G.R. No. 103567 - People vs. Salle, Jr. y Gercilla

Case Summary (G.R. No. 103567)

Procedural History

The RTC (Branch 88, Quezon City) convicted the appellants of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson and sentenced each to reclusion perpetua plus joint and several indemnity of P50,000 to the victim’s heirs. The appellants timely appealed; this Court docketed and accepted the appeal on 24 March 1993. Francisco Salle, Jr. filed a motion to withdraw his appeal, verified by his counsel to have been signed without counsel and in the context of acceptance of a conditional pardon dated 9 December 1993; Salle was discharged 28 December 1993. Ricky Mengote was likewise granted a conditional pardon and released but did not file a motion to withdraw his appeal. The Bureau of Corrections submitted certified photocopies of the conditional pardons and certificates of release; the pardons provided release upon acceptance, but did not show when acceptance occurred. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintained the pardon to Mengote was unenforceable because conviction was not final.

Applicable Constitutional Provision and Chronology

Because the decision date is after 1990, the Court applied the 1987 Constitution. Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that, except in impeachment or as otherwise provided, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, "after conviction by final judgment." The opinion traces the historical constitutional treatment of the pardoning power: under the Jones Law the executive could pardon any time after commission of the offense; the 1935 Constitution limited pardons to "after conviction"; the original 1973 Constitution required "after final conviction"; the 1981 amendments removed the finality requirement; and the 1987 Constitution restored the "after conviction by final judgment" requirement.

Precedents Considered

The Court reviewed earlier cases referenced in the record: People v. Vera (interpretation of the 1935 provision), People v. Crisola (pardon during appeal under a constitutional scheme permitting pardons without final conviction, observed to put an end to an appeal), Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. (statement that acceptance of pardon amounts to abandonment of appeal — characterized in the present opinion as obiter dictum and not a controlling rule under the 1987 Constitution), and the Court’s own prior resolutions in People v. Pedro Sepada and People v. Hinlo (directing that parole/pardon not be processed when appeals remain pending and requiring administrative safeguards).

Legal Issue Presented

Whether a conditional pardon granted to an appellant during the pendency of his appeal from a trial-court conviction is enforceable under the 1987 Constitution’s limitation that pardons be granted "after conviction by final judgment."

Court’s Analytical Framework

The Court emphasized the significance of the "conviction by final judgment" requirement as a constitutional safeguard of judicial power and the appellate process. An appeal vests exclusive jurisdiction in the appellate court over the case; allowing executive clemency to take effect before finality risks frustrating the administration of justice and undermining separation of powers by permitting the executive to alter the consequences of a conviction while the judicial determination remains under review. The Court contrasted the present constitutional rule with prior regimes under which pardons could be granted earlier and noted that precedents decided under earlier constitutions (or addressing different constitutional texts) cannot override the present constitutional limitation.

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon—whether full or conditional—to an accused while his appeal from a conviction by the trial court is pending. Any application for executive clemency should not be acted upon, nor should the process leading to its grant be begun, unless the appeal has been withdrawn and the judgment has become final. Acceptance of a pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal. Release of an accused from custody by virtue of a pardon, commutation, or parole prior to withdrawal of an appeal is improper and those responsible for such release may be administratively liable.

Directives and Case Disposition

Because Ricky Mengote had not withdrawn his appeal, the conditional pardon granted to him should not have been enforced. However, recognizing past administrative practices and the fact that other pardonees had been released, the Court afforded Mengote a remedial opportunity: his counsel was given 30 days to secure and file a withdrawal of the appeal; the conditional pardon would take effect only upon such withdrawal. The Court ordered that, in case of non-compliance, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every effort to retake

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 103567)

Procedural Posture and Case Caption

Citation: 321 Phil. 169 EN BANC; G.R. No. 103567; Decision dated December 04, 1995; ponencia by Justice Davide, Jr.
Parties: People of the Philippines (Plaintiff-Appellee) v. Francisco Salle, Jr. y Gercilla @ "Ka Nonoy," Ricky Mengote y Cuntado @ "Ka Ricky/Ka Liza/Ka Jun," and Ten John Does; Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote y Cuntado are Accused-Appellants.
Relief sought on appeal: Review of trial court convictions and the collateral question of the enforceability of a conditional pardon granted to one appellant (Ricky Mengote) during the pendency of his appeal before this Court.
Lower court disposition: Branch 88, RTC Quezon City, Criminal Case No. Q-90-11835 — decision dated 18 November 1991 (per Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco) finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson; each sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay jointly and severally P50,000.00 indemnity to heirs of the victim.
Appeals: Appellants seasonably filed Notices of Appeal; this Court accepted the appeal on 24 March 1993.

Factual Background Relevant to Pardon and Appeal

Presidential action: Conditional pardons were granted separately to Francisco Salle, Jr. and to Ricky Mengote; the conditional pardon for Salle was dated 9 December 1993 (same date reference made for Mengote).
Releases: Salle was discharged from the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) on 28 December 1993 following his conditional pardon; Mengote was likewise released and left for his province immediately after release.
Motions and counsel verification:
- On 6 January 1994, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
- The Court required verification of voluntariness from Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o (FLAG). In her Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Atty. La'o stated Salle signed the motion without counsel assistance because he was under the misimpression that the motion was a bureaucratic requirement for early release following the grant of conditional pardon.
- Atty. La'o informed the Court that Mengote had been granted a conditional pardon and released on the same dates and that Mengote immediately left for his province without consulting her.
- Mengote had not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal by the time of the Supreme Court's proceedings.
Administrative record submissions: On 3 June 1993, Assistant Director Jesus P. Villanueva of the Bureau of Corrections submitted certified photocopies of the conditional pardons granted to Salle and to Mengote and their certificates of release. The conditional pardon documents stated that release was "upon acceptance of the pardon," but the records did not show when the appellants accepted the pardon.
Office of the Solicitor General position: In its Comment of 17 August 1994, OSG asserted that acceptance of the conditional pardon implied admission of guilt and acceptance of sentence, and thus the appeal should be dismissed.
Presidential Committee explanation: The Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, or Pardon (through a Comment by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano) explained that:
- The Secretariat assisting the Committee has a standing agreement with FLAG and other human rights organizations to recommend conditional pardons for certain convicted persons and that the NGOs' lawyers will take care of filing motions to withdraw appeals where necessary, because presidential pardon may be extended only to those serving sentence after final conviction.
- Before recommending conditional pardon, the Secretariat checks with the Bureau of Corrections whether recommendees have pending appeals so they may be advised to withdraw appeals.
- Per information from Assistant Director Villanueva, Mengote's BuCor prison record did not show a pending appeal with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court; thus, the Secretariat was not able to advise withdrawal of appeal and misappreciation of facts resulted from incomplete records.
- Mariano assured the Court there was no intention to violate Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Specific Procedural Steps Ordered by the Court During the Proceedings

The Court, considering Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, ordered:
- The Office of the Solicitor General and counsel for the accused-appellants to submit memoranda within thirty (30) days on the issue of enforceability of the conditional pardon.
- The Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court, within ten (10) days, why it recommended a conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal.
Subsequent procedural resolution in this case:
- On 23 March 1994, this Court granted Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and considered the case closed and terminated insofar as he is concerned.
- For Mengote, because he had not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal, the enforceability of his conditional pardon became the primary question.

Legal Issue Presented

Pivotal issue identified by the Court: Whether a pardon (conditional or full) granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable under the 1987 Constitution and applicable law.
Ancillary questions: Whether acceptance of a pardon by an appellant during the pendency of appeal operates as abandonment of the appeal and whether agencies may act on pardon applications when appeals are pending.

Governing Constitutional Provisions and Historical Evolution of the Pardoning Power (as Discussed)

Jones Law (Philippine Autonomy Act), Section 21: vested the Governor-General with “exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures”; under the Jones Law and common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, before or after conviction.
1935 Constitution, Article VII, Section 10(6): President has power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, "after conviction" — stricter than Jones Law because it required "after conviction."
1973 Constitution (original Section 14, Article IX): Prime Minister may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, "after final conviction" — introduced the "final conviction" requirement.
1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution: removed the "final conviction" limitation, reverting to a broader power (permitting pardons even before finality).
1987 Constitution, Section 19, Article VII: restored the stricter limitation: President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, "after conviction by final judgment" — the provision at issue in the present case.

Precedents and Authorities Discussed by the Court

People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56 [1937]) — Court held framers of 1935 Constitution provided pardoning power only after conviction as a limitation compared to Jones Law.
In re Lontok (1922), and citation to United States constitutional analogy — referenced in context of pardoning power under Jones Law.
Cristobal v. Labrador (71 Phil. 34 [1940]) — cited in exposition of limitations on pardoning power.
People v. Crisola (128 SCRA 1 [1984]) — held that grant of executive clemency during pendency of appeal may serve to put an end to the appeal; Court noted that Crisola was decided under the 1973 Constitution provision permitting pardon at any time (i.e., not requiring fina