Case Summary (G.R. No. L-47941)
Facts of the Offense
Several months before the incident, the victim repeatedly asked the accused to sell the conjugal home in Sitio Dinalungan and move the family to his in-laws’ house in Tinambac; the accused refused because of his attachments to the land and improvements. On June 23, 1977, the accused left for the farm at about 7:00 a.m. and returned around 9:00 a.m., finding his wife and three-month-old infant gone. He later found his wife on a trail carrying the infant and a bundle of clothes; when he attempted to take the child, the wife threw the infant on the ground, causing it to cry. Enraged, the accused picked up a piece of wood and struck the wife repeatedly until she fell and complained of severe chest pain. He carried her home, attended to the infant, reported the incident to the barangay captain, surrendered to a policeman, and brought with him the piece of wood used in the assault. The victim died shortly thereafter despite the accused’s attempts to alleviate her pain.
Procedural History
The accused was charged with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. At arraignment on November 24, 1977, he pleaded not guilty. On December 13, 1977, after consultation with counsel, he sought to withdraw the not-guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty in open court; his counsel presented mitigating circumstances. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Branch IV) found him guilty of parricide on December 22, 1977, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering indemnity to heirs. The trial court applied three mitigating circumstances (voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and acting under overpowering impulse/passion) and recommended executive clemency. The accused appealed only the correctness of the penalty imposed; the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and penalty.
Guilty Plea and Mitigating Circumstances
The lower court accepted the accused’s change of plea to guilty during trial and allowed his counsel to establish mitigating circumstances. The trial court found three mitigating circumstances in his favor: voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and that the accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation (i.e., passion/heat of blood). No aggravating circumstances were found. The trial court nevertheless imposed the lesser of the two prescribed penalties under parricide (reclusion perpetua, the lesser being imposed because of mitigating circumstances), and recommended clemency.
Issues Raised on Appeal
The appellant challenged only the penalty, advancing four principal contentions: (1) the trial court disregarded its own findings showing a manifest lack of intent to kill; (2) Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code should apply because the felony actually committed (parricide) was different from the felony intended (allegedly physical injuries), requiring application of the penalty corresponding to the intended crime; (3) the trial court failed to follow the mandatory sequence of procedures for determining the proper penalty; and (4) denial of benefits under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, based on the claim that the applicable penalty was divisible (reclusion temporal, and therefore eligible).
Court’s Analysis — Application of Articles 4 and 49 (Liability for Consequences)
The Court rejected appellant’s reliance on Article 49. It emphasized Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that a person is liable for all direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act even if those consequences are more serious than those intended. The Court held that when a felonious act produces more serious consequences (such as death) not intended by the offender, Article 49 does not apply to reduce the penalty; at most the offender’s lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong is a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(3). Article 49 is applicable only where the crime committed is different from that intended and the felony committed befalls a different person in the sense contemplated by jurisprudence; it does not sanction reduction where more serious consequences result from the same unlawful act.
Court’s Analysis — Nature of the Crime and Inapplicability of Article 263
The Court found the appellant’s argument invoking Article 263 (graduated penalties for physical injuries) to be misplaced because the victim died shortly after the assault; the gravamen was therefore a homicide against a protected person (parricide under Article 246), not merely an affliction of physical injuries. The Court cited precedent (e.g., People v. Climaco Demiar) holding that when death results, the proper characterization is the crime causing death (parricide when the victim is the offender’s mother or analogous protected person), and lack of intent to cause such a grave result is a mitigating factor rather than a ground for qualification under a lesser article.
Court’s Analysis — Divisibility of the Penalty and Indeterminate Sentence Law
The Court ruled that parricide under Article 246 is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are indivisible penalties; therefore the penalty is not divisible into degrees that would render the convict eligible under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Because the proper conviction is for parricide and because mitigating circumstances were found but no aggravating circumstances, the trial court correctly imposed the lesser penalty (reclusion perpetua). The Court reiterated that appellant remained liable fo
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-47941)
Case Caption and Citation
- G.R. No. L-47941; decision promulgated April 30, 1985 by the Supreme Court, First Division.
- Trial court: Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch IV, Criminal Case No. 403; judgment dated December 22, 1977 (Judge Alfredo S. Rebuena).
- Parties: The People of the Philippines (plaintiff-appellee) v. Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon (defendant-appellant).
Facts as Found by the Trial Court (Undisputed)
- Victim: Magdalena de los Santos, wife of accused Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon.
- Location of conjugal home: Sitio Dinalungan, Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Siruma, Camarines Sur.
- Pre-occurrence marital dispute: For several months prior to June 23, 1977, Magdalena persistently asked the accused to sell the conjugal home and move the family to the house of the accused’s in-laws in Tinambac, Camarines Sur; accused refused because he did not want to abandon his house and improvements and because the in-laws’ place was very far.
- Events of June 23, 1977:
- About 7:00 a.m., accused left home to work on his farm.
- About 9:00 a.m., he returned and found his wife and their three-month-old baby missing.
- He searched and found his wife on a trail about 200 meters from their home, carrying the infant and a bundle of clothes; she refused to return home.
- When the accused tried to take the child, the wife threw the baby on the grassy portion of the trail, causing the infant to cry.
- Incensed, the accused picked up a piece of wood nearby and struck his wife repeatedly until she fell complaining of severe chest pains.
- The accused carried his wife home, retrieved the child, and despite his efforts the wife died shortly thereafter.
- Post-offense acts:
- The accused changed the dress of his wife, reported the incident to the Barangay Captain, and was brought to Policeman Arellosa where he surrendered and presented the piece of wood used in the beating.
- Detention: The accused had been in detention since June 23, 1977; the Supreme Court notes this amounted to more than seven years at the time of decision.
Procedural History
- Arraignment (November 24, 1977): Accused, with appointed counsel, pleaded not guilty.
- Trial (December 13, 1977): Counsel manifested that accused wished to change his plea from not guilty to guilty; motion to withdraw original plea was allowed without objection by the prosecution.
- Re-arraignment and Plea (December 13, 1977): Accused entered a plea of guilty in open court, confirmed his understanding of the gravity and consequences of the plea.
- Mitigation: Counsel was permitted to establish mitigating circumstances; accused testified and mitigating circumstances were asserted.
- Trial court decision (December 22, 1977): Found accused guilty of parricide; imposed penalty of reclusion perpetua; condemned accused to indemnify heirs of deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment, plus costs; recommended executive clemency after service of the minimum of the medium penalty of prisión mayor; directed a copy of decision be furnished the President and Chairman of the Board of Pardons and Parole.
- Motion for reconsideration: Denied by trial court.
- Appeal: Accused filed notice of appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging principally the penalty imposed.
Trial Court Findings and Disposition
- Convicted offense: Parricide (Article 246, Revised Penal Code under the law as applied in the decision).
- Penalty imposed: Reclusion perpetua.
- Civil liability: Indemnify heirs of Magdalena de los Santos in the sum of P12,000.00.
- Miscellaneous: No subsidiary imprisonment ordered; costs imposed.
- Mitigating circumstances found by trial court (three):
- Voluntary surrender.
- Plea of guilty.
- That the accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation (impulse/passion/obfuscation).
- Trial court’s recommendation: Executive clemency after service of the minimum of the medium penalty of prisión mayor.
Appellant’s (Accused’s) Arguments on Appeal
- General claim: The trial court erred primarily in the imposition of the penalty.
- Specific assignments of error asserted in appellant’s brief:
- The lower court disregarded its own findings of fact showing manifest lack of intent to kill.
- The lower court disregarded Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code prescribing the proper applicable penalty when the crime committed is different from that intended.
- The lower court did not follow the mandatory sequence of procedures for determining the correct applicable penalty.
- The lower court denied the appellant the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
- Substantive contention on Article 49:
- Appellant avers that he intended only to commit physical injuries (qualified physical injuries) and not death.
- He claims the felony actually committed (parricide) carries a higher penalty (reclusion perpetua to death) than the felony intended (qualified physical injuries, reclusion temporal medium and maximum).
- Under Article 49, when the felony committed is different and the penalty for the intended offense is lower, the penalty corresponding to the offense intended should be imposed in its maximum period; thus he argues for reclusion temporal maximum.
- Mitigation and Indeterminate Sentence Law argument:
- Trial court found three mitigating circumstances with no aggravating circumstances.
- Appellant contends the plea of guilty was improvidently made and should not be considered,