differences legitimately bear on legislative or administrative objectives.

Application to Gender and Occupational Classification

Although Department Order No. 1 applied only to “female contract workers” in domestic and household occupations, the Court found no undue discrimination. The gender-based and occupational classification rested on substantial distinctions supported by the evidence of massive and distinctive maltreatment of female domestic workers abroad — a factual predicate that was not established for male workers. The Court emphasized that the classification was evidence-based, germane to the Order’s purpose (“to enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers”), and equally applicable to all members of the defined class. The prospective (indefinite) nature of the suspension pending review was justified as a stop-gap responsive to ongoing conditions and included criteria and mechanisms for lifting the suspension when adequate safeguards existed.

Scope and Specific Provisions of the Order

The Court examined DOLE’s text and concluded the Order did not effect a universal or absolute ban. It contained enumerated authorized deployment exceptions (e.g., hirings by immediate family of heads of state, senior government officials, diplomatic corps, and employers in countries with bilateral labor agreements or understandings) and special rules for vacationing domestic helpers (permitting return to the same employer to finish an existing contract but covering returnees to new employers by the suspension). The Order also provided that the Secretary of Labor, upon POEA recommendation, could lift the suspension in countries with bilateral agreements or existing protective mechanisms.

Right to Travel and Its Qualification

The Court held that the deployment ban did not impermissibly impair the constitutional right to travel. The right to travel is not absolute and is subject to limitations for public safety and as may be provided by law. Department Order No. 1 was a valid qualification of that right in pursuance of the state’s protective duty toward its overseas workers.

Delegation of Police Power and Rule-Making Authority

Acknowledging that police power is traditionally legislative, the Court found no constitutional infirmity in delegatin

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