Title
People vs. Victor y Penis
Case
G.R. No. 127904
Decision Date
Dec 5, 2002
Accused-appellant convicted of simple rape and acts of lasciviousness against his stepdaughter; penalties and damages modified due to insufficient proof of stepfather relationship.
qualified rape
acts of lasciviousness
stepfather

Case Summary (G.R. No. 209415-17)

Factual Background

The prosecution presented Marilyn Villanueva, who testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the rape. She narrated that the accused lived with her mother, Julieta Corpuz, in a house in Payatas, Quezon City, owned by Pinong dela Cruz. Marilyn stated that the accused was usually drunk and jobless, and she and her sister lived with her mother and the accused, including the accused’s son.

Marilyn testified that in May 1996, while her mother was out, the accused gained entry into her room. He was armed with a knife, threatened her not to shout or run, and warned that he would chase her if she resisted. Marilyn said she was petrified and did not move. The accused then undressed her, removed his clothes, pinned her down, held her legs apart, and inserted his penis into her genitalia, making the pumping motions of sexual intercourse. She added that he kissed her and mashed her breasts. She begged him to stop, but he did not. After satiation, the accused warned her not to disclose the incident, threatening to kill her, and she kept silent because of fear and because he was constantly present in the house. She further said that the accused continued to torment her thereafter by persistently kissing her and touching her private parts.

Marilyn testified that when the torment continued, she attempted to avoid encounters by staying at the back of the house for long periods. She later told her mother about the sexual abuse, but according to her, her mother only told her to avoid the accused.

She related that on August 5, 1996, while they were alone, the accused touched her private parts again, kissed her, smashed her breasts, and touched her thighs and legs. She recoiled, ran away, and sought refuge with her sister Raquel, who was then working as a housemaid. Marilyn reported the incident to the sister. A companion, Pinong dela Cruz, brought Marilyn to the police station to report the accused’s sexual assault and lewd acts. The record reflected that the accused also abused Raquel. On August 7, 1996, Marilyn executed an Affidavit-Complaint before SPO1 Nido Gevero of the Central Police District Command, Quezon City, with assistance from DSWD personnel, narrating her ordeal and stating her age as thirteen.

The prosecution also presented Dr. Rosaline O. Cosidon, the Medico-Legal Officer, who conducted a genital examination on August 6, 1996 and prepared Medico-Legal Report No. 1178-96. She testified that Marilyn’s hymen had a deep healed laceration at 3 o’clock and shallow healed lacerations at 5 and 7 o’clock, and that the subject was in a non-virgin state physically. She further opined that the deep healed laceration could have been caused by a blunt instrument such as an erect hard penis. The prosecution and accused-appellant stipulated in open court that Marilyn was thirteen years old when the offenses were committed; thus, the Court dispensed with the presentation of the birth certificate.

Trial Court Proceedings and Evidence

At arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. The accused-appellant testified in his defense and denied the accusations of rape and acts of lasciviousness.

He claimed that he and Julieta Corpuz were married and that she had three daughters by another man, namely Marife (twenty-one), Raquel (seventeen), and Marilyn (thirteen). He averred that Marilyn and her sisters stayed in another place because of their studies prior to the period relevant to the accusations. He insisted that he could not have abused Marilyn because, in his view, he treated her as a stepdaughter. He stated that their relationship was good and that he even gave financial support for her education.

With respect to acts of lasciviousness, he denied subjecting Marilyn to lewd conduct. He testified that he could not have committed the acts because Marilyn was residing with her sister Raquel, who was employed in Quezon City. He explained that the charges were filed as retaliation for scolding Marilyn for arriving home late. He also testified that Marilyn was not a virgin because she was raped in 1995 by a third cousin, Mon Oliva, and he undertook to present a marriage contract but did not adduce it.

The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty in both cases. For qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the trial court imposed the death penalty and ordered the accused to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages to Marilyn. For acts of lasciviousness under Article 336, the trial court imposed an indeterminate penalty ranging from six months and one day of prision correccional minimum to four years and two months of prision correccional medium, and ordered payment of P120,000.00 as moral damages.

The Parties' Contentions on Appeal

On automatic review, the accused-appellant argued principally that the trial court erred in imposing the extreme penalty of death because the relationship between him and Marilyn’s mother was allegedly not proven with certainty. He maintained that he and Julieta Corpuz were only live-in partners, not legally married, and that the information alleged his role as stepfather, which would require proof of a valid marriage between him and the parent of the victim.

The Solicitor General, in contrast, argued that the evidence showed that accused-appellant was indeed Marilyn’s stepfather. It pointed to Marilyn’s testimony describing the relationship and to the accused’s own admission during testimony that he was married to Julieta. The Solicitor General further contended that the accused-appellant could not rely on People vs. Juan Manggasin because, unlike that case, the accused and the mother of the offended party were not necessarily the same in the proof on relationship.

As to the charge of acts of lasciviousness, the accused-appellant argued that the acts complained of did not constitute the felony because they were allegedly not lewd. He also contended that his conduct should, at most, amount to a lesser offense such as unjust vexation. The Solicitor General maintained that lewdness was present, that intimidation need not be irresistible, and that the accused’s stepfather status enabled the compulsion that subdued the offended party’s will. The Solicitor General also argued that the penalty imposed by the trial court for acts of lasciviousness was erroneous.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Court examined the rape case through the lens that, where minority and a qualifying relationship concur, the penalty may be raised to death. It reiterated that the minority of the victim and the offender’s relationship to the victim are special qualifying circumstances that must be alleged in the information and must be proved conclusively and indubitably, lest the offense be treated as simple rape with the lower statutory penalty.

The Court noted that the information alleged minority together with the stepfather-stepdaughter relationship. It held that the stepfather-stepdaughter relationship necessarily presupposes a legitimate relationship, which in turn requires a valid marriage between the offender and the parent of the victim. It observed that the prosecution failed to adduce the marriage contract between the accused and Julieta on its evidence-in-chief. The prosecution relied only on the accused-appellant’s testimony and admission that he was married. The Court ruled that such declaration was not conclusive proof of legal marriage. It also held that the prosecution could not rely on the disputable presumption that cohabitation establishes marriage, because in the case of a qualifying circumstance in rape, the relationship must be proved beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself.

Accordingly, the Court held that although the prosecution proved that the accused used a knife to intimidate Marilyn and force her to submit, the qualifying circumstance of the stepfather relationship was not established with the required degree of certainty for the imposition of the supreme penalty. The Court thus reduced the offense from qualified rape to simple rape, imposing reclusion perpetua instead of death.

The Court also addressed additional elements relevant to damages and civil liability. It reasoned that the use of a deadly weapon in rape is a qualifying circumstance that requires proper allegation in the information for it to justify elevation to the higher penalty. Although the trial court treated the knife as qualifying for penalty, the Court found that such circumstance was not alleged in the rape information; thus, the penalty remained reclusion perpetua. It further noted that the trial court did not award civil indemnity ex delicto for rape, and the Court reiterated that in simple rape, the offended party is entitled to civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000.00.

With respect to exemplary damages, the Court invoked the ruling that an aggravating or qualifying circumstance—whether ordinary or qualifying—should entitle the offended party to exemplary damages within the ambit of Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, even if the information or complaint did not allege it as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, particularly considering that civil liabilities already incurred prior to the effectivity of the procedural rule should not be adversely affected. It thus ordered exemplary damages of P25,000.00.

On the acts of lasciviousness charge, the Court addressed whether the prosecution proved the elements under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. It reiterated the statutory elements: (one) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness, and (two) it is done under circumstances such as force or intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconsciousness, or when the offended party is under twelve years of age. The Court emphasized that whether conduct is lewd must be determined from the circumstance

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