Title
People vs. Ponce
Case
G.R. No. 83694
Decision Date
May 31, 1991
A 1976 robbery in Bukidnon turned deadly, resulting in two deaths. Alfredo Ponce, convicted of robbery with homicide, claimed coercion and alibi, but the Supreme Court upheld his conviction based on credible testimony, valid confession, and conspiracy evidence.
robbery with homicide
credible testimony
admissible confession
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 83694)

Factual Background

The evidence for the prosecution showed that on April 1, 1976, at Mibantang, Quezon, Bukidnon, Nonoy Formadas and Bernardino Hermocilla approached Nestor Ricafort to recruit him for a robbery to be done at Kauswagan, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. After Ricafort was persuaded, the group proceeded to the house of Julian Ancis, identified as the mastermind, at Kauswagan, Dangcagan, Bukidnon, and was informed that they would rob the house of Calixta Gepitacio, which was described as about thirty (30) meters from Ancis’s house.

The participants planned the robbery for mid-April 1976, intending that each participant could obtain firearms. In the middle of April, the group met again at Kauswagan, but, because firearms were not yet available, they returned to their respective homes and agreed to meet again on April 30, 1976 at Mibantang, Quezon, Bukidnon, to proceed to the house of Alberto Jumawan and meet the remaining members.

On April 30, 1976, Ricafort was summoned by Dionisio Alpuerto and Alfredo Ponce and was informed that they would participate in the planned robbery. Formadas and Hermocilla did not arrive, so Ricafort and the others went to Jumawan’s house at Kauswagan, Dangcagan, Bukidnon, arriving at about one o’clock in the afternoon. Jumawan fetched Hermogenes Tagotongan, and by around four o’clock in the afternoon they outlined the details of the robbery. The evidence described a coordinated division of roles: Ricafort and Jumawan were to take charge of the upper portion of the house; Tagotongan was to act as lookout; and appellant Ponce, together with Alpuerto, was to cover the lower portion of the house.

At about five o’clock in the afternoon, the group proceeded to the house of Calixta Gepitacio. The prosecution testimony described that appellant said “pasok” and the group barged into the house. Appellant entered first, followed by Alpuerto. Ricafort and Jumawan proceeded upstairs, and Tagotongan remained as lookout.

Once inside, the evidence showed violence in the course of the robbery. Cornelio Gepitacio was stabbed from behind with a knife and was repeatedly struck; Calixta Gepitacio testified that a pistol hit her below the right ear after money was demanded and she refused. She later heard commotion and an utterance consistent with escape. Gaudencio Gepitacio was later found seriously wounded with intestines protruding. After the assault, the group fled past a bridge toward Mibantang, Bukidnon. Ricafort testified that appellant threw a scythe into the river as they passed over the bridge. They then went to the house of Pantaleon Ortiz in Mibantang, where the money was divided.

Immediately after the robbers fled, Calixta called for assistance by contacting Julian Ancis, who did not respond at once. When a doctor was needed, Ancis initially refused to lend his jeep because it lacked crude oil. When Calixta offered to supply fuel, Ancis agreed. Dr. Cenon N. Tiongson treated Gaudencio Gepitacio, but he died during treatment, and Cornelio Gepitacio had already died when treatment began for him.

Criminal Information and Trial Outcome

Based on the above incident, the prosecution filed an information, later amended, charging the accused with robbery in band with double homicide and physical injuries. The information alleged that on April 30, 1976, the accused and Alberto Jumawan (who was still at large) acted in conspiracy, robbing One Thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos owned by Gaudencio Gepitacio, using assorted bladed weapons and firearms, and attacking Gaudencio, Cornelio, and Calixta Gepitacio. It alleged that the injuries caused the death of Gaudencio and Cornelio and that Calixta’s illness incapacitated her for more than fifteen (15) days. It charged the offense as violative of Article 294 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

In its judgment dated January 4, 1988, the trial court convicted Alfredo Ponce (alias Persing), Dionisio Alpuerto (Boy), and Hermogenes Tagotongan for robbery with homicide under Article 294. The trial court imposed reclusion perpetua and ordered them, jointly and severally, to pay P60,000.00 to the heirs of Gaudencio Gepitacio and Cornelio Gepitacio, with credit for their period of detention. It acquitted Pantaleon Ortiz and Julian Ancis for insufficiency of evidence, discharged Nestor Ricafort who was utilized as a state witness, dismissed the charges against Bernardino Hermocilla for lack of evidence of participation, and archived the case as to Alberto Jumawan until arrest. Hermogenes Tagotongan chose not to appeal.

The appeal before the Supreme Court therefore focused solely on Alfredo Ponce, after the Court appointed counsel de oficio for him in a resolution dated February 28, 1990.

Defense and Appellant’s Assignments of Error

Alfredo Ponce denied participation in the crime and invoked alibi. He testified that before April 30, 1976, he lived in Mibantang, Quezon, Bukidnon, that he did not know Kauswagan or Dangcagan, and that after April 30, he left Mibantang for Cagayan de Oro City to seek work. He also testified that he was apprehended on August 8, 1977 and jailed, and that while being investigated he was mauled and about to be thrown to a river unless he signed an affidavit prepared by police. He further claimed that he saw the other accused for the first time only in jail. He insisted that on April 30, 1976, he was plowing his field from eight in the morning to five in the afternoon and stayed in the house from five in the afternoon until morning.

On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for allegedly overlooking facts of substance and for misappreciating the evidence against him. The Supreme Court treated these assignments as an attack on the trial court’s assessment of evidence and the sufficiency of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Parties’ Contentions on Credibility and the Confession

Appellant contended that the testimony of Nestor Ricafort, who had turned state witness, was fabricated and not credible because Ricafort was an interested witness. The appellant also claimed that he was coerced into admitting participation and that his sworn admission should be deemed inadmissible for lack of counsel during custodial investigation, notwithstanding his claimed waiver. He invoked the principle that waiver of counsel must be made with the assistance of counsel.

The prosecution, as reflected in the Supreme Court’s discussion and the Solicitor General’s observations, argued that appellant’s sworn statement was not fabricated because it contained details not previously known to the police. It also emphasized that the statement was made in the vernacular and that the record did not mention any complaint by appellant about alleged coercion.

Appellate Review of Facts and Conspiracy Findings

The Supreme Court reiterated that findings of fact of the trial court, when supported by the record and based on substantial evidence, were generally accorded finality and would not be re-weighed on appeal. It held that appellant failed to show that the trial court’s decision rested on speculations, surmises, or conjectures.

On the question of credibility, the Court stressed established appellate principles: it would not disturb the trial court’s factual findings absent proof that it overlooked or misapplied facts of weight and substance; the trial court’s assessment of demeanor was accorded great respect; and consistent, spontaneous, and straightforward testimony merited belief.

The Court held that Ricafort’s testimony provided clear indicia of conspiracy. It pointed out that Ricafort supplied the trial court with minutiae that only a participant could have known, including multiple prior meetings where details of the robbery were planned and the specific role assignments during the execution of the plan. While recognizing the general doctrine that co-conspirator testimony, standing alone, is not sufficient and is received with caution due to the polluted source of blame-shifting, the Court found exceptions applicable. It ruled that Ricafort’s testimony was sincere, detailed, and unhesitatingly given in a manner that could not plausibly result from deliberate afterthought. The Court also noted that a co-accused is a competent witness for and against any co-accused in a criminal case and that candid admission of participation, if a witness chose to testify, tends to be a guaranty of truthfulness.

The Court further treated appellant’s conviction as not hinging solely on the disputed extrajudicial confession. It held that independent findings, aside from the confession, were sufficient to establish appellant’s participation.

On the Alleged Violation of the Right to Counsel

Addressing the claim that the sworn admission was obtained without counsel, the Court found no persuasion in appellant’s reliance on the People vs. Galit doctrine. The Court observed that appellant’s claim of duress and prior fabrication was contradicted by details in the sworn statement that only the declarant could have known. It also noted the absence of any record mention of coercion and the lack of a complaint by appellant before the clerk of court when he was brought for signing.

The Court then distinguished the application of the Galit guideline by emphasizing that appellant waived counsel on March 16, 1977, long before Galit was enunciated. It held that the restrictions in Galit had only prospective operation and thus did not apply retroactively to confessions taken before the doctrine’s pronouncement. It also noted that unlike People vs. Galit, where acquittal resulted because the evidence relied on was solely the supposed confession, the conviction here was supported by other independent evidence.

Tagotongan’s Testimony and Retraction

Appellant argued that Hermogenes Tagotongan testified that appellant was never with the group at the scene and that there was no reason for Tagotongan to deny appellant’s participation. The Supreme Court rejected this argument by find

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