Title
People vs. Rojas
Case
G.R. No. L-46960-62
Decision Date
Jan 8, 1987
In 1973, seven men led by Wilfredo Rojas brutally murdered three girls in Zamboanga del Sur, severing ears and using "anting-anting" rituals. Convicted of murder, they were sentenced to death, with the Supreme Court affirming the ruling, citing conspiracy, treachery, and evident premeditation.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-46960-62)

Factual Background

In January 1973, a stranger identified as Wilfredo Rojas, coming from Barrio Tuboran, Malangas, also of Zamboanga del Sur, arrived in Barrio Talanusa. The evidence showed that he befriended the other accused, taught them Christian prayers—“Our Father,” “Hail Mary,” and “I Believe”—as he understood the Christian faith, and sold them on credit an item described as “an ting-anting” oil. According to Rojas, the oil, when rubbed on their bodies, would protect them from injury.

Rojas returned to Talanusa in April 1973, staying for about two weeks, and then returned again in May 1973 for another period. During these stays, he joined his new-found companions in drinking and in reciting the prayers he had taught them. These activities formed the lead-in to the killings that later occurred by the sea at Digon.

On May 23, 1973, Rojas and his companions went to the church in Talanusa, where they prayed, rubbed the amulet oil on their bodies, and girded themselves as if for combat. The evidence established that Rojas carried a shotgun and a knife. Estrera carried a shotgun and a knife. Tundag carried a revolver and a knife. Esmael, Masong, Solomon Totoy, and Saturnino Totoy carried knives, while Villarin had no weapons.

Rojas told them they were going to Digon. The group then proceeded to Digon on foot, about a half-hour walk away. At the seashore at the site later described as containing the victims in a “tapahan,” the accused surrounded the copra kiln enclosure to prevent the girls inside from escaping. The group then attacked Zenaida Nastae and the Carluman sisters, including Canda, Mona, and another girl identified as Dalma and Lina, whose presence placed the age range at from ten years to one.

The trial court found that Rojas approached Zenaida and pretended to look for someone named Yoyong, continuing casual conversation after receiving a negative answer. The evidence portrayed the victims initially as not apprehensive. A sudden act followed. Solomon Totoy fired at Dalma, but the gun jammed. Rojas then pulled out his knife and stabbed Zenaida once in the left side of her body, causing her fatal injury. After that, Rojas stabbed Canda (described as stabbed or shot), causing bleeding to death. Finally, Rojas attacked the smallest girl, Mona, stabbing her twice in the stomach and once in the back, also killing her. The killings were rendered more disturbing by the evidence that the ears of Zenaida and Mona were severed, though the trial court found it unclear when the severing occurred and by whom it was done.

After the butchery, Rojas ordered the group to run, and they fled together from the bloody sands. Dalma escaped with her sister Lina, who both survived by fleeing to the sea and holding on to a log until the men left. The prosecution relied on Dalma and on two state witnesses, Esmael and Estrera, to supply the details of the incident. The Supreme Court accepted the trial judge’s factual findings, despite asserted inconsistencies in the state witnesses’ testimony, and it emphasized the trial judge’s superior opportunity to observe demeanor and credibility.

Trial Court Proceedings and Conviction

The day after the massacre, seven persons were arrested in Barrio Talanusa: Teodoro Villarin, Saturnino Totoy, Solomon Totoy, Gregorio Tundag, Sinfroso Masong, Mohamod Esmael, and Balbino Estrera. Later, Wilfredo Rojas was arrested in Malangas and turned over to the police at Margosatubig.

The arresting officers confiscated and found in possession various articles described in the record, including homemade firearms and knives, as well as items described as mystic or ritual in character, and human ears. All the remaining accused were charged in separate informations with the murder of the victims and pleaded not guilty. On motion of the prosecution, and over the objection of the other defendants, Esmael and Estrera were discharged to serve as state witnesses.

All the defendants, except for the discharged state witnesses, were provided with counsel de oficio. After an extended trial, the trial court rendered judgment on January 27, 1975, convicting all the accused-appellants. It sentenced them to death, except Saturnino Totoy, whose penalty was reduced to eight years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal by reason of the mitigating circumstance of minority. The trial court also imposed solidary civil liability of P12,000.00 for the heirs of each of the three victims. The sentence of death brought the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Issues Raised by the Appellants

The appellants challenged the conviction on several grounds. They argued that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy. They also disputed the imposition of the death penalty collectively, and the trial court’s treatment of certain aggravating circumstances, particularly cuadrilla, dwelling, and evident premeditation. Additionally, Solomon Totoy contested the validity and admissibility of his supposed extrajudicial confession, claiming that it was taken in violation of the Bill of Rights.

The Parties’ Contentions on Conspiracy and Participation

The Supreme Court applied settled standards on conspiracy: it exists when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to carry it out. Although direct proof is desirable, conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence when the accused move in concert toward a common purpose. Thus, the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime may show whether a conspiracy existed.

In this case, the Court reasoned that the accused had engaged in concerted preparations at the church, involving prayers for victory, anointing with oil against injury and death, and girding for combat. The Court held that such solemn preparations were not consistent with the claim that the outing was harmless. It further noted that Rojas needed only to announce their destination; the accused could not reasonably claim ignorance of the mission given the firearms and the circumstances. The Court placed weight on what occurred at the scene: upon arrival in the tapahan around eleven o’clock that morning, the accused immediately positioned themselves around the copra kiln to prevent the girls from escaping, forming an effective siege. The Court found that the accused assumed their spots without visible need for assignments and that none reacted, protested, or intervened when Solomon Totoy attempted to shoot Dalma or when Rojas initiated the killings.

The Court also considered the cutting off of the ears on Rojas’ orders as further evidence of a preconceived plan, and it cited the group’s obedient flight after the massacre as consistent with coordinated execution rather than spontaneous violence. Against the defense narrative, the Court held that these acts—not solely the testimony of co-conspirators—established conspiracy. Once conspiracy was established, the Court treated each conspirator as a co-principal and equally liable on the legal theory that the act of one is the act of all.

Qualified Treachery and Determination of Aggravating Circumstances

The Court held that the killings were committed with treachery, which qualifies the murders. It defined treachery as the employment of means, methods, or forms tending directly and specially to insure the execution of the offense without risk from the defense the offended parties might make. The Court found that the victims were young, defenseless girls confronted by eight full-grown men armed with guns and knives. It further held that the accused pretended to be looking for someone, enabling surprise and ensuring the success of the attack. The resulting deaths of the three victims corroborated that treachery had been successfully employed.

The Court rejected some aggravating circumstances. It refused to sustain dwelling because the tapahan where the murders occurred was a separate structure and did not form part of the building where the victims resided. It also rejected band because it was considered absorbed by treachery. The Court reasoned that cuadrilla or band is already covered when treachery is present, since the number and the group’s conscious adoption of a coordinated method minimize the risk to the assailants from the victims’ possible defense.

On evident premeditation, however, the Court upheld its appreciation. It distinguished cases where direct proof of deliberation exists under normal conditions—where evident premeditation may be taken for granted from the established conspiracy—from implied conspiracy cases, where proof must show how and when the plan was hatched and the time that elapsed before execution. In this case, the Court found sufficient evidence of an opportunity for reflection. It identified the planning as possibly having started during Rojas’ meetings with the other members in April and May, or at the latest when the group assembled in the church at Talanusa before proceeding to Digon. The Court held that between leaving the church and arriving at Digon—about a thirty-minute walk over roughly a two-kilometer stretch—the accused had time to reflect, consult their conscience, and desist if they wished, yet they persisted in carrying out their mission.

Solomon Totoy’s Extrajudicial Confession

With respect to Solomon Totoy’s extrajudicial confession, the Court evaluated its admissibility under Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, as interpreted in Magtoto v. Manguera and subsequent cases. Those cases held that the constitutional requirement should have only prospective operation from January 17, 1973, the date of ratification.

The record showed that the confession was obtained on May 28, 1973, thus falling within the period covered by the constitutional protection. The Court ruled that the record did not show compliance with the requirement that an accused under investigation be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel. The Co

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.