Title
People vs. Valdez
Case
G.R. No. 127753
Decision Date
Dec 11, 2000
Marcelo Valdez was shot by Domingo Valdez in 1995; victim identified assailant before dying. Supreme Court upheld murder conviction, reduced penalty to reclusion perpetua, dismissed illegal firearms charge, treating it as aggravating.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 127753)

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, convicted the accused of (1) murder (sentenced to death under R.A. No. 7659) and (2) illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D. No. 1866 (sentenced to reclusion perpetua). The conviction was subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. The accused appealed, asserting insufficiency of proof, misapplication of aggravating and qualifying circumstances, and erroneous separate punishment for illegal possession despite later amendments to P.D. 1866.

Facts: The Shooting Incident

On the evening of October 31, 1995, at about 9:00 p.m., Labrador was lying on a carabao sled under his family’s nipa house conversing with his father Marcelo. Two shots were fired from the western side of the house. Labrador sustained a lacerated wound to the left thumb and index finger and a gunshot wound to the chest/neck area that exited below the right breast; he walked upstairs but later died from cardiopulmonary arrest due to severe hemorrhage. Witnesses heard the victim identify the assailant as the appellant before his death. The assailant fled after firing.

Evidence Establishing Guilt and Causation

Forensic and testimonial evidence established that gunshot wounds caused the victim’s death. The medico-legal autopsy documented external and internal injuries consistent with fatal gunshot trauma and identified the proximate cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage from chest and lumbar gunshot wounds. Multiple eyewitnesses (including the father and the victim) identified appellant as the shooter at or shortly after the shooting. Sworn statements and testimony placed appellant at the scene by identification and by the victim’s declarations.

Identification, Credibility, and Alibi Defenses

The appellant presented alibi testimony saying he was elsewhere from roughly 6:00–9:00 p.m., corroborated by friends and family. The trial court and the Supreme Court found the alibi insufficient because the distance between the alleged alibi site and the crime scene (about one kilometer) did not make presence at the scene impossible; the alibi did not exclude physical presence at the time of the offense. The court assessed credibility in light of the witnesses’ demeanor, contemporaneous sworn statements (reduced to writing on November 1, 1995), illumination from a kerosene lamp, and the brief but clear opportunities for identification. Reasonable doubt requires moral certainty but not absolute certainty; the totality of direct testimony and corroborating circumstantial facts satisfied the required quantum.

Admissibility and Weight of the Victim’s Identifications (Dying Declaration)

The Supreme Court treated the victim’s name-identifying statements as admissible dying declarations under Section 37, Rule 130. The court applied the four traditional requirements: (1) the declarant spoke under consciousness of impending death (inferred from the gravity and nature of the wounds and the victim’s weakened state), (2) the declarant was competent at the time, (3) the declaration concerned the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death, and (4) it was offered in a criminal prosecution for the declarant’s death. The court also explained that third parties who heard the declarant (even if the statement was not directed to them) may testify as to the content of the dying declaration. The fact that some testimony described the declarant as weak but not explicitly saying “I am going to die” did not defeat the element of consciousness of impending death when viewed in context.

Treachery and Other Circumstances: Analysis of Aggravating and Qualifying Factors

The court found treachery present because the victim was shot in a sudden and unexpected manner while lying on the carabao sledge, giving him no chance to defend himself—thus satisfying the essential element of treachery (employing means, methods, or forms in the execution of the offense which would give the victim no opportunity to defend). By contrast, the Supreme Court refused to uphold evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and nocturnity as aggravating circumstances for lack of specific factual basis: there was no proof of cool reflection for premeditation; any alleged superior strength overlapped and was absorbed by treachery; and there was no demonstration that the offender specifically sought the cover of night to perpetrate the crime.

Treatment of Illegal Possession Charge and the Effect of R.A. No. 8294

Appellant had been separately indicted and convicted for illegal possession of a firearm under P.D. No. 1866. R.A. No. 8294 (effective July 6, 1997) amended P.D. 1866 to treat the use or possession of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide/murder as an aggravating circumstance rather than as a separately punishable offense. The Court applied the principle of retroactivity of penal laws favorable to the accused (Article 22, Revised Penal Code) and the Supreme Court’s own precedents to hold that R.A. 8294 should be applied retroactively because it is beneficial to the accused. Consequently, the separate illegal-possession conviction could not stand as an independent offense where the same factual act constituted an aggravating circumstance to murder.

Sentencing Law and Constitutional Considerations

Although the trial court initially imposed the death penalty for murder pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, the Supreme Court modified the sentence because the aggravating circumstance deriving from the unlicensed firearm could not be used to increase the penalty to death retroactively if doing so would be unfavorable to the accused. The Court applied Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code on indivisible penalties (when two indivisible penalties are provided and one aggravating circumstance exists, the greater penalty is applied), but concluded that retroactively applying aggravation to impose a harsher penalty than in effect at the time of commission would be impermissible. The Court also relied on the constitutional suspension of the death penalty (Section 19(1), Article III, as cited in the decision) and precedent (People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.) to constrain the trial court’s imposition of death or penalties higher than allowed under the applicable law when the aggrieving change would not favor the accused.

Modification of Judgment and Damages

Accordingly, the Supreme Court modified the judgment: th

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