G.R. No. 176946 - Tamayo vs. Senora

Case Summary (G.R. No. 176946)

Factual Background

The information alleged that YU HAI ALIAS "HAYA" permitted the game of panchong or paikiu, a game of hazard, and acted as maintainer thereof in the municipality of Caloocan on or about June 26, 1954. The offense was charged under Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes punishment by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.

Motion to Quash and Lower Court Rulings

The accused moved to quash the information on the grounds that it charged more than one offense and that the criminal action had prescribed. The Justice of the Peace Court sustained the motion on December 24, 1954 on the ground that the offense was a light offense which, under Article 90, prescribed in two months. The provincial fiscal appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the dismissal. The provincial fiscal appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue Presented

The sole issue before the Court was the applicable prescriptive period for the offense charged, namely whether the crime prescribed in two months as a light offense under Article 90 in relation to Article 9, or whether it prescribed in ten years pursuant to Article 90 by reason of the maximum fine of P200 being, under Article 26, a correctional penalty.

Parties' Contentions

The lower courts treated the crime as a light offense within the meaning of Article 9, and therefore as prescribing in two months under Article 90. The Solicitor General contended that because the crime may be punished by a maximum fine of P200, that fine, when considered under Article 26, is a correctional penalty, and that offenses punishable by a correctional penalty prescribe in ten years under Article 90.

Ruling

The Court affirmed the dismissal of the information. The Court held that the offense was a light offense under Article 9 and that, under Article 90, light offenses prescribe in two months. The decision appealed from was affirmed, with costs de oficio. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista, Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concurred.

Legal Reasoning

The Court began with the language of Article 90, which provides varying prescriptive periods and expressly states that "light offenses prescribe in two months." The Court looked to Article 9 for the definition of "light felonies," which it found to be controlling. Article 9 defines light felonies as those infractions of law punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both. The Court distinguished Article 26, which classifies fines, when imposed as a principal penalty, into afflictive, correctional, or light fines according to their amounts. The Court explained that Article 26 concerns the classification of a fine as a kind of penalty and does not redefine the species of offenses for purposes of prescription. The question was one of the prescription of the crime, not of the penalty imposed.

The Court rejected the Solicitor General's contention as producing absurd and unworkable results. Under that contention a difference of one peso in the maximum fine would change the prescriptive period by nine years and ten months. The Court observed that the proper prescriptive period could not be ascertained until a court had determined which alternative penalty to impose, which could not occur if the offense had already prescribed. The Court further noted the incongruity that would result if an offense punishable alternatively by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200 were deemed less grave merely because of a technical classification under Article 26, while an offense punishable by both arresto menor and a fine not exceeding P200 would remain a light offense under Article 9. The Court relied on the rule that criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused, and cited People v. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679, for the proposition that the law-maker did not intend to raise the prescriptive period for certain light offenses over others. Applying these principles, the Court held that the definition in Article 9 governs the prescriptive rule of Article 90.

Application to the Present Case

Because the offense charged

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 176946)

Parties and Procedural Posture

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES was the plaintiff and appellant through the provincial fiscal who prosecuted the case below.
YU HAI alias "HAYA" was the defendant and appellee charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan.
The Justice of the Peace Court quashed the information on December 24, 1954, on the ground of prescription.
The provincial fiscal appealed the quashal to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the dismissal of the information.
The provincial fiscal then appealed directly to this Court, where the Solicitor General argued for the People.
Justice Reyes, J.B.L., delivered the decision of the Court.

Key Factual Allegations

The information, filed on October 22, 1954, charged YU HAI alias "HAYA" with permitting the game of panchong or paikiu and acting as maintainer thereof.
The information alleged the offense occurred on or about June 26, 1954.
The accused moved to quash the information on the grounds that it charged more than one offense and that criminal liability had been extinguished by prescription.
The Justice of the Peace sustained the motion to quash on the theory that the offense was a light offense which prescribed in two months.

Statutory Framework

Article 90, Revised Penal Code provides the prescription periods and states that offenses punishable by a correctional penalty prescribe in ten years, those punishable by arresto mayor prescribe in five years, libel prescribes in two years, oral defamation and slander by deed prescribe in six months, and light offenses prescribe in two months.
Article 9, Revised Penal Code classifies felonies into grave, less grave, and light, and defines light felonies as those infractions for which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both is provided.
Article 26, Revised Penal Code classifies a fine imposed as principal penalty as afflictive if it exceeds 6,000 pesos, correctional if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos, and light if it is less than 200 pesos.
Article 195, Revised Penal Code (sub-paragraph 2)