Title
People vs. Osias y Mallari
Case
G.R. No. 88872
Decision Date
Jul 25, 1991
Romeo Cuaderno was stabbed during a bicycle robbery in Kalookan City. Eyewitness Ricardo Durana identified Virgilio Osias as the perpetrator. Osias’ alibi was rejected; he was convicted of robbery with homicide, affirmed by the Supreme Court.
robbery with homicide
credible testimony
witness identification

Case Summary (G.R. No. 88872)

The April 25, 1984 Incident

The events began at about ten o’clock in the morning of April 25, 1984 along J.P. Rizal Street, Kalookan City, where Romeo Cuaderno y de la Cruz rode an “easy rider butterfly-type” bicycle. The Supreme Court found that the co-accused Fernando Sanchez y de la Cruz (“Dodo”) appeared and attempted to grab the bicycle, causing Romeo to fall. Romeo immediately stood up to prevent the taking. While Romeo and Dodo struggled over the bicycle, the appellant—nicknamed “Benjie”—positioned at the back of Romeo, stabbed Romeo on the left side of the neck using a six-inch double-bladed knife, with a described hand motion “by making a sway of his right hand upward going downward.”

After gaining possession of the bicycle, Dodo and the appellant fled toward Manila. Romeo then walked toward Martinez Hospital, which was about ten meters away, but collapsed near the gate of the hospital. He later died at 10:30 in the morning of April 25, 1984, due to shock, traumatic, caused by “a stab wound at the right side of the neck, measuring 5 x 3.5 x 12 cm. deep, lacerating the right jugular vessel, trachea, and the left lung.”

Prosecution Evidence and the Eyewitness Account

The Supreme Court held that the incident was seen by Ricardo Durana, the prosecution’s sole eyewitness. Durana was standing across the street in front of St. Joseph’s Pharmacy, about six meters away from the place of the stabbing. He had just come out of the pharmacy after buying prosteclin. He testified that the street environment did not obstruct his view at the moment of the incident because no motor vehicle passed during that time when the grappling and stabbing occurred. Durana’s testimony became the central basis for identifying the appellant as one of the assailants.

The RTC Conviction and Appellant’s Theory

The appellant denied participation and asserted alibi. He claimed that on April 25, 1984 he was at the family residence at No. 111 B. Santos Street, Isla de San Juan, Kalookan City, with his sisters—Patricia, Metring, and Paring—preparing coconut jam for sale from about six o’clock in the morning until about three o’clock in the afternoon. He said his task was to remove the coconut meat from the shells and that he helped in cooking. After about three o’clock, he went to the public market to buy sweet peanuts and then remained at home for the rest of the day. He further testified that Luisa Osias, his sister, corroborated his account.

The RTC decision found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and imposed reclusion perpetua. It ordered indemnification of the heirs in P30,000.00 as consequential damages, ordered return of the bicycle or payment of P1,000.00 if return was not possible, and imposed costs. The RTC credited the appellant with time spent in preventive imprisonment. As to the co-accused Fernando Sanchez, the case was archived since he had not been apprehended.

Appellant’s Assigned Errors on Appeal

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction by questioning the credibility of the eyewitness and the sufficiency of identification. He argued that: (1) Durana’s testimony was “weak” and allegedly full of inconsistencies; (2) Durana was a paid witness, allegedly making his testimony unworthy of belief; and (3) Durana did not positively identify the appellant as one of the perpetrators. He maintained that, taken singly or collectively, these matters created reasonable doubt and warranted acquittal.

Witness Credibility: Alleged Inconsistencies and Delayed Reporting

The Supreme Court rejected the contention that Durana’s delayed reporting automatically rendered his testimony incredible. The appellant pointed out that Durana reported the stabbing only on May 3, 1984 through a sworn statement to the Kalookan City police, and he argued that the time gap proved fabrication. The Court held that there was no correlation between credibility and belated reporting. It explained that initial reluctance of an eyewitness to come forward and become involved in a criminal prosecution was common and understandable, and it did not by itself affect credibility. It also noted Durana’s explanation that he waited until after the victim’s burial before reporting to authorities. The appellant further argued that Durana was biased because he was a neighbor and a family friend of the victim. The Supreme Court ruled that mere relationship as neighbor or family friend did not compel a finding of bias; bias would require proof of motive or special interest, which was absent.

The appellant also relied on the witness’s detailed narration of the milieu of the stabbing and claimed that it was internally inconsistent with the passage of time and motion in a busy street. The Supreme Court disagreed. It found Durana categorical and unwavering on why his line of sight was not obstructed: he testified that when grappling occurred, no vehicle passed by, allowing him to observe the stabbing clearly.

On the alleged inconsistency between Durana’s account and the medical description, the Court considered the discrepancy minor and collateral. The appellant emphasized that Durana said the appellant stabbed the victim on the left side of the neck, while the physical or medical evidence indicated a stab wound on the right side of the neck, and the physician’s account purportedly indicated the assailant faced the victim and stabbed downward, with the victim dying at the scene. The Supreme Court held that such contradictions did not destroy the credibility of Durana. It reasoned that it was understandable that a witness might not pinpoint with precision the exact side where a fatal blow was inflicted, particularly because the victim and assailants were grappling and positions were changing. The Court further reasoned that Durana’s testimony deserved credence over the physician’s statement of immediate death because Durana testified that the victim walked about ten meters to the Martinez Hospital before collapsing.

Allegation of a Paid Witness

The appellant next claimed that Durana was a paid witness because the victim’s father, Vicente Cuaderno, admitted giving Durana P25.00 each day he appeared in court to testify, allegedly amounting to about P1,000.00. The Supreme Court acknowledged its general ruling that a witness who receives money from the complainant might become morally beholden. However, it held that that principle must be applied in its proper perspective. It ruled that the mere fact of receiving money did not compel outright dismissal of the testimony as incredible or manufactured. Instead, payment was only an indicium to be weighed in assessing probative value.

Applying that framework, the Supreme Court treated the admission of payment as consistent with the prosecution’s account rather than an indicator of falsehood. It emphasized that the payment was relatively meager and that the appellant failed to show that without the money Durana would not have testified. It also invoked doctrine from People v. Rafael Lacson, et al. (1961) that even assuming witnesses were supported by political enemies, trifling sums did not demonstrate that they would perjure themselves and falsely charge the accused with a capital offense.

Alleged Failure of Positive Identification

Finally, the appellant argued that Durana did not positively identify him as one of the attackers. The appellant relied on Durana’s admission that he met the appellant only twice: during the stabbing incident and later, on October 28, 1987, when he testified at trial. The appellant contended that Durana’s identification was based on hearsay from Bonie, the brother of the co-accused Dodo, who allegedly told Durana that the companion was Benjie, identified by name as the appellant. The appellant argued that this made Durana’s “positive identification” a conjecture.

The Supreme Court held this argument to be only half-true. It noted that Durana did not merely identify the appellant based on hearsay. Durana testified that he already knew the appellant while still at 9th Avenue, and the Supreme Court treated the apparent contradictions by reading the testimony as a whole. The Court reproduced extensive clarificatory questions posed by Judge Cancio that reflected Durana’s confusion and difficulty in understanding the questions. Despite those difficulties, the Supreme Court found that the totality of Durana’s testimony supported the identification of the appellant as the one he saw carrying the bicycle with Dodo and stabbing the victim.

The Supreme Court acknowledged the clarificatory exchange showing that Durana initially claimed he did not know the appellant’s real name at t

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