Title
People vs. Sarmiento y Nave
Case
G.R. No. L-26183
Decision Date
Jun 19, 1975
Atty. Manuel Verzosa was fatally shot in 1965; Angel Sarmiento was convicted based on credible witness testimonies, rejected alibi, and dismissed hearsay implicating another. Indemnity increased to P12,000.
murder
reclusion perpetua
multiple witnesses

Case Summary (G.R. No. 100724)

Factual Background of the Shooting

In the afternoon of March 12, 1965, while the Electoral Tribunal was holding a session in the Supreme Court building, Atty. Verzosa went to his car parked inside the Supreme Court Compound. As he was about to open his car door to board it, a lone gunman who had been waiting near the vehicle fired at close range using a .45 caliber firearm. The first shot missed. The second shot hit Atty. Verzosa at the corner of his upper lip, then the bullet exited at the back of the head to the left, macerating the brain and fracturing the skull. Atty. Verzosa fell on his back beside the car. The assailant then fired two more shots at the still body, hitting the victim in the face and neck.

At the time of the shooting, boy scouts of the U.P. Preparatory School were drilling on the lawn in front of the Rizal Hall building adjacent to the Supreme Court. The boy scouts immediately cordoned the lifeless body until authorities arrived. At the scene, authorities found four empty .45 caliber shells, and a .45 caliber bullet beneath the neck of the deceased. The left hand of the victim still clutched his car keys.

Autopsy Findings and Cause of Death

The autopsy report of Dr. Angelo Singian described three gunshot wounds and resulting internal injuries. Externally, the victim suffered: (1) a gunshot wound of entry at the corner of the upper lip, with an oblique course upward and backward and an exit on the left posterior parieto-occipital region; (2) a gunshot wound of entry on the right side of the face over the lower mandible, with an oblique course downward and an exit over the left postero-lateral side of the neck, with a 0.45 caliber slug found on the pavement; and (3) a gunshot wound of entry on the neck over the thyroid cartilage slightly to the right of the midline, coursing obliquely downward and exiting over the left supra-scapular region at the back, with a 0.45 caliber slug found on the clothing beneath and the left shoulder. Internally, the autopsy found maceration of the frontal, left parietal, and left occipital lobes of the brain and the cervical cord, and a perforating through-and-through laceration of the thyroid cartilage. The cause of death was shock due to multiple (three) gunshot wounds, with maceration of the brain, fracturing the skull and cervical vertebrae, and laceration of the spinal cord.

Prosecution Evidence and Identification of the Appellant

The prosecution’s theory was that the appellant was the assailant. To establish identity, it presented witnesses Julio Arambulo, Liza Rowena Go, and Julio Ancheta, all connected with the U.P. Preparatory School, together with Arturo Leano, an advertising account executive.

Julio Arambulo testified that while drilling on the lawn in front of the Rizal Hall, he heard a gunshot. When he looked toward the source, he saw a man inside the Supreme Court Compound aiming a gun at the deceased. The man fired, and the victim fell. In that position, the assailant fired two more successive shots at the victim. Afterward, the man ran out of the gate of the Supreme Court, tucked his gun at his waistline, and fled on foot along Padre Faura Street toward Mabini Street. Arambulo positively identified the appellant as the assailant.

Liza Rowena Go stated that at about 4:30 p.m., she was waiting near the fence of the Supreme Court Compound by the gate to take a jeepney home. After a loud explosion and persons began running, she initially believed it was a blow-out of a truck tire and remained where she was. Then a man came out of the gate running. He wore eyeglasses and a hat, and he was smiling as he ran. As he passed near her at a distance of about two feet, his hat fell. She called his attention, but he did not stop and continued running along Padre Faura Street toward Nebraska Street. She became alarmed and went to the U.P. Preparatory School, after which she learned of the shooting. She identified the appellant as the man who passed her running and whose hat fell.

Julio Ancheta testified that during the incident he was supervising the drill of boy scouts on the lawn. Shortly after four shots, he saw a man running westward along Padre Faura Street while tucking a .45 caliber gun at his waistline. Mistaking him for a peace officer chasing a culprit, Ancheta also ran a few paces behind. Upon reaching the corner of Florida Street, he turned back. When he returned, he saw the lifeless victim and the boy scouts cordoning the body until a police car arrived. Ancheta identified the man he saw running along Padre Faura Street and tucking a gun as the appellant.

Arturo Leano provided additional linkage. He testified that shortly after the shots from the Supreme Court Compound, the appellant came out of the compound and ran toward Florida Street. As he ran, the appellant’s hat fell, but he did not stop to retrieve it. Before reaching the corner of Nebraska and Padre Faura Streets, the appellant boarded a slowly moving jeep with plate number information described in the testimony. The jeep was later found to be owned by the appellant and registered in his name.

The Defense Arguments and Their Rejection by the Court

The appellant maintained that he was not the assailant. He argued that the prosecution witnesses made mistakes in identifying him and pointed to discrepancies between their descriptions and his actual physical features. He also invoked alibi, asserting that at the time of the killing he was at his house in Pasay City, about two to three kilometers from the scene.

The Court held that the appellant’s identity as the killer was established by clear and convincing evidence and that the trial court correctly gave full faith and credence to the prosecution witnesses. The Court noted that the record did not show any improper or evil motive for the state witnesses to falsely impute the crime to the appellant, and that this supported the witnesses’ credibility. It emphasized that when credibility is at issue, the conclusions of the trial court carry great weight and are not disturbed on appeal unless the trial court overlooked facts of substance and value that could alter the outcome.

The Court acknowledged that inconsistencies in witness descriptions existed but regarded them as more apparent than real, involving minor or collateral matters. It also recognized that an exact and completely accurate description of an assailant cannot always be expected when the incident is extraordinary, exciting, or frightening. It found it sufficient that the witnesses’ descriptions were reasonably descriptive of the assailant’s general appearance, characteristics, and bearing, and, more importantly, that they positively identified the appellant.

On alibi, the Court held that it could not prosper in the face of the prosecution witnesses’ positive identification. The Court further stated the governing principle that alibi requires competent proof not only that the accused was elsewhere, but also that, considering the distance, it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of the commission. The appellant failed to show such physical impossibility.

Attempt to Shift Liability to Another Person and Its Evidentiary Defects

The appellant also attempted to escape liability by attributing the killing to a certain Ricardo Dimero. In support, the defense presented Hermogenes Torres, who testified that Dimero admitted to him that he was the author of the crime. The Court found the testimony of Torres unworthy of credence, aligning with the trial court’s assessment. It noted that the witnesses offered by the defense were from Cavite, and specifically it found it strange that Torres did not report to the court when he last met Dimero prior to March 14, 1965, as well as the claimed relationship between Torres and Dimero as not more intimate than ordinary acquaintance or friend.

The Court also considered it highly improbable that a person who committed the crime would naively admit authorship to a person with whom he had no intimacy, especially since a natural tendency of an offender is to keep the secret unless he surrenders to authorities personally or through intermediaries. Moreover, the Court treated Torres’s claim as hearsay. It observed that Dimero was not placed on the witness stand to be cross-examined by the state, and thus the defense relied

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.

About Privacy Terms