Title
People vs. Sunga
Case
G.R. No. 126029
Decision Date
Mar 27, 2003
A 15-year-old was raped and killed in Palawan; accused were acquitted due to unreliable testimony, inadmissible confessions, and insufficient evidence.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 127473)

Key Dates and Procedural History

June 29, 1994: Incident alleged to have occurred.
July 12, 1994: AAA’s mutilated body discovered.
September 6, 1994: Information for rape with homicide filed in RTC, Puerto Princesa (Criminal Case No. 11984).
October 18–20, 1994: Prosecution moved to discharge Locil as state witness; trial court granted discharge.
March 7, 1996: RTC convicted Sunga and Lansang of rape with homicide (death sentences) and Pascua of rape (reclusion perpetua); Octac acquitted.
Automatic review by the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 47, RPC; Decision of the Supreme Court (Davide, Jr., C.J.) reviewed the issues and reversed and acquitted appellants.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Framework

Constitutional basis: 1987 Philippine Constitution (decision date post‑1990). Key constitutional protections invoked: right to remain silent; right to competent and independent counsel; right to be informed of these rights (Art. III, Sec. 12(1)). Procedural rules: Section 9, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court (discharge and testimony of accused as state witness). Evidentiary standards: requirement of corroboration for testimony of accomplice/co‑accused turned state witness; standards for admissibility of extrajudicial confessions and waivers.

Allegations and Charges

Information alleged that on or about June 29, 1994, appellants conspired to have carnal knowledge of AAA by force and violence (rape) and, to conceal the crime, with accomplice Locil, attacked and killed AAA by repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on her head, causing mortal wounds and skull fractures — charged as rape with homicide.

Facts as Established by the Prosecution

State witness Locil (14 years old at trial) gave an eyewitness account describing that she boarded a tricycle in Mendoza Park with a lesbian woman and AAA, proceeded to Barangay Irawan where Sunga and Lansang confronted and pinned AAA, after which Lansang and others raped AAA sequentially; Sunga stabbed the victim’s abdomen and Lansang smashed her head with a stone, causing death; all then left the body and later transported/dumped it at Jacana, Barangay Bancao‑Bancao. Autopsy by Dr. Vigonte showed depressed skull fractures and intracranial hemorrhage consistent with blunt force trauma and opined multiple attackers. Other prosecution witnesses supplied post‑event circumstances (sighting of Lansang near the scene on June 30, inquiries at a sari‑sari store, statements to the victim’s father about knowing someone who could finger the perpetrators, and funeral expenses).

Defense Case and Alibi Evidence

All accused proffered alibi defenses with corroborating witnesses and documentary evidence. Lansang presented detailed alibi testimony corroborated by bank records (encashment of checks on June 29, 1994), receipts, jeepney/boat travel witnesses, and other witnesses placing him elsewhere at relevant times. Pascua and Octac also produced alibi witnesses and records; Octac had an employer’s log entry. Defense also attacked the credibility of Locil’s testimony and raised constitutional and procedural infirmities regarding Sunga’s extrajudicial statements.

Discharge of Locil as State Witness: Procedural Sufficiency

The Supreme Court examined the trial court’s grant of discharge under Section 9, Rule 119. It found that discharge may be moved for and granted at various stages (from filing of information up to defense opening), and that the trial court had already received evidence and Locil’s sworn statement during hearings on the bail petition, with opportunity for defense to oppose. The Court concluded the trial court’s procedure satisfied the purpose of a hearing in substance even though the formal motion hearing occurred contemporaneously with bail hearings. The Court also observed that the statutory conditions for discharge (consent of accused‑to‑be witness, testimony being absolutely necessary, lack of other direct evidence, susceptibility to corroboration, witness not the most guilty, and no prior conviction for moral turpitude) were met at the time of discharge, or that any procedural defects were not reversible insofar as they did not affect the competency and quality of the discharged witness’ testimony.

Legal Standard for Accomplice Testimony and Corroboration Requirement

The Court reiterated the established rule: the testimony of an accomplice or self‑confessed co‑accused who becomes a state witness cannot, by itself, sustain conviction and must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony or strong circumstances such that the accomplice’s trustworthiness becomes manifest. An exception exists where the co‑accused’s testimony is so straightforward, unhesitating, and detailed that it could not have been a result of contrivance; otherwise corroboration is required.

Admissibility of Sunga’s Extrajudicial Statements (Exhibits A and I)

The Supreme Court found Sunga’s two extrajudicial statements inadmissible against him and his co‑accused. Key reasons:

  • Custodial interrogation protections under the 1987 Constitution required the accused to be informed of rights and to have competent, independent counsel; these protections attach once interrogation focuses on a particular suspect and custody circumstances exist.
  • At the time Sunga gave the first statement (July 18, 1994, Exhibit A), he was effectively under custodial interrogation and his choice of counsel—Atty. Agustin Rocamora, the City Legal Officer—posed a conflict because that official’s role is akin to a public legal officer whose interests are adverse to an accused. The Court relied on precedent (People v. Bandula) disallowing such representation as independent counsel in custodial investigations.
  • Testimony showed Atty. Rocamora did little more than facilitate answering questions and did not adequately advise or safeguard Sunga’s rights; the record lacked any testimony from Rocamora explaining meaningful legal assistance.
  • The initial questioning by other police officers before formal investigation, and alleged maltreatment, reinforced the custodial nature preceding Exhibit A.
  • The second statement (Exhibit I) before the NBI on August 3, 1994, executed while Sunga remained in custody and without counsel effectively present, likewise occurred in a custodial setting. The purported waiver of counsel in Exhibit I was invalid because it was not executed in the presence of counsel as constitutionally required.
  • For these reasons, both statements were excluded as involuntary/tainted and inadmissible.

Impact of Excluding Sunga’s Statements on Corroboration of Locil

Because Sunga’s extrajudicial admissions were inadmissible, they could not be used to corroborate Locil’s account. The prosecution’s remaining evidence—autopsy findings and witnesses relating to events after the crime, plus some sightings and statements—did not substantially corroborate the essential material portions of Locil’s testimony (who identified specific overt acts and the roles of particular accused). The Court stressed that post‑event circumstances and the autopsy do not, by themselves, establish that the appellants committed the fatal acts or the rape.

Assessment of Locil’s Credibility and Sufficiency of Her Testimony

The Court carefully scrutinized Locil’s testimony and found multiple indicators undermining its reliability:

  • The manner of testimony showed tentativeness, uncertainty, low voice and difficulty communicating that impeded credence; the record contained repeated admonitions to speak louder and instances where her identification and descriptive capacity were in doubt.
  • Implausibility and improbability in material respects: it was unlikely that perpetrators would take a spectator to a remote locus to witness their commission of a violent crime and then later threaten that spectator into silence; such conduct is inconsistent with normal criminal behavior.
  • Specific misdescription: Locil’s description of one rapist as having “singkit” (narrow) eyes did not match Pascua’s actual features; when corrected, this inconsistency damaged the reliability of her identifications.
  • Background of the witness (teen pregnancy, use of an alias, living away from family) was noted as diminishing her trustworthiness in the Court’s view. Given these credibility concerns and absence of independent, substantial corroboration, Locil’s uncorroborated testimony failed the jurisprudential test permitting conviction on an accomplice’s stand‑alone testimony.

Circumstantial Evidence and Standards Applied

The Court reiterated the rule for circumstantial evidence: there must be at least two proven circumstances which, in complete sequence, lead to no other reasonable conclusion than the accused’s guilt. The prosecution’s circumstantial or ancillary evidence (sightings, inquiries at store, statements to father, autopsy) were individually weak and collectively insufficient to close the evidentiary gap left by the exclusion

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