Title
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
Case
G.R. No. L-31195
Decision Date
Jun 5, 1973
Workers staged a mass demonstration despite company warnings, violating the CBA. CIR ruled it an unfair labor practice; SC upheld dismissal due to late appeal, emphasizing strict procedural compliance.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 148106)

Key Dates

March 1–4, 1969: union decision and demonstration; March 3, 1969: two meetings between company and union representatives (about 11:00 A.M. and 5:00 P.M.); March 4, 1969 (9:50 A.M.): union cablegram reiterating request to excuse day-shift employees; March 4, 1969: company filed charge with CIR; April 18, 1969: corresponding complaint by CIR prosecutors; September 15, 1969: CIR judge’s order finding PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and declaring eight officers to have lost employee status; September 22–23, 1969: notice of that order received; September 29, 1969: motion for reconsideration filed (two days late under CIR rules); October 9, 1969: CIR en banc dismissed motion for being pro forma; October 31, 1969: petition for relief filed in CIR; November 3, 1969: notice of appeal to the Supreme Court; June 5, 1973: Supreme Court decision.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Framework

Constitutional framework: the Constitution in force at the time (principles invoked include protections for freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and the right to petition for redress of grievances, as well as State directives on promotion of social justice and protection of labor). Statutory/regulatory instruments: Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act) — particularly Section 3 (right to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection) and Section 4(a-1) (unfair labor practices defined as interference, restraint or coercion of those rights); other statutory/regulatory provisions discussed in the record include Sections 13–15 of R.A. 875 as referenced in the charge, the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) clause “No Lockout – No Strike” (Article XXIV), the CIR Rules (Sections 15–17 governing motions for reconsideration and periods for filing), and Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (CIR charter) authorizing the CIR to act according to justice and equity without undue regard to technicalities.

Factual Background (concise)

The union gave prior notice to the employer of a planned demonstration on March 4, 1969 protesting alleged abuses by Pasig police. Management met with union representatives on March 3 and warned that first-shift and regular-shift employees who failed to report for work without leave would be dismissed for violating the CBA and committing an illegal strike; management acknowledged the constitutional right to demonstrate but insisted on avoiding undue prejudice to company operations. Despite company warnings, roughly 400 union members — including many first-shift employees and union officers — joined the demonstration. The company filed an unfair labor practice charge with the CIR alleging violation of R.A. 875 and the CBA; the CIR ultimately found the union guilty of bargaining in bad faith and ordered that certain officers had lost employee status.

CIR Decision and Procedural Posture

Judge Joaquin M. Salvador (CIR) entered an order (September 15, 1969) finding PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and declaring eight named union officers to have lost employee status (effectively dismissing them). Petitioners received the order and, after a lapse beyond the five-day period fixed by CIR rules, filed a motion for reconsideration. The CIR en banc dismissed that motion as pro forma for late filing (October 9, 1969). Petitioners sought relief from the CIR’s dismissal of the motion for reconsideration and then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court addressed, inter alia: (1) whether the mass demonstration, conducted to protest alleged police abuses and not directed against the employer, was protected activity under the Constitution and R.A. 875; (2) whether the temporary stoppage of work resulting from the demonstration constituted an illegal strike or an unfair labor practice by the union; (3) whether management’s threats to dismiss workers who participated constituted interference with the protected concerted activities of employees under Section 4(a-1) of R.A. 875; and (4) whether the CIR’s dismissal of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration under its rules (for lateness) should bar judicial relief where constitutional rights were implicated.

Majority’s Analysis — Constitutional Freedoms and Their Primacy

The Court emphasized the centrality of the dignity of the human person and the special place of freedoms of expression, assembly and petition in the constitutional Bill of Rights. It held that the demonstration was a political/civic protest directed at alleged abuses of municipal police and was not aimed at the employer; therefore it was an exercise of free expression, peaceful assembly and petition for redress. The Court stressed the primacy of those human rights over property interests: while property and business interests may justify some regulation under a lesser test, restrictions on human rights require a stricter showing (e.g., a grave and immediate danger to be prevented). The Court found no showing of such danger here and concluded that the union’s concerted demonstration — aimed at mutual aid and protection against police abuses — fell squarely within the protections of Section 3 of R.A. 875.

Majority’s Analysis — Employer Conduct as Unfair Labor Practice

The majority found that the employer’s expressed warning that first-shift and regular-shift workers who joined the demonstration without prior leave would be dismissed operated as coercion and interference with the employees’ statutory and constitutional rights. That refusal to permit participation in a demonstration aimed at police abuses, and the subsequent dismissal of union officers, amounted to an unfair labor practice under Section 4(a-1) read with Section 3. The Court criticized the employer’s failure to intercede with local authorities on behalf of its employees and regarded the company’s insistence on protecting its property interests (by preserving operations) as insufficient to override the employees’ constitutional and statutory liberties in the circumstances.

Majority’s Analysis — Relation Between the CBA and Fundamental Rights; Lack of Proof of Company Loss

The Court rejected the CIR’s expansive construction that the CBA’s working-shift stipulations denied employees the right to stage a demonstration during working hours. It explained that the CBA could not be interpreted to authoritatively strip employees of constitutional freedoms without substantial and specific justification. The majority observed that the CIR did not make a finding of actual loss sustained by the company and that the company presented no proof of material damage or lost contracts; indeed, the Court noted that the company saved wages and operating costs for the single day. The Court concluded that dismissal of officers for a one-day absence to participate in a political protest was a disproportionate and vindictive sanction.

Majority’s Analysis — Procedural Rules, Jurisdiction and Relief from Final Orders

The majority held that both the employer and the CIR had trenched upon the petitioners’ constitutional rights and that such violation ousted the CIR of jurisdiction, rendering the orders null and void. The Court found that the CIR rule fixing a five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration (and related ten-day period for filing supporting arguments) was a procedural regulation promulgated under delegation and that, as applied, the rule worked to nullify constitutionally protected activity. Because a constitutional right may be raised at any stage when necessary to resolve a case, and because the CIR is charged by its charter (Commonwealth Act No. 103, Sec. 20) to act according to justice and equity without undue regard to technicalities, the Court exercised its power to set aside the CIR orders and to suspend application of the CIR’s procedural rule in the peculiar circumstances of this case. The majority also relied on the Court’s inherent authority to suspend rules when required by justice.

Holding and Relief Ordered by the Supreme Court (Majority)

The Supreme Court (Makasiar, J., writing) set aside the CIR orders dated September 15 and October 9, 1969, and ordered reinstatement of the eight petitioners (named union leaders) with full back pay from the date of separation until reinstatement, less one day’s pay (to account for the one-day absence) and less any earnings obtained elsewhere during the period of separation. Costs were awarded against the private respondent (Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.). Justices Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando and Esguerra concurred; Chief Justice Makalintal took no part.

Concurring Opinion (Justice Teehankee) — Agreement on Merits and Relief

Justice Teehankee concurred in the result and emphasized that the CIR’s finding of bargaining in bad faith and the dismissal of union officers constituted grave abuse of discretion. He agreed that the demonstration was not a strike, that the motion for reconsideration had been dismissed in a manner constituting a manifest act of grave abuse, and that

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