Title
Peran vs. Presiding Judge, Branch II, Court of 1st Instance of Sorsogon
Case
G.R. No. L-57259
Decision Date
Oct 13, 1983
A dispute over possession of unregistered land in Sorsogon, involving ownership transfers, jurisdictional issues, and possession by tolerance, led to the Supreme Court ruling in favor of the petitioner, reinstating the lower court's decision for eviction.
possession
unregistered residential land
legal battle
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-57259)

Factual Background

The land originally belonged to Jose Evasco. On December 29, 1950, Jose Evasco executed a “Reparticion Ex-Trajudicial” partitioning his properties among his five heirs. The subject property was allotted to his son, Alejandro Evasco, who had it surveyed in 1956 and declared it in his name under Tax Declaration No. 1900.

Later, Alejandro Evasco sold the property to Jose E. Torella on December 31, 1972, after which the buyer declared it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 5157. Jose E. Torella in turn sold the land to Jose Enriquez Sabater on July 10, 1977, and Sabater declared it in his name under Tax Declaration No. 7127. Petitioner then acquired the land by purchase from Sabater on December 27, 1978, and thereafter declared it under Tax Declaration No. 7310. The sale was recorded in the Register of Deeds Office of Sorsogon on January 3, 1979, consistent with Sec. 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344.

Sometime in January 1979, petitioner personally demanded that private respondents remove the improvements and vacate the premises, although their house stood on a portion of the lot. Despite this confrontation, private respondents refused. Negotiations before the Municipal Mayor and later before the Municipal Judge of Bulusan-Barcelona failed. Private respondents thereafter asserted in their pleadings that they were lawful possessors for more than twenty (20) years over the portion occupied, claiming their connection as descendants of Jose Evasco.

Filing and Proceedings in the Municipal Circuit Court

On February 8, 1979, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Illegal Detainer before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona. Petitioner alleged, in substance, that private respondents were mere squatters, had prevented petitioner from entering the property and had deprived him of possession, and that their refusal to vacate had caused or contributed to erosion of the land to petitioner’s prejudice.

Private respondents answered by denying the material allegations and by asserting that they were in possession as lawful possessors for more than twenty (20) years of the portion formerly belonging to Jose Evasco, grandfather of Encarnacion. They also contended that petitioner had no right to eject them.

On September 1, 1979, the Municipal Circuit Court rendered a decision ordering private respondents to vacate the lot in question, return possession to petitioner, reimburse petitioner P300.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, and pay costs. Private respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied on November 12, 1979.

Appellate Review by the Court of First Instance

Private respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II. The appellate court reversed and dismissed the case on March 28, 1980. It held that the Municipal Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was filed only on February 4, 1979, which it characterized as beyond the one-year period of limitation. It anchored the reckoning of the cause of action on the sale by Alejandro Evasco to Jose E. Torella on December 31, 1972, rather than on the demand to vacate made by petitioner.

The appellate court further ruled that, in an illegal detainer case, the sole issue was physical possession, and thus “whoever has prior possession, no matter in what character, is protected by law.” Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner then appealed directly to the Supreme Court on a question of law, presenting as the lone issue whether the appellate court erred in: (a) how it counted the one-year period for jurisdiction; and (b) its assumption that “prior possession in whatever character is protected by law.”

The Parties’ Contentions in the Supreme Court

Petitioner maintained that the appellate court misapplied the limitation period for unlawful detainer and wrongly treated the sale date as the point from which to count. Petitioner emphasized that his demand to vacate in January 1979 preceded the filing of the ejectment case, making the action timely under Rule 70.

Private respondents, by contrast, relied on their claimed long possession and on the theory that physical possession alone, without regard to legal character, determines protection in unlawful detainer proceedings. They also denied petitioner’s right to eject them.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court examined the governing principles for forcible entry and unlawful detainer and applied them to the established factual milieu. It began by noting private respondents’ admission that the land had originally belonged to Jose Evasco. The Court also found that tax declarations covering private respondents’ house identified it as built on land owned by Jose Evasco under Tax No. 1599, while the property had later been adjudicated to Alejandro Evasco through Jose Evasco’s “Reparticion Ex-Trajudicial.” Since the partition had allotted the subject land to Alejandro, private respondent Encarnacion—claimed as a granddaughter of Jose Evasco—could not lay claim to the land as against petitioner’s predecessors in interest derived from that partition.

The Court further found that private respondents failed to prove their title or right to possess the portion they occupied. The records showed that no concrete evidence was introduced by private respondents on this point. The Court also regarded as significant that the validity of the “Reparticion Ex-trajudicial” adjudicating the lot to Alejandro had never been challenged.

On the character of private respondents’ occupation, the Court held that, at most, their possession was by mere tolerance of petitioner’s predecessors in interest. The Court stressed that possession by tolerance is lawful, but it becomes illegal upon the owner’s demand to vacate when the possessor refuses to comply. It characterized such a possessor by tolerance as bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, and it held that a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy upon refusal. The Court added that it was not necessary that there be a formal lease agreement to sustain an unlawful detainer case against a possessor by tolerance. It also held that prior physical possession by petitioner was not indispensable to file the action.

In light of these circumstances, the Court rejected the appellate court’s broad statement that, because the issue is only physical possession, “whoever has prior possession, no matter in what character, is protected by law.” The Court explained that this rule does not fit when possession is by tolerance and has become illegal upon demand.

On the limitation period and jurisdiction, the Supreme Court invoked Sec. 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court, which requires that a forcible entry and unlawful detainer action be brought within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. It held that the one-year period commences from the time of demand to vacate, and when several demands are made, the period is counted from the last letter of demand. It also stated that demand may be personal or in writing under Sec. 2, Rule 70.

The Court treated petitioner’s demand in January 1979 as the operative point and noted that the ejectment suit was instituted on February 8, 1979. Accordingly, it concluded t

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