G.R. No. L-25265 - People vs. Ramos

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-25265)

Criminal Charges for Copyright Violations and Filings

On September 3, 1965, the prosecution filed two criminal cases against Ramos in the Court of First Instance of Manila: Criminal Case No. 80006 (Branch III) and Criminal Case No. 80007 (Branch XIV). The information in each case was identical in the manner of charging the alleged violation, except that they related to different editions of the same textbook.

In Criminal Case No. 80007, the information alleged that from July to September 1963, in Manila and within the court’s jurisdiction, Ramos—acting as proprietor and general manager of the National Book Store, a business engaged in publishing, selling, and distributing books—wilfully and illegally sold and distributed spurious and pirated copies of the high school textbook “General Science Today for Philippine Schools, First Year” by Gilman, Van Houten, and Cornista. It further alleged that Ramos knew the book was duly copyrighted by the Phoenix Publishing House, Inc. and that it was distributed exclusively by its sister corporation, Alemar’s or Sibal and Sons, Inc.

Motions to Quash Based on Prescription

On September 7, 1965, Ramos filed identical motions to quash in both criminal cases on the ground of prescription, relying on the alleged date of discovery and prior rulings, including reference to the Pangasinan Trans. Co. case. She argued that the discovery of the alleged offense occurred as early as July 17, 1963, and that subsequent knowledge, including matters confirmed by a police search on September 4, 1963, merely corroborated the earlier discovery.

Under her theory, prescription began the day after discovery on July 17, 1963, and thus the offenses had long prescribed by the time the informations were filed. Even assuming arguendo that the start of computation should be the date of the last actual sale, she maintained that the last sale was on August 30, 1963, which still made prescription complete before September 3, 1965.

Prosecution’s Opposing Theory of Continuing Offense and Computation

The prosecution, in both cases, opposed the motions to quash. It argued first that the prescription issue required evidence and was therefore premature before trial. Second, it insisted that the offense was a continuing offense, so the prescriptive period should be computed from the alleged completion of the last act, which it claimed occurred on September 3, 1963. On that basis, when the information was filed on September 3, 1965, it was said to be within the two-year period, even if filed on the last day.

Ramos, in her reply, contested this by insisting that if computation started from August 30, 1963, the last invoiced sale, prescription had already set in. She further argued that if computation started from September 3, 1963—as the prosecution preferred—the two-year period was “tolled” when reckoned under Article 13 of the New Civil Code because 1964 was a leap year. She asserted that the total number of days for two years was 730 days, and that the 730th day fell on September 2, 1965, rendering the September 3, 1965 filing already late.

Rejoinders, Striking Motions, and Divergent Treatment in the Trial Courts

In rejoinder, the prosecution maintained that February 28 and 29, 1964 should be treated as one day only, so that the two-year period would end on September 3, 1965. It also argued that under Act No. 3326, prescription was interrupted by the filing of proceedings in the fiscal’s office, and that prescription could not be invoked because the complainant had not waived the right to prosecute. Ramos then filed an Urgent Motion to Strike the rejoinder for being filed after submission for resolution, and she asked for opportunity to file a surrejoinder if it was considered.

The trial courts admitted the rejoinder in both cases, but Ramos filed a surrejoinder only in Criminal Case No. 80006, where she reiterated that the two-year period ended on September 2, 1965, and that the filing of proceedings in the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila did not interrupt prescription.

Branch XIV: Motion to Quash Granted (Criminal Case No. 80007)

On October 7, 1965, Hon. Jesus De Veyra granted the motion to quash in Criminal Case No. 80007 and dismissed the case on the ground that the offense had prescribed. The order expressly treated the prosecution’s own admission that prescription would run from September 3, 1963, and found that the case was filed on September 3, 1965, which was one day too late. The trial court anchored its computation on the premise that Article 13, CCP provides that a year means 365 days, that this was applied to criminal cases in People v. del Rosario, and that 1964 being a leap year meant the filing was one day late.

Branch III: Motion to Quash Denied (Criminal Case No. 80006)

In contrast, in Criminal Case No. 80006, Hon. Placido Ramos did not resolve the motion to quash until December 23, 1965. The trial court denied the motion to quash, holding that the information had been filed within the two-year period measured from the last offense.

The trial court reasoned that the period should commence not on September 3, 1963, but on September 4, 1963, based on evidence showing that on September 4, 1963 the police—via a search warrant obtained by the offended party—seized multiple copies of General Science Today and that on September 3, 1963 the store had sold certain copies. The trial court concluded that possession on September 4, 1963 implied distribution or selling on that date. Accordingly, it held that the two-year period, excluding the first and including the last, would expire on September 4, 1965, and that the information filed on September 3, 1965 was within the prescriptive period.

The trial court also rejected Ramos’s leap year computation. It held that, even if the last sale was treated as occurring on September 3, 1963, the two-year period would expire on September 3, 1965. It further ruled that the argument that leap year makes the period contain 731 days lacked merit, because the provision that a year is understood to be of 365 days controls, and the computation of the period of prescription treats a year as the calendar year from January 1 to December 31, regardless of the number of days it contains.

After a motion for reconsideration, the trial court later denied it for lack of merit and reset arraignment on February 24, 1966.

Supreme Court Petitions, Consolidation, and Intervention

Ramos sought relief before the Supreme Court by filing a petition combining certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition to annul and set aside the December 23, 1965 denial of the motion to quash and the January 20, 1966 denial of reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 80006, and to secure dismissal on the ground of prescription. The Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on February 11, 1966, restraining further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 80006 during the pendency of the action.

On the same date, the Supreme Court consolidated the two cases: G.R. No. L-25265, which was an appeal of the Branch XIV order granting the motion to quash in Criminal Case No. 80007, and G.R. No. L-25644, which was the special civil action filed by Ramos.

Positions of the Parties in the Supreme Court

In G.R. No. L-25265, the prosecution appealed. The Solicitor General, through a brief dated December 21, 1965, recommended affirmance of the order quashing the information and dismissal of the appeal, stating that the appealed order was in accordance with law. Ramos filed a brief reiterating her arguments.

The Phoenix Publishing House, Inc. intervened to protect its interest. It asserted that the Solicitor General had recommended dismissal instead of prosecuting the appeal and argued that it was necessary for the intervenor to sustain the position that the criminal action had not yet prescribed. The Supreme Court granted intervention over Ramos’s opposition. The intervenor assigned errors including, among others, that the trial court acted on Ramos’s motion to quash without requiring evidence, that the four-year period under Act No. 3326 should apply, that preliminary investigation interrupted prescription, and that February 28 and 29, 1964 should be counted as one day for purposes of prescription.

In G.R. No. L-25644, the special civil action, the Supreme Court was confronted with People’s position that Ramos had no cause of action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because Judge Ramos allegedly committed no grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash. The People also contended that prescription should start from September 4, 1963, consistent with the trial court’s ruling.

Ramos countered that she had a proper remedy through certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, and disputed the interruption arguments advanced by the People.

Supreme Court’s Treatment of Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition

The Supreme Court resolved first the procedural matter regarding the propriety of the special civil action. It held in favor of Ramos. The Court relied on Quizon vs. Baltazar, stating that it was unfair and unjust to require an accused to undergo trial and conviction when the information was patently defective or the offense was indisputably shown to have already prescribed, because in such a case the ordinary remedy of appeal could not be plain and adequate.

With respect to mandamus, the Court agreed that mandamus would not lie to control a function that was not ministerial. It observed that to quash an information was not a purely ministerial function. Nevertheless, it found mandamus to be unnecessary because the petitioner could obtain full relief through certiorari and prohibition.

Non-Applicability of the Four-Year Prescriptive Period Under Act No. 3326

The Supreme Court also ruled that Act No. 3326 did not apply. The Court reasoned that Act No. 3326 governs violations penalized by special acts only when the special act does not provide its own prescriptive period. In this case, the Copyright Law expressly provided

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-25265)

The case involved two entitled matters decided jointly because both arose from the prosecution of the same accused, Socorro C. Ramos, for alleged violations of the copyright law.
The common legal issue concerned whether the extra day in leap year 1964 should be taken into account in computing the two-year period of prescription under Section 24 of the Copyright Law.
The first case was an appeal (G.R. No. L-25265), while the second was a special civil action (G.R. No. L-25644).
Both cases originated from the filing of two separate criminal informations in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the accused for offenses arising from different editions of the same textbook.

Parties and Procedural Posture

In G.R. No. L-25265, the People of the Philippines appeared as plaintiff-appellant, and Socorro C. Ramos appeared as defendant-appellee.
In the same appeal, Phoenix Publishing House, Inc. was allowed to intervene to protect its alleged interest in sustaining the criminal action.
In G.R. No. L-25644, Socorro C. Ramos appeared as petitioner, while Hon. Placido Ramos, in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch III, CFI Manila, and the People of the Philippines represented by State Prosecutor Delia P. Medina appeared as respondents.
In the special civil action, the petitioner sought certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 80006 during the pendency of the action.
The special civil action challenged and sought nullification of orders denying the accused’s motion to quash and motion for reconsideration, which had been premised on the ground of prescription.
The Court consolidated the two cases and resolved them jointly.

Key Factual Allegations

The accused was charged as the proprietor and general manager of the National Book Store, an enterprise engaged in publishing, selling, and distributing books.
Criminal Case No. 80007 alleged that, on or about July to September 1963, in Manila and within the court’s jurisdiction, the accused wilfully and illegally sold and distributed spurious and pirated copies of General Science Today for Philippine Schools, First Year, knowing it was duly copyrighted by Phoenix Publishing House, Inc.
The information further alleged that the copyrighted book was being distributed exclusively by Phoenix Publishing House, Inc.’s sister corporation.
Criminal Case No. 80006 was identical in every respect except that it pertained to a different edition of the same textbook.
The accused’s defenses in both cases were anchored on prescription, with the contention that discovery and knowledge of the alleged offense occurred as early as July 17, 1963 and that later events were merely confirmatory.

Motions to Quash and Arguments

The accused filed identical motions to quash on September 7, 1965 in both criminal cases on the ground that the offenses had long prescribed.
The accused contended that under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, and based on cited reasoning in earlier jurisprudence, the prescriptive period began to run on the day after July 17, 1963.
The accused alternatively argued that even if the last actual sale was treated as the starting point, the last sale was made on August 30, 1963, and the offenses were still time-barred.
The prosecution opposed the motions to quash in both cases and raised two principal issues: first, that the prescription issue required evidence and was premature; second, that the violation was a continuing offense, so prescription should be counted from September 3, 1963.
The prosecution argued that as a continuing offense, the prescriptive period began to run from the completion of the last act or series of acts constituting the offense, which it alleged ended on September 3, 1963.
The accused replied that even if the offense were continuing, prescription should start from August 30, 1963 and not September 3, 1963, as there was allegedly no indubitable proof of a sale on September 3, 1963.
The accused further asserted a leap-year tolling computation theory by invoking Article 13 of the New Civil Code, arguing that the two-year period meant 730 days, and that the 730th day fell on September 2, 1965 because 1964 was a leap year, rendering the filing on September 3, 1965 one day too late.
The prosecution’s rejoinder maintained that February 28 and 29, 1964 should be regarded as one day only for prescription computation, and it also raised interruption arguments connected with filing in the fiscal’s office and the Department of Justice.
The accused moved to strike the rejoinder as filed after submission for resolution, and the trial courts admitted the rejoinder, with a surrejoinder being filed only in Criminal Case No. 80006.

Trial Court Dispositions

In Criminal Case No. 80007, Hon. Jesus De Veyra granted the motion to quash by an order dated October 7, 1965 and dismissed the case for prescription.
The order in Criminal Case No. 80007 explicitly relied on the prosecution’s admitted theory that the two-year period should run from September 3, 1963, and it treated the filing on September 3, 1965 as occurring one day too late because 1964 was a leap year.
In Criminal Case No. 80006, the prosecution’s position that the prescriptive period ran from September 3, 1963 was rejected by the trial court.
The trial court in Criminal Case No. 80006 found that police discovered pirated books on September 4, 1963 and reasoned that the accused’s possession on S