Case Summary (G.R. No. 173905)
Key Dates (procedural)
Information filed: August 17, 1990.
Arrest order: August 24, 1990.
Arraignment and plea (private respondents): May 17, 1991 (pleaded not guilty).
Initial trial setting: July 26, 1991 (postponed at prosecutor’s request).
Next trial setting: September 20, 1991 (prosecutor absent; judge dismissed case for failure to prosecute).
Denial of prosecution’s motion for reconsideration: October 4, 1991.
Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis
Governing constitution: 1987 Constitution (applicable as the decision was rendered after 1990).
Relevant constitutional provisions cited: Article III, Section 16 (right to a speedy disposition of cases) and Article III, Section 21 (prohibition against double jeopardy).
Relevant rules: Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (speedy disposition); Section 3, Rule 17 of the New Rules of Court (dismissal for failure to prosecute).
Facts — Pretrial and Postponements
The private respondents were arraigned and pleaded not guilty on May 17, 1991. The case was set for trial on July 26, 1991; the prosecutor moved for postponement because he had not been able to contact material witnesses, and the defense did not object; the hearing was reset to September 20, 1991. On September 20, 1991, the prosecutor failed to appear; the trial judge deemed the absence unjustified and dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution explained that September 20 was a Muslim legal holiday (birthday of the Prophet Muhammad), supported by a March 11, 1991 memorandum circular from the Office on Muslim Affairs instructing closure of government offices in Regions 9 and 12 on that holiday; the trial court denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.
Procedural Posture and Relief Sought
The Solicitor General petitioned for certiorari, alleging the trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute despite a valid cause for the prosecutor’s absence. The Solicitor General sought annulment of the dismissal and reinstatement of the case, arguing the dismissal was void and reinstatement would not place the private respondents in double jeopardy.
Issue Presented
Whether the dismissal of the criminal information for failure to prosecute—based on the prosecutor’s absence on a date the prosecutor contends was a recognized Muslim legal holiday—was proper, and whether reinstatement of the case would be barred by the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Court’s Analysis — Authority to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute
The Court acknowledged the trial court’s authority under Section 3, Rule 17 to dismiss actions for failure to prosecute and that the dismissal may constitute an adjudication on the merits unless otherwise provided. That authority, however, is discretionary and must be exercised with due regard for the competing rights of the accused (including the right to speedy trial) and the State’s right to prosecute.
Court’s Analysis — Prosecutor’s Absence Was for a Valid Cause
The Court found that the prosecutor’s failure to appear on September 20, 1991, was attributable to a reasonable, good-faith belief that the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office was closed on account of a nationally recognized Muslim legal holiday under a memorandum circular issued by the Office on Muslim Affairs. Given that government offices in Regions 9 and 12 were authorized to be closed on that holiday, the prosecutor could not be faulted for nonattendance.
Court’s Analysis — Speedy Trial Balancing Test Applied
The Court emphasized that the right to speedy trial is violated only by vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delays, or unjustified postponements that extend the trial unreasonably. The balancing test requires weighing length of delay, whether the defendant asserted the right, prejudice to the defendant, and the conduct of both prosecution and defense. Here, the record showed only two postponements totaling less than two months: the first was requested by the prosecution and unopposed by the defense; the second was due to the valid cause explained above. The brief extent and circumstances of the delays did not constitute an unreasonable or oppressive depr
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 173905)
Citation and Procedural Posture
- Reported at 314 Phil. 35, Second Division, G.R. No. 102485, decided May 22, 1995.
- Petition for certiorari filed by the Solicitor General challenging the dismissal by respondent Judge Wilfredo C. Ochotorena of Criminal Case No. S-1902 for failure to prosecute and the subsequent denial of the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.
- The Supreme Court (Puno, J.) granted the petition, annulled and set aside the trial court’s dismissal and denial of reconsideration, and remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs were imposed.
- Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concurred.
Parties
- Petitioner: People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General in the present certiorari petition.
- Private respondents (appellees below and accused): Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario Suco, and Gavino Cadling (the last three were at large).
- Judicial respondent: Hon. Wilfredo C. Ochotorena, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
- Note on arrests: Only Luis Tampal, Samuel Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and Domingo Padumon were arrested; Pablito Suco, Dario Suco, and Gavino Cadling remained at large (Order of Arrest dated August 24, 1990, Original Records, p. 52).
Factual Background and Charge
- Information dated August 17, 1990 charged the seven named respondents with the crime of "Robbery with Homicide and Multiple Physical Serious Injuries."
- The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. S-1902 and raffled to respondent Judge Ochotorena as presiding judge (Original Records, p. 49).
- Arraignment took place on May 17, 1991, where the private respondents pleaded not guilty to the offense charged (Original Records, p. 54).
Pretrial and Scheduled Hearings
- The case was scheduled for trial on July 26, 1991.
- On July 26, 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for a postponement on the ground that he had failed to contact material witnesses; the defense counsel did not object. The case was reset to September 20, 1991 (Order, dated July 26, 1991, Original Records, p. 57).
- When the case was called on September 20, 1991, the prosecutor was absent. The trial court found the absence unjustified and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute (Order dated September 20, 1991, Rollo, p. 35).
Motion for Reconsideration and Trial Court’s Denial
- The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, explaining that the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office was closed on September 20, 1991, because the date was a Muslim legal holiday—Mauluddin Nabi (Birthday of Prophet Mohammad SAW)—and alleging that September 20 was treated as such and offices were closed.
- The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in an Order dated October 4, 1991.
- The trial court’s denial expressly relied on the court’s authority under Section 3, Rule 17 of the New Rules of Court (Failure to prosecute), and the trial court quoted the prior dismissal order stating: "As such, for its failure to prosecute, this case is hereby DISMISSED. LET them be released immediately from custody unless held on other legal cause. COSTS de oficio. SO ORDERED."
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the criminal case for failure to prosecute despite the public prosecutor’s absence being for a valid cause.
- Whether the dismissal constituted an acquittal that would bar reinstatement of the case under the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
- Whether the private respondents’ right to speedy trial was violated, thereby justifying the dismissal and barring further prosecution.
Applicable Law and Authorities Cited
- Section 3, Rule 17, New Rules of Court (Failure to prosecute) — dismissal may be entered when plaintiff fails to appear or to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time; such dismissal "shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the Court."
- Section 1(h), Rule 115, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution — right to a speedy disposition of cases.
- Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution — protection against double jeopardy.
- Precedents and authorities cited in the opinion:
- Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991, 199 SCRA 298 — balancing test for speedy disposition/trial, and characterization of delays that violate the right as "vexatious, capricious or oppressive."
- People v. Navarro, Nos. L-38453-54, March 25, 1975, 63 SCRA 264 — authority that a trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of dismissal, and that arbitrary refusal to reopen will be set aside to give the State its day in court when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced.
- People v. Declaro, G.R. No. 64362, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 142.
- People v. Pablo, No. L-37271, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 289.
- Gorion v. Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Br. 17, G.R. N