Case Summary (G.R. No. 97471)
Procedural Posture
An information filed May 31, 1989 charged the appellants with kidnapping for ransom (Article 267, RPC). After arraignment and trial, the trial court (promulgated September 26, 1990) convicted them of robbery with extortion committed on a highway under P.D. No. 532 and sentenced each to reclusion perpetua, and ordered payment of actual and temperate damages. The appellants appealed, contending (1) they were not charged under P.D. No. 532 and thus could not be convicted thereunder, and (2) the application of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 was erroneous because the offense proved was not necessarily included in the charged offense.
Material Facts Found by the Trial Court and Adopted on Appeal
The appellate court adopted the trial court’s factual findings. On January 13, 1988, Isabelo, who worked as the husband’s driver, drove the victim in her employer’s Mercedes. Enrique entered the vehicle, displayed a gun, and, with Isabelo’s participation, compelled the victim at gunpoint to surrender P7,000 in cash and sign three checks (two for P30,000 and one for P40,000) after threatening her and demanding P100,000. The victim was held in the car while the perpetrators drove along highways; she later escaped by jumping from the vehicle on the North Superhighway and reported the incident to authorities. Enrique was later arrested attempting to encash one of the checks.
Trial Court Ruling and Its Rationale
The trial court rejected the kidnapping-for-ransom charge and instead found the appellants guilty under P.D. No. 532 for robbery with extortion committed on a highway, imposing the severe penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court relied on the fact that the robbery occurred while the victim was carried from one place to another on thoroughfares and that the perpetrators extorted additional money en route.
Issues Raised on Appeal
Primary issues addressed by the appellate court: (1) whether the evidence established kidnapping for ransom or another offense; (2) whether the crime constituted “highway robbery/brigandage” punishable under P.D. No. 532; and (3) whether simple robbery is a necessarily included offense in the information charging kidnapping for ransom, allowing conviction under the lesser included offense doctrine (Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120).
Parties’ Contentions on Appeal
Appellants argued they were improperly convicted under P.D. No. 532 because the information charged kidnapping for ransom, not highway robbery, and that Section 4 and 5, Rule 120 could not be used to convict for an offense not proven as necessarily included. The Solicitor General and the trial court maintained that the conduct fell within P.D. No. 532 and that the decree modified applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Legal Standards Applied: Kidnapping for Ransom and Robbery
The court reiterated that kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention require proof of an actual intent to deprive a person of liberty. Established jurisprudence holds that detention or asportation incidentally attendant to the commission of another primary offense does not of itself constitute kidnapping when the primary intent was robbery or another crime. Robbery under Article 293 was characterized as unlawful taking with intent to gain by means of intimidation. Ransom was defined as payment demanded for the redemption of a captured person—i.e., payment that releases from captivity.
Court’s Analysis on Motive, Specific Intent, and Kidnapping
The appellate court found no evidence that the appellants nurtured any motive to deprive the victim of her liberty other than to extort money. Appellant Puno’s testimony, conceding that money and checks were obtained early in the episode and that the victim’s further detention was not an end in itself but a tactical measure, reinforced the court’s conclusion that there was no intent to effectuate a ransom-style deprivation of liberty. The deprivation of freedom was thus incidental to the primary objective—robbery by intimidation—and did not satisfy the specific intent element for kidnapping for ransom.
Ransom Element and Immediate Obtention of Money
Because the cash and checks were obtained directly and immediately from the victim under threat, the court held these transfers to be involuntary surrenders incident to robbery, not ransom in the technical sense used in kidnapping law. The immediacy and personal delivery of the money/cheques distinguished the conduct from the classical notion of ransom as payment for release from captivity.
Scope and Purpose of P.D. No. 532 (Highway Robbery/Brigandage)
The court examined P.D. No. 532’s history and scope and concluded that the decree primarily amended the law on brigandage (Articles 306–307, RPC) and targeted indiscriminate highway depredations by roving bands—i.e., crimes against all travelers, not singular targeted robberies against predetermined victims. The preambular language of P.D. No. 532, its use of the terms “highway robbery/brigandage,” and its contemporaneous background support this interpretation. The court emphasized that brigandage addresses bands organized to prey indiscriminately on travelers, whereas a single robbery against a specifically chosen victim does not embody the communal and indiscriminate danger that P.D. No. 532 was enacted to punish.
Statutory Construction and Avoidance of Absurd Results
Applying principles of statutory construction and contemporaneous exposition, the court rejected a literalist approach that would apply P.D. No. 532 merely because the robbery occurred while the vehicle was on a highway. The court warned such an interpretation would yield absurd consequences and conflict with other statutes (e.g., Anti-Carnapping Act, Anti-Cattle Rustling Law) by supplanting specialized crimes and penalties with the broad reach of P.D. No. 532. The legislature’s (and executive promulgator’s) intent was read to preserve the distinctiveness of brigandage/highway robbery as crimes against the traveling public rather than singular targeted robberies.
Application of Included-Offense Doctrine and Rule 120
The appellate court found no procedural obstacle to
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Court and Citation
- Decision reported at 292 Phil. 80, Second Division, G.R. No. 97471, promulgated February 17, 1993.
- Opinion authored by Justice Regalado; Narvasa, C.J., and Justices Feliciano, Nocon, and Campos, Jr., concurred.
Procedural Posture
- Information dated and filed May 31, 1989, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-57404.
- Appellants pleaded not guilty and were tried in the trial court.
- Trial court convicted appellants of robbery with extortion committed on a highway under Presidential Decree No. 532 and sentenced each to reclusion perpetua; ordered joint and several payment of P7,000.00 actual damages and P3,000.00 temperate damages to the offended party.
- Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court raising errors in conviction under PD No. 532 and in application of Rules of Court provisions concerning included offenses.
- Supreme Court reviewed factual findings and legal issues and rendered a new judgment convicting appellants of simple robbery (Article 293, penalized under Paragraph 5, Article 294, in relation to Article 295) and imposed an indeterminate sentence and damages.
Nature of the Charge in the Information
- Charged offense: kidnapping for ransom, alleged to have been committed on or about January 13, 1988 in Quezon City.
- Information alleged appellants, private individuals, conspired, confederated, and mutually aided each other to wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away Maria del Socorro Sarmiento for the purpose of extorting ransom.
Facts as Established at Trial (People’s Statement Adopted by Court)
- Complainant: Mrs. Maria del Socorro Mutuc Sarmiento (testified under name "Corina Mutuc Sarmiento" but clarified baptismal name).
- Mrs. Sarmiento owned Nika Cakes and Pastries on Araneta Avenue, Quezon City.
- Around 5:00 p.m., January 13, 1988, Isabelo Puno (appellant, personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento’s husband) arrived at the bakeshop, told Mrs. Sarmiento her driver Fred had to go to Pampanga and that Isabelo would temporarily drive her.
- Mrs. Sarmiento rode in her husband’s Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving.
- After turning a corner on Araneta Avenue, the car stopped; Enrique Amurao (appellant) boarded beside the driver, climbed over the front seat to the rear, pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento, and intimidated her.
- Isabelo allegedly introduced Enrique as his nephew and announced intention to get money from her.
- Mrs. Sarmiento surrendered a bag containing P7,000.00 at Santo Domingo exit.
- Appellants demanded P100,000.00. Mrs. Sarmiento drafted three checks (two for P30,000.00 and one for P40,000.00) and signed them when so demanded.
- During part of the ordeal Enrique menaced her with a gun, threatened to be an NPA member, and attempted to intimidate further (including ordering her to swallow a pill).
- The car traveled north toward the North Superhighway and allegedly also toward Pampanga; Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car at one point, sustained injury causing torn and bloody dress, flagged down a fish vendor’s van, and reported the incident to CAPCOM at Balintawak.
- Both accused were arrested the next day; Enrique was arrested trying to encash the P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati.
- Defense version (minimal divergence): Puno asserted he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out; he slowed the car and saw she had gotten a ride; he claimed she fell while running across the highway; appellants parked the Mercedes in Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga, ate, and divided the proceeds; Puno later testified he needed money to pay for ulcer medication and had been denied salary advances.
Trial Court Findings and Disposition
- Trial court found appellants guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway under Presidential Decree No. 532.
- Sentence imposed by trial court: reclusion perpetua on each appellant (per PD 532).
- Monetary awards by trial court: joint and several liability to pay P7,000.00 actual damages and P3,000.00 temperate damages to the offended party.
Issues Raised on Appeal
- Appellants’ principal contentions:
- The trial court erred in convicting them under PD No. 532 because they were not expressly charged with an offense under that decree.
- The court erred in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 (1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure) to convict them of an offense not expressly charged; appellee’s position and trial court’s conviction under PD 532 allegedly constitute proof of an offense not “necessarily included” in the offense charged.
- Solicitor General and trial court maintained the offense could be robbery under PD No. 532 (highway robbery/brigandage) because the robbery was committed while the victim was carried and extorted en route on the highway.
Threshold Legal Principles Applied
- Rule on motive and specific intent:
- Motive and specific intent are important in determining the exact nature of the crime when acts may partake of variant offenses or modifying circumstances.
- Motive may distinguish whether an act is absorbed by a greater offense (e.g., murder in furtherance of rebellion) or is a standalone crime.
- Kidnapping/serious illegal detention requires proof of intent to deprive liberty; incidental deprivation that is an incident of another offense is not kidnapping.
- Ancient rule cited: detention/forcible taking is not kidnapping where deprivation of liberty was incidental to commission of another primary offense (U.S. and Philippine precedents such as United States v. Ancheta and subsequent cases).
- Definitions and elements:
- Ransom defined in municipal criminal law as money, price, or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person; payment that releases from captivity.
- Robbery defined by Article 293; robbery elements: unlawful taking of personal property with intent to gain through intimidation of the owner or possessor.
- Kidnapping-for-ransom under Article 267 requires clear intent to deprive liberty and to hold for ransom, which must be distinguished from forcible taking incidental to robbery.
Court’s Analysis on Kidnapping vs. Robbery
- The Suprem