Title
People vs. Omal
Case
G.R. No. L-14457
Decision Date
Jun 30, 1961
Surety liable for accused's escape due to negligence; failure to act promptly after rearrest and disappearance upheld bond obligation.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-14457)

Factual Background

On December 30, 1954, Otiak Omal was charged with robbery in band in the Justice of the Peace Court of Datu Piang, Cotabato (Criminal Case 2175). After the preliminary investigation was waived, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, where the bail fixed for Omal’s provisional liberty was reduced from P24,000 to P10,000. Upon the filing and approval of the bail bond in that amount by Luzon Surety Company, Inc., Omal was released.

On August 10, 1956, Omal was arrested anew because he faced a charge for rape in Criminal Case No. 2627 before the same court. Subsequently, on August 23, 1956, he was placed “under the custody of the governor … pending a proposal of amicable settlement, the case being private,” as shown by an entry in the Provincial Jail Blotter (page 71). Later, on December 12, 1956, Datu Udtog, the provincial governor, ordered one Candado and the Chief of Police of Cotabato to bring Omal home because he was reported causing trouble. Omal was last seen walking toward the governor’s place with the governor’s emissaries, and thereafter he disappeared.

Ex-Parte Motion to Cancel the Bail Bond

It was only on December 20, 1957 that Luzon Surety Company, Inc. filed an ex-parte motion for the withdrawal of the bail bond and prayed to be relieved of responsibility. The surety alleged that it had exerted efforts to find Omal but had been unable to locate or apprehend him. It further claimed that, given the gravity of the charges Omal was facing, it had “reasons to believe” that its efforts would prove fruitless. The surety also asserted that if the Provincial Warden and Provincial Governor had performed their duties well in connection with Omal’s custody, the surety would have had no difficulty in surrendering him to the court.

The State opposed the motion. It argued that the surety did not seek cancellation when Omal was rearrested in connection with the rape charge; instead, it sought cancellation only after Omal’s disappearance on December 12, 1956. The State contended that the surety chose to continue with its liability under the bond and should be held accountable for the accused who escaped after his rearrest.

Lower Court Ruling and the Appeal

After the surety presented evidence in support of its motion, the lower court issued an order cancelling the bail bond. The People of the Philippines appealed from that order, insisting that the surety should not have been relieved of liability because it failed to take the steps required by law and by controlling jurisprudence when Omal was rearrested and placed under custody.

Legal Standards on Bail and Surety Liability

In resolving the appeal, the Court anchored its discussion on established doctrine. It noted that, in People vs. De la Cruz, 93 Phil., 487, the Court held that a surety’s rights, duties, and liabilities after the prisoner is arrested for another offense and then escapes or absconds must be governed by statutory provisions other than Section 16, Rule 110, or by general principles of contract. The decision also recalled rulings such as U.S. vs. Bunuan, 22 Phil., 1, and U.S. vs. Sunico, 40 Phil., 826, that bail may be exonerated when performance of the condition becomes impossible due to the act of God, the act of the obligee, or the act of law.

The lower court, in cancelling the bond, apparently considered the surety’s inability to produce Omal as resulting from alleged negligence or irregular conduct by the Provincial Warden and the Provincial Governor that facilitated Omal’s escape. The Supreme Court did not treat that circumstance as, by itself, sufficient to justify cancellation. It emphasized that a surety is the jailer of the accused and is responsible for the accused’s custody, citing People vs. Tuising, 61 Phil., 404. The Court reasoned that because the surety’s authority in holding the accused is no more and no less than the Government’s authority to keep the accused under preventive imprisonment, the surety bore the obligation to keep the accused under surveillance at all times.

The Court further held that even assuming irregular conduct by public officials contributed to the accused’s escape, the surety remained chargeable with negligence for failing to act for a considerable time until the escape occurred. Additionally, the Court reiterated that when performance becomes impossible due to causes such as acts of God, acts of the obligee, or acts of law, the surety still bears the duty to inform the court of the event so that the court may take action or decree the surety’s discharge.

The Court’s Ruling on the Surety’s Conduct

The Supreme Court found that Luzon Surety Company, Inc. did not take such steps when Omal was rearrested. It also observed that the surety did not ask for cancellation until after Omal had already escaped or disappeared. In this respect, the Court relied on the doctrine in People vs. Tuising, including the principle that once a surety puts up a bail bond, it assumes the role of jailer and must keep the accused under surveillance until the bond is cancelled or the surety is discharged.

The Court treated Rule 110, Section 16 as prescribing the procedure and grounds for discharge, including situations where sureties request discharge upon surrender of the defendant, where the defendant is rearrested or ordered into custody on the same charge or for the same offense, where the defendant is discharged by the court at any stage or acquitted or convicted and surrendered to serve sentence, and where the defendant dies during the pendency of the action. The Court held that, even on grounds of impossibility stemming from acts of God, obligee, or law, the surety must still inform the court so it may decree discharge.

The Court rejected the surety’s position by explaining that it remained silent when the accused was re-arrested and did not take the steps pointed out by law. It only gave notice after the court ordered the accused’s appearance for arraignment or trial, and even then, the surety informed the court that Omal had been re-arrested, detained, and had subsequently made good his escape. Because the bond was still valid and binding at the time of the re-arrest and because the surety had remained silent, the Court presumed that the surety chose to continue its liability and must be held accountable for what later happened.

The Supreme Court also invoked the rule that the subsequent arrest of the principal on another charge or in other proceedings does not operate ipso facto as a discharge of bail, such that if the accused escapes while free on bail and later fails to appear when called, the bail remains bound to produce the accused. The Court therefore distinguished cases where the surety had done the “next best thing” of informing the court in a manner that could be treated as an implied request for discharge, noting that such conduct was absent on the surety’s part in the present case.

Similar Case Distinction and Evidence of Efforts

The Court acknowledged and discussed People vs. Mamerto de la Cruz, 93 Phil., 487, where the Court had found that the sureties did not bring the accused to court because of causes brought about by the Government itself and had instead informed the court of the prisoner’s arrest and confinement in another province, with the court by its conduct impliedly acquiescing. The Supreme Court contrasted that with the present record, stating that no

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