Title
Perez vs. Sandiganbayan
Case
G.R. No. 245862
Decision Date
Nov 3, 2020
Mayor Perez faced graft charges over a 2001 waste management MOA; SC ruled in his favor, citing prescription and inordinate delay in proceedings.
nullify criminal charges
offense has prescribed
dismiss case

Case Summary (G.R. No. 245862)

Factual Background

Petitioner Hermis Carlos Perez served as Municipal Mayor of Biñan, Laguna when the Municipality executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Etsaw Consultancy and Construction of Environmental Technologies International Corporation of the Philippines (ECCE) on November 12, 2001, to employ ECCE’s Hydromex Technology for solid waste management. An amended MOA dated March 25, 2002 changed price and payment terms, reducing the contract price from P75,000,000 to P71,000,000 and accelerating payments. The Sangguniang Bayan of Biñan approved the mayor’s authority to enter into the MOA by Kapasiyahan Blg. 239-(2001) on October 1, 2001. The complaint filed April 27, 2016 alleged absence of public bidding, ECCE’s inadequate capitalization and technical capacity, and harm to residents from ECCE’s dumpsite operations.

Proceedings before the Ombudsman

Upon the April 27, 2016 complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman directed response affidavits on October 13, 2016. Perez filed a counter-affidavit on December 20, 2016. On February 22, 2018, the OMB Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer found probable cause to charge Perez with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, while dismissing charges for malversation, Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, and violations of R.A. No. 9003 for lack of merit. Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales approved the finding on February 28, 2018, and a motion for partial reconsideration filed by Perez was denied on June 7, 2018.

Information and Filing with the Sandiganbayan

An Information charging Perez with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 was prepared July 19, 2018, approved by the Ombudsman, and filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 5, 2018. The Information alleged that Perez, acting as municipal mayor, willfully and with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence, gave unwarranted benefit to ECCE by awarding the solid waste management contract despite irregularities including absence of public bidding, lack of PBAC recommendation, and failure to conduct due diligence regarding ECCE’s financial and technical qualifications.

Motion to Quash and the People’s Opposition

On October 31, 2018, Perez moved to quash the Information on the ground of prescription under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, which prescribes offenses under that Act after fifteen years. Perez asserted that the alleged offense occurred between November 12, 2001 and March 25, 2002 and that the Information filed October 5, 2018 was therefore time-barred. Perez also invoked his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The People of the Philippines opposed the motion, arguing that prescription is reckoned from discovery under the discovery rule and that the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman on April 27, 2016 effectively tolled prescription; the People further contended that no inordinate delay violated Perez’s right to speedy disposition.

Rulings of the Sandiganbayan

In its January 29, 2019 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash and ordered arraignment. The court held that the applicable prescriptive period was fifteen years because R.A. No. 10910 took effect only on July 21, 2016, and that prescription commenced from discovery by operation of the blameless ignorance doctrine in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. The Sandiganbayan further ruled that the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman interrupted prescription. On procedural grounds, the Sandiganbayan treated Perez’s motion for reconsideration of its January 29, 2019 Resolution as late-filed under A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC and, in its March 8, 2019 Resolution, denied reconsideration and affirmed its earlier denial on the merits.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed two issues: (a) whether the offense charged against Perez had prescribed, and (b) whether Perez’s constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases was violated.

Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration

The Court first addressed whether Perez timely filed his motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s January 29, 2019 Resolution. The Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial required that a motion for reconsideration of a meritorious motion be filed within five calendar days. Perez alleged receipt of the January 29 Resolution on February 4, 2019 and filed reconsideration on February 13, 2019, beyond the five-day rule. The Sandiganbayan therefore deemed the motion late. The Supreme Court acknowledged belated filing but invoked judicial liberalism in meritorious cases where liberty or property may be deprived and proceeded to decide the petition on the merits rather than dismiss on technicality.

Applicable Prescriptive Period

The Court held that the prescriptive period for the offense charged was fifteen years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 because R.A. No. 10910’s extension to twenty years took effect only on July 21, 2016 and therefore could not be retroactively applied to crimes committed prior to its passage.

When Prescription Began to Run

The Court analyzed Act No. 3326’s Section 2 and the blameless ignorance exception. The Court recognized that, as a general rule, prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the crime, but that the discovery rule applies where the offense is not known at the time and the injured party had no reasonable means of knowing of the violation. The Court explained that the blameless ignorance principle has been applied notably in cases involving behest loans and similar secretive schemes. The Court rejected the Sandiganbayan’s application of the discovery rule to this case. It reasoned that the Local Government Code requires posting of contracts and fiscal summaries and that legible copies of municipal contracts and summaries of revenues and disbursements were publicly accessible, providing reasonable means to discover the MOA and any irregularities. The Court concluded that the offense was discoverable upon execution of the MOA on November 12, 2001, and therefore prescription began to run from that date.

Interruption of Prescription

The Court addressed whether the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman on April 27, 2016 interrupted prescription. Although Perez contended that only judicial proceedings tolled prescription under Act No. 3326, the Court followed precedent holding that the commencement of preliminary investigation proceedings before the Ombudsman interrupts prescription. Citing People v. Pangilinan and Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, the Court observed that the historical purpose of Act No. 3326 was to suspend prescription upon institution of proceedings for investigation and punishment and that modern preliminary investigations before the Ombudsman are equivalent to the proceedings contemplated by the statute. Because the complaint to the Ombudsman was filed within fifteen years from the commission of the alleged offense, the Court held that the prescriptive period had been interrupted and that the Information filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 5, 2018 was not time-barred.

Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases — Legal Standard

The Court applied settled doctrine on the right to speedy disposition and due process. It reiterated that the right to speedy disposition of cases differs from the right to speedy trial and that the accused may invoke the former before any tribunal. The Court adopted the guidelines in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, which direct courts to: determine when the right was invoked; allocate burdens of proof depending on whether the invocation was within prescribed periods; consider complexity and volume of evidence; examine whether delay was malicious or caused by the defense; and require that the accused timely raise the right.

Application to this Case — Inordinate Delay Found

The Court found that there was inordinate delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution of the preliminary investigation. The Rules require that an investigating officer determine sufficiency of grounds within ten days after investigation under Section 3(f), Rule 112, and Rule 112, Section 4 requires further dates for review by the Ombudsman or deputy. After Perez filed his counter-affidavit on December 20, 2016, the Ombudsman did not resolve the matter until February 22, 2018; thus the preliminary investigation lingered for one year, two months, and two days beyond the ten-day period. The Court held that institutional constraints do not alone justify such delay. The prosecution bore the burden to justify the delay once it exceeded prescribed periods; it failed to show that the complexity or volume of evidence required the protracted interval, and it did not demonstrate absence of prejudice to Perez. The Court rejected the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that Perez had impliedly waived his right by not moving for early resolution, explaining that it was the Ombudsman’s duty to act within prescribed periods and that an accused need not prod the prosecuting body to perform its positive duty. The Court further noted that Perez filed a timely motion to quash immediately after the Information was filed, which contradicted any suggestion of acquiescence.

Disposition and Relief

Because the prosecution could not justify the inordinate delay in the Ombudsman’s preliminary investigation and because Perez did not forfeit his right to speedy disposition, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion i

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.

About Privacy Terms