Title
People vs. Tomotorgo y Alarcon
Case
G.R. No. L-47941
Decision Date
Apr 30, 1985
A man convicted of parricide after killing his wife during a heated marital dispute, with mitigating factors acknowledged but denied Indeterminate Sentence Law benefits.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-47941)

Factual Background

On June 23, 1977, the accused and his wife, Magdalena de los Santos, quarreled over the latter's persistent request to sell the conjugal home and move to her in-laws' house. The accused left to work at about seven o’clock and returned at about nine o’clock to find his wife and their three-month-old infant gone. He found her on a trail about two hundred meters from their home carrying the child and a bundle. When he sought to take the child, the wife allegedly threw the infant on the grassy portion of the trail. The accused then picked up a piece of wood and struck the wife repeatedly until she fell and complained of severe chest pains. He carried her home and brought the infant back. Despite his efforts, the wife died soon thereafter.

Surrender and Custodial Events

After the death, the accused changed his wife's clothing, reported the incident to the Barangay Captain, and surrendered to Policeman Arellosa. He brought with him the piece of wood used in the assault. The prosecution thereafter charged him with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

Trial Court Proceedings

At arraignment on November 24, 1977, the accused pleaded not guilty with the assistance of appointed counsel. On December 13, 1977, counsel informed the court of the accused's desire to withdraw his plea and enter a plea of guilty. The court permitted the withdrawal and allowed counsel to present mitigating circumstances. The accused testified and affirmed his guilty plea in open court. The trial court found him guilty of parricide and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, ordered indemnity of P12,000 to the heirs of the deceased without subsidiary imprisonment, and recommended executive clemency after the accused had served the minimum of the medium penalty of prision mayor.

Grounds of Appeal

The accused appealed, challenging only the penalty imposed. He contended that the trial court erred by disregarding findings that showed a manifest lack of intent to kill, failing to apply Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code which he invoked to impose the penalty corresponding to the offense he intended, neglecting the mandatory sequence for determining the correct penalty, and denying him the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Appellant's Argument on Penalty

The accused asserted that he intended to commit qualified physical injuries and not death. He argued that because the felony actually committed, parricide, carried a higher penalty than the offense he intended, Article 49 required the imposition of the penalty corresponding to the intended offense in its maximum period. He reasoned that this would render the applicable penalty divisible (reclusion temporal, maximum), thereby entitling him to indeterminate sentencing. He further urged that the plea of guilty was improvident and should be discounted, leaving two mitigating circumstances to reduce the penalty by one degree.

Prosecution and Courts Below Position

The prosecution and the courts below maintained that Article 49 did not apply where more serious, unintended consequences flowed directly from the offender's felonious act, because Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code renders the offender liable for all direct and natural consequences. They argued that lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong is at most a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, par. 3, and that the crime was properly classified as parricide subject to the penalties fixed in Article 246. They noted jurisprudence holding that the penalty for parricide — reclusion perpetua to death — comprises indivisible penalties and that, with mitigating circumstances and no aggravating ones, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.

Legal Analysis and Reasoning of the Court

The Court held that the accused’s intent to inflict physical injuries did not exempt him from liability for the resulting death. The Court applied Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code to impose liability for the direct and natural consequences of the felonious act. It ruled that Article 49 is inapplicable when a more serious consequence than intended occurs as a direct result of the offender’s act, and that such lack of intent operates only as mitigation under Article 13, par. 3. The Court cited People vs. Climaco Demiar to illustrate that similar facts resulting in parricide were held to attract the parricide provision, with lack of intent treated as mitigating. The Court further observed that the penalty for parricide under Article 246 is composed of indivisible penalties; consequently, the accused could not be relegated to the

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