Title
People vs. Santos y Narciso
Case
G.R. No. 100225-26
Decision Date
May 11, 1993
Raul Santos convicted for murder and frustrated murder after ambush; alibi rejected, positive identification upheld, civil indemnity increased.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 100225-26)

Criminal Informations and Charges

In Crim. Case No. 8517-MN, the information alleged that Santos, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery, and evident premeditation, conspired with others, and without justifiable cause and with the use of unlicensed firearms of unknown caliber, shot Glicerio Cupcupin y Reyes, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries that caused his death. In Crim. Case No. 8518-MN, the information charged that Santos, also with deliberate intent to kill, treachery, and evident premeditation, fired at Alberto Bautista y Cayetano with firearms of unknown caliber, inflicting serious physical injuries and performing acts which would have produced murder, but which did not result due to timely, able, and efficient medical attendance at the Tondo Medical Center, Manila—thus characterizing the offense as frustrated murder.

Facts as Found by the Trial Court

The trial court found that Glicerio Cupcupin and Alberto Bautista were riding on a jeep driven by Cupcupin on 26 May 1989. Around 11:45 a.m., as the jeep stopped at the corner of Estrella and Yangco Streets in Navotas and was about to make a right turn, two persons armed with short guns approached and fired at the jeep. Cupcupin was hit multiple times and died from multiple gunshot wounds, with an autopsy later confirming nineteen (19) gunshot wounds and death due to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds. Alberto Bautista sustained gunshot wounds in several parts of his body but survived by running away and taking cover in a store. Bautista testified that he identified one of the gunmen as Santos and the other as Mario Morales, stating that the other shooter fired at Cupcupin. Bautista further recounted that he saw Cupcupin slump and fall as gunshots struck him near the left side of his body near the waist.

The trial court also relied on the testimony of Police Aide Victorino Bohol, who was directing traffic when he heard gunshots. He saw two persons holding Cal. 45 pistols firing at persons aboard a stainless steel owner jeep. Bohol could not approach immediately because he had no firearm. After running to call for police assistance and returning, he learned Cupcupin had been killed. He then identified Santos through a one-way mirror at the police station. Bohol also testified that he did not recognize the two additional persons who, in his account, were also firing.

On investigation, Cpl. Sabino Patood testified that his inquiry followed intelligence tipping Santos’s involvement in the ambush that resulted in Cupcupin’s death. Patood stated that Santos admitted participation in the ambush during the interview. The trial court described the absence of a written statement, explaining that counsel was not available and Santos was not willing to submit a written statement.

Trial Court’s Treatment of the Defenses and Identification Evidence

Santos presented an alibi, supported by the testimonies of a friend and a sister, claiming that on the date and time of the ambush, he was in Ibaan, Batangas, having traveled there on 20 May 1989 due to a subpoena he received through family members in connection with a different case. He insisted he stayed continuously there from 12 June 1989 onward. The trial court rejected the alibi as weak, noting in substance that it was not established by independent and credible evidence and did not overcome the positive identification made by the prosecution’s witnesses—particularly by Bautista, the surviving victim.

In evaluating identification, the trial court credited Bautista’s and Bohol’s testimonies. It found Bautista’s opportunity to observe the assailants at close range during the sudden attack. It also found that Bohol, located about twelve (12) arm-lengths away and observing the events at about 11:45 a.m. in good weather, had an adequate vantage point and observed the actions of the shooters, including that one shooter stripped Cupcupin of his gun and jewelry before the attackers walked away.

Grounds Raised in the Appeal

Santos assigned multiple errors. He first argued that the witnesses’ identification lacked reliability. He contended that Bautista and Bohol purportedly saw him for the first time at the time of the crime yet identified him only five (5) months later at the police station, at a time he claimed was too distant from the incident to support accurate recognition. He also questioned the clarity of Bohol’s view due to his positioning relative to the ambushers.

Santos also argued, second, that the trial court improperly considered evidence from a separate case. In particular, he assailed the admission of a sworn statement by Ronaldo Guerrero (Exhibit “EE”), a witness in another criminal case (Criminal Case No. 8117) involving the murder of Daniel Nuguera, allegedly committed at the same location where Cupcupin and Bautista had been ambushed.

Third, Santos challenged the overall conviction, including the sufficiency of the identification and the rejection of his alibi.

Appellate Court’s Discussion on Identification and Credibility

The Court rejected Santos’s first and main argument. It held that the trial court’s factual conclusion rested on ample opportunity to observe. It emphasized that Bohol was about twelve (12) arm-lengths away and that the shooting happened at 11:45 a.m. in conditions described as favorable, with the sun nearly at its zenith. It also noted that Bohol’s testimony included the observation of unusual events following the shooting, such as one gunman removing a watch and a gun from Cupcupin’s body, which the Court treated as likely to remain in an eyewitness’s memory. Bautista, as the surviving victim who escaped death, had also every reason to remember the faces of the assailants, and the Court cited People v. Jacolo, et al. for the principle that reliable identity evidence is generally accepted when visibility is favorable and the witness is not biased, especially when the witness is the victim or a near-relative.

The Court likewise found no reversible error in the treatment of the defense claim about Bohol’s location. It accepted the Solicitor General’s observation that if Bohol was positioned in relation to the jeep as argued, then he could not have been confined solely to the left side of the assailants. It further reasoned that Bohol observed the shooters moving after firing and even leaving the scene after taking the victim’s possessions.

Police Line-Up and the Counsel Issue

Santos argued that he was not afforded the right to counsel during the police line-up, making the identification inadmissible. The Court treated this as premised on the assumption that counsel was required because Santos was already under custodial investigation at that stage. It applied doctrine from Gamboa v. Cruz, reiterated in People v. Loveria, that there is “no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police line-up,” because the usual practice involves investigating and questioning the witness, not interrogating the accused during the line-up.

The Court recognized a caveat in Gamboa but found nothing in the record showing that investigators sought to elicit admissions or confessions from Santos during the line-up. It stressed that the police did not interrogate him during the line-up and that he remained silent after being identified.

Santos further alleged improper suggestiveness during the line-up, amounting to an uncounselled confession. The Court found that the record did not show coaching of the witnesses by police investigators. It also held that the phrase “iyan po,” drawn from Bohol’s testimony on cross-examination, was too cryptic to qualify as a pointed and improper suggestion, especially in the context described where Santos was identified successively by Bautista and Bohol.

Claimed Inconsistencies in Witness Statements

Santos attacked the credibility of Bautista and Bohol by pointing to purported inconsistencies between pre-trial affidavits and trial testimony. The Court found that the alleged inconsistencies either did not exist or were minor and inconsequential. It considered immaterial that Bohol did not remember the type of shoes or the color of the guns, since the core matters were Bautista and Bohol’s ability to see the ambush, observe both assailants, and see the victims during the shooting. It also stated that the claimed discrepancies about the size of the line-up were immaterial because a police line-up is not essential to a proper and positive identification, and it held that whether Bautista or Cupcupin drove the jeep, or whether Bohol was directing traffic or taking merienda when gunshots were heard, could not be regarded as critical in the face of the direct identification evidence.

The Court further observed that minor inconsistencies tend to strengthen rather than weaken credibility because they negate rehearsal.

Admission of Guerrero Affidavit and Evidentiary Issues

On the second assignment of error, Santos argued that the Guerrero affidavit constituted hearsay because Guerrero was not presented as a witness. The Court held that the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the affidavit for limited purposes under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court on S

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