Case Summary (G.R. No. 234825)
Key Dates
Original trial court order of dismissal: December 16, 1936.
Supreme Court decision date: October 18, 1938.
Applicable constitutional framework: 1935 Philippine Constitution (decision predates 1990).
Applicable Law and Authorities Cited
- Revised Penal Code: Article 17 (definition of principals), Article 367 (repeal reference to prior statute).
- Act No. 1697 (previously penalized subornation of perjury; expressly repealed by article 367 of the Revised Penal Code).
- Act No. 2709 (provides certain immunity to a witness used by the prosecution).
- General Orders, No. 58, sec. 44 (on appealability of orders).
- Precedents cited: U. S. v. Ballentine, 4 Phil. 672; U. S. v. Abanzado, 37 Phil. 658.
Procedural History
An information charged Pudol and Reyes with perjury, alleging Pudol subscribed a false affidavit and Reyes induced and cooperated in that act. At trial the provincial fiscal moved for the discharge of Pudol so she could be used as a prosecution witness; Pudol was dismissed for that purpose. Reyes then moved for dismissal as to him on two grounds: (1) that dismissal of the alleged principal (Pudol) eliminated the basis for prosecuting the suborner (Reyes); and (2) that subornation of perjury had been expressly repealed and was not penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The trial court dismissed Reyes on the first ground without resolving the second. The fiscal appealed.
Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court’s order dismissing the case as to Reyes was appealable.
- Whether the dismissal of the alleged principal (Pudol) for use as a prosecution witness precluded prosecution of Reyes as a suborner or as a principal by inducement/cooperation under article 17 of the Revised Penal Code.
Court’s Analysis — Appealability
The Supreme Court held the dismissal order was appealable. Two principal reasons were given: (1) Because Reyes had withdrawn his plea of not guilty and thus had not yet pleaded to the information, the trial court could not have rendered a final judgment on the merits; and (2) the order was not an acquittal of Reyes. Citing General Orders No. 58, sec. 44 and precedent (U. S. v. Ballentine), the Court concluded the order was an interlocutory disposition subject to appeal by the fiscal.
Court’s Analysis — Nature of the Fiscal’s Motion and Effect on Proof of the Principal
The Supreme Court reviewed the fiscal’s motion and found the trial court had misread its substance. The fiscal had stated that there was “no other direct evidence to support the information except the testimony of said accused” (Pudol) and that her testimony “can be substantially corroborated in its material points.” The trial court had inferred from the motion that the principal act could not be proven and thus that subornation could not constitute a crime. The Supreme Court rejected that inference: the motion did not assert impossibility of proof but rather the tactical necessity of Pudol’s testimony and the possibility of corroboration.
Court’s Analysis — Presumption of Innocence and the Effect of Discharge for Use as Witness
The Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s view that Pudol’s discharge restored a presumption of innocence that would preclude finding Reyes guilty. The fiscal’s motion did not seek dismissal on grounds of Pudol’s innocence; it sought discharge to use Pudol as a witness against Reyes. While Act No. 2709 provides certain immunity to a testifying witness used by the prosecution, such immunity is not equivalent to a judicial determination restoring a presumption of innocence, and discharge for use as a witness does not alter the legal status of a co-accused for purposes of prosecution. The Court cited U. S. v. Abanzado for the proposition that discharge for use as a witness does not equate to an acquittal or to restoration of innocence that would bar prosecution of a co-accused.
Court’s Analysis — Subornation and the Revised Penal Code (Article 17)
The Supreme Court addressed the contention that subornation of perjury had been removed from the Revised Penal Code by repeal of Act No. 1697. The Court examined article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines principals to include: (1) those who directly commit the act; (2) “Those who directly force or induce others to commit it” (subsection 2); and (3) those who cooperate by another act without which the offense would not have been accompl
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 234825)
Citation and Decision
- Full citation: 66 Phil. 365 [ G.R. No. 45618. October 18, 1938 ].
- Decision delivered by Justice Concepcion.
- Case caption: The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. Esminia Pudol and Alberto Reyes, Defendants.
- Final disposition by the Supreme Court: the order appealed from was reversed and the case remanded to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur for further proceedings in accordance with law, with costs to the appellee.
- Justices concurring in the result: Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ.
Facts of the Case
- An information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur charging Esminia Pudol and Alberto Reyes with the crime of perjury.
- The charge alleged that Esminia Pudol subscribed a false affidavit by induction and that Alberto Reyes cooperated in and participated directly in the execution of that false affidavit.
- At the calling of the case for trial, the provincial fiscal moved for the discharge of Esminia Pudol so that she could be utilized as a witness for the prosecution against her co-accused.
- Upon arraignment, Alberto Reyes pleaded not guilty, but he withdrew that plea shortly thereafter.
- The trial court, acting on the fiscal’s motion, dismissed the case as to Esminia Pudol for the purpose set forth by the fiscal (i.e., to utilize her as a witness).
- Following the dismissal as to Pudol, the accused Alberto Reyes moved for dismissal as to him, advancing two grounds:
- (1) That the dismissal as to Pudol, who was the alleged principal by direct participation, left no ground for prosecuting Reyes as suborner; and
- (2) That the Revised Penal Code does not penalize subornation of perjury because section 4 of Act No. 1697 (which formerly penalized subornation of perjury) had been expressly repealed by article 367 of the Revised Penal Code.
- The trial court sustained Reyes’s first ground and deemed it unnecessary to pass upon the second ground, and it dismissed the case as to Alberto Reyes by an order dated December 16, 1936.
- The provincial fiscal appealed from the order dismissing Reyes.
Procedural Question Presented (Appealability)
- The accused contended, indirectly through memorandum authorities, that the trial court’s order was an order of dismissal on the merits and therefore not appealable by the fiscal.
- The Supreme Court considered whether the order appealed from was appealable.
Court’s Ruling on Appealability
- The Court held the contention that the order was an unappealable dismissal on the merits to be untenable for two stated reasons:
- First, because the accused had withdrawn his plea of not guilty and thus had not yet pleaded to the information; in that procedural posture it was legally impossible to decide the case upon its merits.
- Second, because the order of dismissal by the trial court was not an acquittal of the accused and therefore was appealable under applicable rules (citing section 44, General Orders No. 58; and U. S. vs. Ballentine, 4 Phil., 672).
- On these bases, the Supreme Court deemed the fiscal’s appeal properly taken.
Trial Court’s Reasoning for Dismissal — As Stated in the Order
- The trial court’s dismissal was grounded upon its interpretation of the fiscal’s motion, specifically:
- The fiscal’s motion alleged “that there is absolute necessity of the testimony of said accused” Esminia Pudol, because “there is no other direct evidence to support the information.”
- The trial court inferred from this that “there is no means of showing that Esminia Pudol has committed perjury or has given false testimony.”
- The trial court reasoned further that if the principal act could not be proven, then even if subornation were shown, subornation would not constitute a crime be