Title
People vs. Santos y Baingan
Case
G.R. No. 94545
Decision Date
Apr 4, 1997
A 1987 murder case where the victim’s dying declaration identified Francisco Santos as the shooter, overriding his alibi defense and affirming treachery.
dying declaration
admissibility
evidence
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 178198)

Information, Arraignment, and Trial Focus

The Information alleged that the appellant, with conspiracy and evident premeditation and treachery, shot David Ambre, causing his instant death. On arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty. The trial proceeded against the appellant alone because the co-accused, Villamor Asuncion, remained at large. After trial, the RTC rendered the assailed decision convicting the appellant of murder.

Factual Background as Presented by the Prosecution

The prosecution relied primarily on the testimonies of Corazon Dayao, Pedro Dayao Jr., and Lolita Ambre, supported by the medico-legal findings of Dr. Teodomiro Hufana Jr..

Corazon Dayao testified that on the evening of September 18, 1987, she was in the terrace of the Ambre residence, sorting dirty clothing near David, who was about half a meter away. She described dark and rainy conditions but noted a Coleman lamp that illuminated the area. She heard five successive gunshots and saw David fall to the ground. She then observed that David wanted to say something and asked Lolita’s attention, after which Lolita approached. Corazon testified that when David answered Lolita’s question as to who shot him, David stated, “It was Pare Pran.” Corazon claimed that she heard the words because she had also placed her head near David while he was still alive.

Lolita Ambre, the widow, narrated that she and David had just come out of their canteen and were washing their feet while David looked toward their jeep. She heard a gunshot and her husband cried, “Apo!” She testified that she jumped until Corazon told her that David wanted to say something. When she went near him, David said, “Pare Pran.” She knew that David was referring to Francisco Santos, the godfather of their youngest child. She further testified that after the shooting she gave a sworn statement to Pfc. Domingo D. Cuntapay dated September 25, 1987, initially implicating only Asuncion; however, during preliminary investigation she executed another affidavit before Judge Felipe Castaneta, disclosing that the assailant was Francisco Santos. She later executed further sworn statements before Pfc. Cuntapay reiterating her disclosure.

Pedro Dayao Jr., the driver, testified that he was inside the house rolling a rope when he heard five gun bursts. He heard Lolita cry out that someone had shot her “Manong,” and he rushed outside to escort Lolita and Corazon back into the house.

Medical Evidence on the Nature of the Wounds

Dr. Teodomiro Hufana Jr., the municipal health officer who conducted an autopsy, testified on the postmortem findings. He identified a gunshot wound with entrance at the left side of the body, injuring the left lung and bisecting the lower ventricle of the heart, with injury to the right lobe of the lungs and an exit at the right hypochondriac region. He also reported a gunshot wound through and through at the distal third of the forearm. He concluded that the cause of death was severe internal hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound.

He clarified that the Certificate of Death stated an “instant” interval between onset and death, but he testified that he was sure the victim still had “a few seconds or minute” before actual death. He opined that during those few seconds or minute, the victim could utter “about two or three words,” which could be audible and intelligible, and he emphasized that death due to bullets in the heart or lungs was not as instantaneous as death due to a bullet in the head.

Defense Evidence and Theories

The appellant testified in his own behalf. He denied killing David Ambre and raised alibi, claiming that at the time of the shooting he was at home waiting for his sick sisters’ arrival from Baguio. He asserted he did not leave his house until the next day when he learned of the victim’s death and that he and his wife even visited the wake. He further denied that his alias was “Pran,” stating it was “Frank.”

The defense also attempted to cast doubt on the true identity of the assailant through testimony regarding statements attributed to Mrs. Zeny Bayaua, a close friend of the widow. The appellant testified that Bayaua approached him and admitted that he was not the killer but that blame was placed on him to pressure him to name the real culprit. Defense counsel also testified that Bayaua asked him to convince appellant to disclose who really killed Ambre and that the widow and Bayaua responded that naming “pare Frank” who killed her husband would not lead to the accused’s prosecution. Additionally, Mariano Pimentel, Governor of Quirino, testified that Bayaua told him that appellant was staying with him but was not the real assailant and that blame was being used only to pressure appellant to reveal the truth. The defense doctor, Dr. David Longid, testified as an expert and suggested that the victim’s death was instantaneous, but he admitted that the time between onset and death in heart and lung injuries depended on the caliber of the gun and the physical makeup of the victim. He declined to state whether it was impossible for the victim to speak in the few seconds preceding death.

Issues Raised on Appeal

The appellant challenged the conviction on four principal grounds. He argued first that the victim could not have made any dying declaration because death was instantaneous. Second, he contended that even if the victim had spoken, the words uttered did not properly identify him as the killer. Third, he attacked the credibility of Lolita and Corazon for allegedly sounding incredible due to the circumstances. Fourth, he maintained that the evidence warranted acquittal rather than conviction.

Threshold Determination: Possibility of an Antemortem Utterance

The Court addressed the “threshold issue” of whether the victim’s antemortem statement identifying the appellant could qualify as a dying declaration sufficient to sustain conviction. On the question whether the victim died instantaneously, the Court held that the evidence did not support the appellant’s contention. Although the Certificate of Death indicated that the interval between onset and death was instant, the Court found undisputed testimony from Corazon and Lolita that David remained alive for a few seconds and uttered the words “Pare Pran.” The Court also relied on both Dr. Hufana’s testimony and the defense doctor’s admissions that heart and lung injuries did not necessarily cause instantaneous death.

To reinforce its factual conclusion, the Court cited doctrinal and medical authority. It noted the Court’s discussion in People vs. Obngayan that whether an act could have been done after receiving a wound must be decided on the merits of the particular case and that medical assertions of immediate loss of consciousness are not necessarily true in all situations. The Court observed that in the present case, the victim remained able to recognize and relay his assailant’s identity, and the brief interval between the shooting and the utterance did not preclude the possibility of a dying declaration.

The Court’s Treatment of the Statement as a Dying Declaration

The Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the victim’s revelations to Lolita and Corazon constituted both a dying declaration and part of the res gestae. The Court found that the statement’s utterance had been established by Corazon’s testimony in which she described calling for Lolita and placing her ear near the victim’s mouth, after which David told Lolita that “It was Pare Pran.” The Court found that Lolita’s testimony corroborated Corazon’s. Lolita testified on the witness stand that when her husband was shot he shouted “Apo!”, after which Corazon called her attention because David “wanted to say something,” and when she went near him, he uttered “Pare Pran.” The Court noted that the trial court was justified in giving full faith and credit to the dying declaration.

The Court reiterated the doctrine that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because a person aware of impending death would not make a careless and false accusation. It stated the requisites for admissibility in criminal cases: (1) the declaration is made under consciousness of impending death; (2) the deceased was competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of death; and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case where the declarant’s death is a subject of inquiry. It emphasized that the consciousness of impending death may be shown directly by the declarant’s statement or inferred from the nature and extent of the wounds and surrounding circumstances.

Applying these requisites, the Court held that although the victim’s statement consisted only of the words “Pare Pran,” it could not be expected that the victim would articulate his awareness of death’s inevitability. The seriousness of the injuries supported the inference that the victim’s utterances were made under consciousness of impending death. The Court also reasoned that the victim’s death, while not instantaneous, came swiftly thereafter, further supporting the inference that the victim knew recovery was hopeless.

The Court rejected the appellant’s insinuation that the victim might have mentioned the appellant’s name for an implausible or jocular reason, noting that the trial record provided no basis for such speculation. The Court also found that attempts to shake Lolita’s version failed, as Lolita adamantly maintained that her husband told her Pare Pran was the shooter and that David’s words were in response to her question as to who shot him. It held that the declaratory naming of the appellant as assailant deserved full weight and was admissible as a dying declaration. The Court further held that the same declaration was properly admitted as part of the res gestae.

Res Gestae Admissibility

The Court treated the statement as admissible under the doctrine of res gestae. It explained that a declaration m

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