Case Summary (G.R. No. 215746)
Petitioner
The People of the Philippines, through the provincial fiscal, appealed the dismissal of the information charging a violation of Article 195, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code (permitting and maintaining the game of panchong or paikiu).
Respondent
Yu Hai alias “Haya,” accused of permitting and maintaining a game of hazard (panchong/paikiu) in Caloocan on or about June 26, 1954.
Key Dates
Alleged commission of offense: June 26, 1954. Information filed/accusation before the Justice of the Peace: October 22, 1954. Justice of the Peace order sustaining motion to quash: December 24, 1954. Decision by the Supreme Court (this opinion): August 15, 1956.
Applicable Law
- Article 195, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code: the charged offense (punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200).
- Article 90, Revised Penal Code: prescriptive periods of crimes (providing, inter alia, that light offenses prescribe in two months; crimes punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten years; those punishable by arresto mayor prescribe in five years; special provisions for libel, oral defamation, etc.).
- Article 9, Revised Penal Code: classification of felonies into grave, less grave, and light; defines light felonies as those for which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200 or both is provided.
- Article 26, Revised Penal Code: classification of fines (afflictive if > P6,000; correctional if P200–P6,000 inclusive; light if < P200).
Facts
The information charged Yu Hai with permitting and maintaining a gambling game (panchong/paikiu) allegedly occurring June 26, 1954. The defendant moved to quash the information on grounds of multiplicity and prescription; the Justice of the Peace sustained the motion on prescription grounds, treating the offense as a “light offense” prescribing in two months. The provincial fiscal appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed dismissal. The provincial fiscal then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Procedural History
- Justice of the Peace quashed the information (Dec. 24, 1954).
- Court of First Instance affirmed dismissal.
- The provincial fiscal appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General argued that the offense should be treated as punishable by a correctional penalty where the maximum fine is P200 and therefore prescribed in ten years under Article 90.
Issue Presented
What is the prescriptive period for the offense charged under Article 195—specifically, whether it is a “light offense” that prescribes in two months under Article 90 (by virtue of Article 9’s definition), or whether Article 26’s classification of a P200 fine as a correctional penalty should extend the prescriptive period to ten years.
Court’s Analysis — General Approach
The Court considered the statutory scheme as a whole. Article 90 specifies distinct prescriptive periods and refers to “light offenses” as a class that prescribes in two months. Article 9 supplies the definition of “light felonies” (and thus “light offenses”) for purposes of classification. Article 26 deals solely with the classification of fines as penalties (afflictive, correctional, or light) when imposed as a principal penalty and does not purport to define the class of offenses for prescription purposes.
Application of Articles 90, 9, and 26
The Court held that Article 9’s classification governs what constitutes a “light offense” for prescription under Article 90. Because Article 195 prescribes the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200, the offense squarely falls within Article 9’s definition of a light felony (arresto menor or fine not exceeding P200). Article 26’s taxonomy of fines pertains to the classification of the fine itself when imposed as the principal penalty, not to the classification of the offense for purposes of prescription. Therefore Article 26 does not control the prescriptive period.
Rejection of the Solicitor General’s Argument and Absurdity Rationale
The Court found the Solicitor General’s argument—that a maximum fine of P200 should be treated as a correctional penalty under Article 26, producing a ten-year prescription—untenable for several reasons: (1) Article 90 entrusts the meaning of “light offenses” to Article 9, so Article 9 must govern; (2) accepting the Solicitor General’s view would yield absurd and anomalous results, such as a one-peso difference in the maximum fine producing a nine-year and ten-month difference in prescription; (3) it would make the prescriptive period depend on which alternative penalty the court might eventually impose, which is impossible to ascertain before conviction and would preclude prosecution where the offense may already have prescribed; (4) it would i
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 215746)
Facts of the Case
- On or about June 26, 1954, Yu Hai alias "Haya" allegedly permitted and maintained the game of panchong or paikiu, described as a game of hazard, in the municipality of Caloocan.
- The accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan on October 22, 1954, for violation of Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
- The accused moved to quash the information on two grounds: that the information charged more than one offense and that the criminal action had already been extinguished by prescription.
- The Justice of the Peace Court, by order dated December 24, 1954, sustained the motion to quash on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense which, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribed in two months.
- The provincial fiscal appealed to the Court of First Instance of the Province, which affirmed the order dismissing the information.
- The provincial fiscal appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Procedural History
- Complaint filed in Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan: October 22, 1954.
- Motion to quash sustained by Justice of the Peace Court: December 24, 1954.
- Provincial fiscal appealed to the Court of First Instance; the Court of First Instance affirmed dismissal.
- Provincial fiscal appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-9598).
- Decision of the Supreme Court rendered August 15, 1956, authored by Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Central Legal Issue
- What is the period of prescription for the offense charged under Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code — specifically whether the offense is a "light offense" prescribing in two months, or whether it is subject to a longer prescriptive period because the maximum fine of P200 should be classified as a correctional penalty under Article 26 and thus prescribe in ten years under Article 90.
Statutory Provisions Relevant to the Decision (as cited)
- Article 90, Revised Penal Code:
- Prescribes the periods of prescription for crimes.
- States that those punishable by a correctional penalty prescribe in ten years, with the exception that those punishable by arresto mayor prescribe in five years.
- Specifies particular crimes with shorter prescription (libel two years; oral defamation and slander by deed six months).
- Concludes with: "Light offenses prescribe in two months."
- Article 9, Revised Penal Code:
- Classifies felonies into grave, less grave, and light felonies.
- Defines "less grave felonies" as those punished with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional.
- Defines "light felonies" as infractions for which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both is provided.
- Article 26, Revised Penal Code:
- Classifies fines, when imposed as a principal penalty, into afflictive (exceeding P6,000), correctional (not exceeding P6,000 but not less than P200), and light (less than P200).
Parties' Contentions
- Plaintiff-Appellant (The People / Provincial Fiscal / Solicitor General):
- Argued that because the crime charged may be punished by a maximum fine of P200, Article 26 classifies that fine as a correctional penalty and therefore, under Article 90, the prescriptive period should be ten years.
- Defendant-Appellee (Yu Hai alias "Haya"):
- Contended that the offense charged is a "