Title
People vs. Sitchon y Tayag
Case
G.R. No. 134362
Decision Date
Feb 27, 2002
Appellant beat a 2-year-old with a hammer and stick, causing fatal injuries. Convicted of murder, penalty reduced to life imprisonment due to lack of intent.
murder
guilt
appropriate penalty
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 134362)

Factual Background

At the time of the incident, appellant lived in the second floor of a three-square meter house at 2001 Batangas Street, Tondo, Manila. Lilia Garcia, a neighbor who had lived there for two months, resided on the first floor. On June 12, 1996 at about 10:00 in the morning, Lilia heard a boy crying. When she went upstairs with her children, she found the open upper-floor door allowing her to witness appellant beating Mark Anthony Fernandez (“Macky”) on his body. From a distance of less than three arms length, she saw appellant strike the boy with a wooden piece of about 14½ inches long and 2½ inches in diameter, and she also saw him bang the boy’s head against the wooden wall. The beating reportedly lasted for about one hour. Lilia later saw appellant carry the child downstairs to take him to the hospital. She observed that the boy was already black and no longer moving.

Roberto Fernandez, the victim’s eight-year old brother, testified that Macky had scattered feces in the house. Appellant, whom Roberto called “Kuya Chito,” beat Macky with a belt, a hammer, and a 2x2 piece of wood. Roberto said he could not help because he feared that appellant might also beat him. When Kuya Chito brought Macky to the hospital, the little boy—barely able to talk—was no longer crying.

Investigating officer PO3 Paul Dennis Javier testified that he was informed by Alice Valerio from Galang Medical Hospital that a boy had been admitted. When PO3 Javier arrived, the child was already dead. He saw injuries on the left middle finger, right index finger, and both feet. There were also lacerations in the upper lip and contusions all over the boy’s head and body. The officer proceeded to appellant’s house at No. 2001 Batangas Ext., Tondo, Manila, where human feces and fresh blood were splattered on the floor. He recovered broken wooden sticks, the steel hammer, and a bloodstained white T-shirt allegedly used in beating the boy. Afterward, PO3 Javier went to appellant’s sister’s residence in Del Fierro St., Tondo, where she informed him of matters related to appellant’s identification.

A search operation in Cavite, where appellant’s mother lived, did not locate appellant. Later that afternoon, PO3 Javier learned that appellant surrendered to Station 3 of their district. The following day, a staff member of the television program Magandang Gabi Bayan turned over to PO3 Javier a brown belt allegedly used in beating the victim, which Roberto had given to the staff member.

Medical and Physical Evidence

Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the postmortem examination on June 12, 1996 at 4:40 p.m. He found multiple injuries, including three wounds at the head and anterior chest, which could have been inflicted with blunt objects such as a piece of wood or a fist. He estimated that the child could have been dead three to four hours, or not more than eight hours, before the postmortem. Dr. Lagonera concluded that the victim died of bilateral pneumonia secondary to multiple blunt traversal injuries, or as a complication of the lungs due to those injuries.

The autopsy report detailed numerous external contusions, lacerations, abrasions, and hematomas involving the head, thorax, limbs, fingers, and feet, as well as internal findings of a left sub-aponeurotic hematoma and consolidations in both lungs, with a small amount of rice porridge found in the stomach.

Forensic chemist Felicisima M. Francisco examined specimens sent by P/Sr. Inspector Pedro Ramos Angulo, Jr. from the Western Police District. She reported that the steel hammer was positive for human blood but insufficient for blood grouping. The broken wooden sticks and the white T-shirt were positive for human blood and showed reactions of Group A.

Proceedings in the Trial Court

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty at the start. Before testifying in his own defense on June 4, 1998, appellant admitted he killed the victim and changed his plea to guilty. During trial, five prosecution witnesses testified: Lilia Garcia, Roberto Fernandez, PO3 Paul Dennis Javier, Dr. Manuel Lagonera, and Felicisima Francisco.

Appellant testified in his defense despite his changed plea. He stated that he enjoyed a harmonious relationship with the victim’s mother, whom he lived with for two years before the incident. He admitted killing the boy and claimed that he acted only because he was under the influence of shabu, marijuana, and Valium 10. He said he began using drugs in 1974 and also took drugs two weeks before the incident. Appellant recounted that on June 12, 1996 he found Macky playing with feces and scattering them. He scolded the child, took hold of him, and when Macky struggled, appellant allegedly became so angry that he picked up a broom with a wooden handle and hit the boy. He said he did not realize he had hit the child hard until he saw him sprawled on the floor breathing with difficulty. He then dressed the child and brought him to the hospital, telling him he prayed that nothing serious would happen. He also said he asked a doctor to do what she could, but the doctor told him Macky was already dead.

Appellant asserted that he surrendered the same day to the police, was brought to the Homicide Section at 3:00 p.m., and explained that he changed his plea because he believed the killing was “accidental.” He reiterated his claim that he was conscious during the incident but simply did not realize he had hit the child hard with the broom’s wooden handle. He denied using a hammer or bashing the child’s head against the wall. He expressed that he was a drug dependent and had been confined at the Tagaytay Rehabilitation Center.

On July 3, 1998, the trial court promulgated a judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. It sentenced him to death, and ordered payment to the victim’s mother, Christina Tabora, of moral and nominal damages of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively, plus death compensation in the sum of P50,000.00, with interest at the legal rate from the date of decision until fully paid.

The Parties’ Contentions

The trial court held that appellant’s guilt was established by Lilia Garcia and Roberto Fernandez, whose testimonies were said to be corroborated by the investigating officer, the medico-legal officer, the forensic chemist, and the object evidence. It also ruled that appellant’s lack of intent to kill did not absolve him from liability for the death that resulted from his violent acts. The trial court appreciated treachery and found evident premeditation as part of the circumstances alleged. It also treated the acts as attended by cruelty against the accused and considered intoxication as an aggravating circumstance, ultimately qualifying the offense as murder punishable by death.

On review, the Supreme Court addressed the correctness of the appreciated circumstances, the timing and effect of appellant’s plea change, the alleged basis for voluntary surrender, and the penalty that should follow once the proper qualifying and mitigating circumstances were determined.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Supreme Court held that the evidence sufficiently established appellant’s killing of the victim. It relied on the testimonies of Lilia Garcia and Roberto Fernandez, both of whom saw or described appellant beating Macky. Those accounts were corroborated by PO3 Javier’s observations at the scene, the recovery of the broken wooden sticks, steel hammer, and bloodstained T-shirt, and the forensic findings of human blood on the objects. The Court also noted appellant’s own admission in open court that he beat the child and that such beating resulted in death. It rejected the claim that lack of intent to kill would exculpate him, consistent with the principle under Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code that criminal liability attaches despite a mismatch between the wrongful act intended and the wrongful act done.

On qualification, the Court sustained the presence of treachery. It reiterated the doctrine that treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms that tend directly and especially to insure execution without risk arising from any defense the offended party might make. It emphasized that the killing of minor children who, by reason of tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense is treacherous. Conversely, it found evident premeditation absent. It held that for evident premeditation to be appreciated, the prosecution must establish the time of decision, the overt act showing clinging to the determination, and a lapse of time sufficient for reflection. The Court concluded the prosecution failed to prove these requisites.

The Court also corrected the trial court’s appreciation of aggravating circumstances. It explained that cruelty as an aggravating circumstance requires that the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing an additional wrong not necessary for commission, or inhumanly increased the victim’s suffering, or outraged or scoffed at the victim’s person or corpse. It held that the sheer number of wounds alone was not the test. It found no showing that appellant enjoyed inflicting injuries. It reasoned that the inordinate force appeared to have resulted not from sadistic intent but rather from drugs that diminished his capacity.

As to drug addiction or intoxication being treated as aggravating, the Court rejected the trial court’s approach. It noted that Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates mitigating circumstances, and that Article 13(10) permits consideration of other circumstances similar in nature and analogous to those mentioned. It held, however, that neither Article 14 (aggravating circumstances) nor Article 15 (alternative circumstances) contained a provision comparable to Article 13(10) that would allow drug addiction to be treated as aggravating by analogy. It further stressed that penal statutes must be strictly construed.

The Court then ad

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