Title
People vs. Tomas y Orpilla
Case
G.R. No. 241631
Decision Date
Mar 11, 2019
Accused acquitted due to lapses in chain of custody of seized drugs, failing to prove integrity and identity beyond reasonable doubt.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 241631)

Information and Elements of Illegal Sale Charged

In an Information dated May 9, 2011, Tomas was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The accusatory portion specifically described a structured buy-bust encounter at Brickstone Mall, Pengue-Ruyu, Tuguegarao City, where Tomas allegedly received previously marked buy-bust money and, in exchange, handed over two plastic sachets of suspected shabu, leading to his arrest and the recovery of the marked money and the seized drug evidence.

Trial Proceedings in the RTC

Tomas pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial. The prosecution presented IO1 Binwag, IO1 Juneclide D. Cabanilla (IO1 Cabanilla), Barangay Chairman Jimmy Pagulayan, Police Senior Inspector Glenn Ly Tuazon (PSI Tuazon), and Investigating Agent 3 Allan Lloyd B. Leano (IA3 Leano). The defense presented Tomas and Dr. Marcelina Mabatan-Ringor (Dr. Mabatan-Ringor).

The RTC, in a Decision dated December 3, 2014, found Tomas guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It held that the elements of illegal sale were established through the prosecution witnesses’ consistent account of a sale during a buy-bust operation and noted that Tomas did not directly question the apprehending officers’ compliance with chain-of-custody procedures during trial. It sentenced Tomas to life imprisonment and imposed a fine of P400,000.00, with confiscated drugs forfeited to the government.

Appellate Ruling of the CA

Tomas appealed, and the CA, in a Decision dated May 31, 2017, affirmed the conviction but modified the fine to P500,000.00. The CA reasoned that the fact that the seized sachets were marked at the PDEA Regional Office did not negate the elements required for preservation of the integrity of the seized drugs. The CA also gave little credence to Tomas’s defenses of denial and frame-up, which it viewed as unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. It further invoked the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, emphasizing that Tomas did not impute evil motives to the apprehending team.

Issues Raised on Appeal

Before the Supreme Court, Tomas maintained that his arrest was illegal and that the seized items should have been considered inadmissible as fruits of a poisonous tree. He specifically alleged irregularities in the custody and handling of the drug evidence, namely: (1) the marking, photograph, and inventory were allegedly not done immediately at the place of arrest; (2) no DOJ representative was present during the photograph and physical inventory; and (3) Barangay Chairman Pagulayan merely signed the certificate of inventory but did not witness the actual inventory.

Supreme Court Framework for Illegal Sale

The Court reiterated that prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires proof of three elements: (a) the transaction or sale took place; (b) the corpus delicti or illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (c) the buyer and seller were identified. Relying on the testimony of IO1 Binwag, the Court found that Tomas was positively identified as the person who was caught in flagrante delicto selling plastic sachets of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu in the buy-bust operation conducted on May 8, 2011 at Brickstone Mall. It therefore held that the first and third elements—sale and identity—were established.

The decisive matter was whether the second element, the establishment of the identity and evidentiary integrity of the seized drugs, was adequately proven in light of chain-of-custody requirements.

Chain of Custody Rules Under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and the IRR

The Court focused on Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, which requires that immediately after seizure and confiscation, the apprehending team physically inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of: the accused (or representative or counsel), a media representative, a DOJ representative, and an elected public official who must sign the inventory and receive a copy.

The IRR Section 21(a) similarly required immediate inventory and photographing but allowed a saving clause when non-compliance occurred under justifiable grounds and as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. The Court stressed that the rule required not only performance of inventory and photographing, but performance immediately after seizure and with the required witnesses physically present at or near the seizure or arrest point, subject to practicability for the place of compliance.

Findings on Apprehending Officers’ Non-Compliance

The Court held that the apprehending team “miserably failed” to meet the specifications of Section 21 and its IRR. IO1 Binwag and IO1 Cabanilla admitted that they conducted the physical inventory and taking of photographs at their office at Camp Adduru rather than at the place of arrest or seizure. When asked to justify this departure, the officers cited only that it was the discretion of their team leader to avoid being compromised in the area. The Court found the explanation unsupported and insufficient.

It further found that the officers did not mark the seized sachets at the place of arrest, despite their ability to do so. While the Court acknowledged that, for warrantless seizures, inventory and photographing could be conducted at the nearest police station or nearest office when place-of-seizure compliance was not practicable, it held that such allowance did not dispense with the witness requirements. The required witnesses were to be physically present at the time of and at or near seizure and confiscation, because their presence at that point served to insulate against the evils of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.

Failure to Secure the “Three-Witness Rule” and the DOJ Representative’s Absence

The Court found that the prosecution admitted the absence of a DOJ representative during the physical inventory and photographing at the PDEA office. IO1 Cabanilla attributed the absence to difficulty in contacting DOJ because the buy-bust operation occurred on a Sunday, a non-working day. The Court rejected this as an inadequate justification because police officers had sufficient time to make arrangements in planned buy-bust operations, and they were required to demonstrate earnest efforts to secure the presence of the required witnesses.

The Court also ruled that Barangay Chairman Pagulayan did not actually witness the physical inventory. Relying on the testimony excerpt, it concluded that Pagulayan’s knowledge came from what the PDEA agents told him and what was already visible upon arrival, rather than from actual attendance at the inventory process. The Court emphasized the significance of these insulating witnesses in ensuring the chain of custody and removing suspicion of evidentiary manipulation.

Jurisprudential Standards Applied

To address the requirement of the three witnesses and when they must be secured, the Court cited People v. Adobar. It adopted the view that the phrase “immediately after seizure and confiscation” meant inventory and photographing had to be performed at the place of apprehension and/or seizure, or as soon as the team reached the nearest station or office if not practicable. Even under this flexibility, the witnesses—media, DOJ, and an elected public official—must still already be physically present at the time of seizure and confiscation. Their purpose was to prevent planting evidence.

The Court likewise invoked People v. Mendoza, underscoring that the absence of any of these witnesses during seizure and marking undermined the integrity and credibility of the corpus delicti and adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination.

On the prosecution’s burden when witnesses were not secured, the Court referenced People v. Ramos, which required the prosecution to provide a justifiable reason or show genuine and sufficient effort to secure the witnesses under Section 21. It also cited People v. Umipang for the rule that a mere statement that witnesses were unavailable, without explanation and without proof of serious attempts, could not qualify as a justified ground.

Saving Clause Not Applicable: No Justifiable Ground and No Proper Preservation

The Court explained that while the chain-of-custody rule admitted of less-stringent compliance in exceptional cases, the prosecution had to satisfy two requisites under the saving clause: (1) the presence of justifiable grounds for non-compliance; and (2) proper preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.

The Court held that both requisites were absent. It found insufficient and unsubstantiated explanations for: the failure to mark, inventory, and photograph immediately at the place of apprehension and confiscation; the failure to secure the presence of the elected public official, DOJ representative, and media representative at the arrest and seizure stage; and the failure to secure those witnesses during the actual inventory and photographing at the PDEA office. It treated the cited reasons—compromising area and Sunday non-working day—as tenuous, uncorroborated, and failing to amount to proof of justifiable grounds.

It further ruled that belated marking at the PDEA office without a plausible explanation created a serious gap in the chain at its inception. The Court stressed that marking was the starting reference point for subsequent custodians. It reasoned that alteration, substitution, or tampering could not be dismissed because the seized items reportedly did not bear markings or labels when transported from the place of arrest to the PDEA office, reducing their readily identifiable character.

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