Case Summary (G.R. No. 101127-31)
Factual Background
The records showed that Reyes was charged in three criminal cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and in two criminal cases for estafa, all in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37. The cases were jointly tried and were decided by Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez on March 12, 1991. For the three B.P. Blg. 22 cases, Reyes was convicted and sentenced to a total of two years of imprisonment and to pay a total fine of P96,290.00. For the estafa cases, the trial court rendered two separate convictions: in Criminal Case No. 86-51209, Reyes was found guilty of estafa and sentenced to twenty-two years of reclusion perpetua, with accessory penalties, and to indemnify the complaining witness in the sum of P80,540.00 and to pay the costs; in Criminal Case No. 86-51210, she was likewise convicted and given an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six years and one day of prision mayor and a maximum of fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with accessory penalties, indemnity to the offended party of P15,750.00, and costs.
While the matters were elevated to appellate review, it appeared that Reyes was under provisional liberty on bail in the criminal cases, including Criminal Case No. 86-51209, based on a corporate surety bond posted by Oriental Assurance Corporation in the amount of P86,000.00. The Court noted that the bond had been posted pursuant to a trial court order dated May 16, 1991, hence prior to the Court’s resolution dated October 15, 1991 referred to in the consultation.
Procedural History and Referral to the Court En Banc
Reyes’ convictions were appealed to the Court of Appeals, which forwarded the cases to the Supreme Court because the penalty of reclusion perpetua was involved. During the pendency of the review, the question whether Reyes could remain on bail pending the appeal became the subject of referral en consulta to the Court En Banc. The referral specifically concerned her conviction of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 and the consequent sentencing to serve twenty-two years of reclusion perpetua, together with accessory penalties and indemnification, with the provisional-liberty status existing due to her existing bail.
The Legal Question Presented
The Court En Banc framed the issue as whether, consistent with constitutional and procedural developments and the Court’s earlier ruling in People vs. Ricardo C. Cortez, an accused convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua could be allowed to and remain on bail during the pendency of her appeal. The inquiry had to be answered in light of the earlier en banc bail-effect policies and in light of changes stemming from the 1987 Constitution and related amendments to Rule 114, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
The Court’s Reference to People vs. Ricardo C. Cortez
In addressing the bail issue, the Court En Banc reproduced the policies established in People vs. Ricardo C. Cortez for the effectivity of bail after conviction. Those policies were articulated through three principal rules. First, where the accused, originally out on bail, was charged with an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua and was convicted after trial of the offense charged or of a lesser offense, the accused could generally remain free on the original bail pending appeal unless the proper court ordered otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2(a, as amended). Second, where the accused was charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, similarly, after trial conviction for a lesser offense than that charged, the same approach applied. Third, and decisive for convictions for the offense charged where the charged offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, the accused’s bond was to be cancelled and the accused placed in confinement pending resolution of the appeal.
The Cortez resolution also laid down operational rules for cases covered by that third situation, describing the steps for surrender by the bondsman, the transmittal of the accused to the penal institution through the proper law enforcement channel, and the consequences of failure to surrender, including forfeiture and dismissal of the appeal under Section 8, Rule 124 for jumping bail.
Constitutional and Statutory Antecedents on Bail and Non-Bailability
To resolve the consultation, the Court undertook a historical and doctrinal examination of the constitutional and statutory changes governing bail. The Court recalled that before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the rule on non-bailability was limited in its scope and applied singularly to capital offenses where evidence of guilt was strong. As of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, bail was treated as a matter of right except in capital cases, with the controlling definition of a capital offense then being one punishable with death under the law in force at the time of commission and at the time of application for bail.
With the 1987 Constitution’s prohibition on the death penalty, a corresponding constitutional provision declared that bail was unavailable to persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt was strong. The Court pointed out that Rule 114 had been correspondingly amended to align with this constitutional command, providing that no bail shall be granted for an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.
The Court rejected the notion that the constitutional and procedural language permitted exceptions or distinctions. It stressed that the 1987 Constitution and the amended rules were unequivocal and could not be judicially qualified beyond their terms.
Application to Estafa Punishable by Reclusion Perpetua
Against this backdrop, the Court addressed whether Reyes—convicted of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua—should receive the benefit of remaining on bail despite her conviction. The Court reasoned that nothing in the constitutional and rule text exempted estafa punishable by reclusion perpetua from the non-bailability principle.
The Court further addressed the classification of penalties under Presidential Decree No. 818, which had amended Article 315. The decree provided that false pretenses or fraudulent acts under paragraph 2(d) involving the relevant amount of fraud would be punished by increasing penalties culminating in reclusion perpetua for cases where the amount exceeded the prescribed threshold. The Court discussed the legal basis for treating durations exceeding twenty years—the maximum duration of reclusion temporal—as falling within the ambit of reclusion perpetua, even though the Code did not specify a minimum and maximum for reclusion perpetua in the manner it did for other penalties. It anchored the computation and classification on the Revised Penal Code’s provisions on duration and on related rules for pardon eligibility and service of multiple penalties.
The Court then rejected the proposed policy rationale that estafa, being a crime against property, was not as “heinous” as crimes against persons or chastity and therefore should not be treated like those offenses for purposes of bail denial. It held that such determinations were for the legislature, not for judicial legislation or for judicial modification of constitutional and statutory commands. The Court also cited the prevalence and damage caused by large-scale or professional swindling to justify the legislative policy embedded in the denial of bail for such offenses.
Legislative Policy and the Limited Scope of PD 818
The Court clarified that P.D. No. 818 did not apply to all forms of estafa but only to estafa by deceit under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315, described in the text as estafa through bouncing checks. It quoted the preambular rationale of P.D. No. 818, which noted an upsurge in bouncing-check estafa and emphasized the need to protect public confidence in negotiable instruments, trade and commerce, and the banking system.
The Court then situated the punitive policy within broader legislative patterns. It noted that reclusion perpetua was imposed not only for crimes characterized by inherent odiousness, such as offenses involving homicide or assaults against chastity, but also in property crimes and other offenses where the moral depravity, criminal perversity, or the necessity of protecting government, financial, and economic interests justified severe punishment. The Court cited examples within the Revised Penal Code where reclusion perpetua could be imposed due to qualifying circumstances or increased degrees for various property and protective-punishment categories.
Disposition: Cancellation of Bail and Orders for Surrender and Confinement
Applying the controlli
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 101127-31)
- The case reached the Court En Banc through an en consulta referral of the First Division, which raised the question of whether Cresencia C. Reyes, then convicted of estafa punishable by reclusion perpetua, could remain on bail pending appeal.
Parties and Procedural Posture
- The People of the Philippines acted as Plaintiff-Appellee.
- Cresencia C. Reyes acted as Accused-Appellant.
- The First Division issued a resolution dated May 13, 1992 referring to the Court En Banc the bail question.
- The Court En Banc resolved the matter in a resolution dated August 07, 1992.
- The underlying criminal cases were tried jointly in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, decided by Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez on March 12, 1991.
- The cases reached the Court on appeal and were forwarded by the Court of Appeals to the Court because of the penalty of reclusion perpetua involved.
Key Factual Allegations
- The accused was charged in three cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and in two cases for estafa.
- The estafa convictions were in Criminal Case No. 86-51209 and Criminal Case No. 86-51210.
- In Criminal Case No. 86-51209, the trial court found the accused guilty of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and imposed twenty-two (22) years of reclusion perpetua, including accessory penalties, plus indemnification in the sum of P80,540.00 and costs.
- In Criminal Case No. 86-51210, the trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence with prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal as maximum, plus accessory penalties, indemnification in the sum of P15,750.00, and costs.
- While the appeal was pending, the accused remained on provisional liberty on bail, including in Criminal Case No. 86-51209, under a corporate surety bond posted by Oriental Assurance Corporation in the amount of P86,000.00.
Relevant Statutory and Constitutional Background
- The Court traced the bail issue through constitutional and procedural changes affecting non-bailability of offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua.
- Prior to the 1987 Constitution, bail was treated as a matter of right except when the offense was capital and the evidence of guilt was strong.
- The Court treated a capital offense under the earlier procedural framework as one punishable with death at the time of commission and at the time of the bail application.
- The 1987 Constitution barred the imposition of the death penalty, and correspondingly declared non-bailability for persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong.
- The Court emphasized that the constitutional rule was implemented procedurally by amendments to Rule 114, Sec. 3, which provided that no bail shall be granted to those charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.
- The Court also noted a penal-law backdrop specific to the accused’s estafa charge, including the amendment introduced by Presidential Decree No. 818 to Article 315.
People v. Cortez Bail Policies
- The Court relied on its earlier resolution en banc in People vs. Ricardo C. Cortez for the effect of an accused’s bond after conviction pending appeal.
- The Cortez policies distinguished among cases based on whether the offense charged and punishable at the time of commission and bail application was less than reclusion perpetua, or punishable by reclusion perpetua, and whether the conviction was for the same offense or a lesser offense.
- Under the first Cortez rule, when the accused was originally charged with an offense punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua, and was out on bail, then after trial the accused could remain free on original bail pending appeal if convicted of the charged offense or a lesser offense, unless the proper court directed otherwise under Rule 114, Sec. 2(a) as amended.
- Under the second Cortez rule, the same principle applied when the accused was initially charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and was out on bail, but was later convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged.
- Under the third Cortez rule, when the accused was initially charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and was out on bail, and the trial court convicted the accused of the offense charged, the bond had to be cancelled and the accused had to be placed in confinement pending resolution of the appeal.
- The Court further laid down operational rules for Cortez-covered cases already pending on appeal before it where the accused remained on provisional liberty.
- For those cases, the Court ordered the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from notice to the court of origin, with the Court ordering bond cancellation thereafter.
- The Court required the trial court, immediately after surrender, to order transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons through the Philippine National Police, to maintain confinement pending appeal.
- The Court ruled that if surrender did not occur within ten days, the bond would be forfeited, an order of arrest would issue, and the appeal would be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 on the theory that the accused had jumped bail.