Title
People vs. Oanis
Case
G.R. No. 47722
Decision Date
Jul 27, 1943
Police officers, acting on orders to capture an escaped convict "dead or alive," mistakenly killed an innocent man in his sleep. The Supreme Court ruled it as murder with mitigating circumstances, emphasizing excessive force and failure to verify identity.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 216120)

Procedural Posture

The trial court convicted Oanis and Galanta of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced each to an indeterminate term of 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of prision correccional, plus joint and several indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs. Defendants separately appealed.

Facts as Found by the Trial Court

The Provincial Inspector received a telegram directing: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina name Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Monsod assembled a party including Galanta and privates and showed them the telegram and a newspaper picture. Oanis volunteered to accompany the party. The Inspector divided the party; Oanis, Galanta and a private approached the room indicated by Brigida. Inside, a man (Tecson) was sleeping with his back to the door. On sight the two accused fired at him (with .32 and .45 revolvers). Irene awoke to find her paramour already wounded and saw the defendants firing. Tecson was killed; autopsy disclosed multiple gunshot wounds caused by .32 and .45 caliber bullets. Galanta, when questioned by the Inspector, answered, "We two, sir," referring to himself and Oanis. Irene’s testimony and the autopsy were given significant weight by the trial court.

Appellants’ Versions and Contradictions

Both appellants offered exculpatory versions. Galanta testified that Oanis first fired when Tecson was about to sit up; Galanta then fired when Tecson rushed at him. Oanis testified that Galanta first fired while Tecson was still in bed and that Oanis only fired later. These accounts conflict with each other and differ materially in timing and conduct. The trial court found these testimonies mutually contradictory and not credible.

Credibility Findings by the Trial Court and the Majority

The trial court accepted Irene Requinea’s testimony and rejected appellants’ accounts. The majority affirmed that finding, noting the appellants’ conflicting statements and that Irene’s testimony was corroborated in material respects by the appellants’ own contradictory admissions (e.g., that Tecson was shot while in bed). The majority emphasized the trial court’s opportunity to observe the witness’ demeanor and the trial court’s reasonable refusal to credit the appellants’ self-serving explanations.

Legal Issues Presented

Primary legal questions:

  • Whether the defendants, acting under an honest mistake of fact while performing official duties and following an order to get the fugitive "dead or alive," are criminally liable for the killing of a person they honestly, but mistakenly, believed to be the wanted man.
  • Whether the killing, given the surrounding circumstances, constitutes reckless imprudence (homicide) or murder.
  • Whether any justifying or mitigating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code apply, specifically (a) the incomplete justifying circumstance of Article 11 No. 5 (acting in fulfillment of duty or in lawful exercise of office), (b) the doctrine of innocent mistake of fact, and (c) whether the qualifying circumstance of alevosia is present.

Precedents and Doctrinal Points Considered

The majority considered prior cases cited by the parties:

  • U.S. v. Ah Chong (an instance of innocent mistake of fact without fault where pressing circumstances left no time for inquiry)—distinguished because in the present case the victim was asleep and no exigent danger compelled immediate deadly force.
  • U.S. v. Donoso and other authorities emphasizing that notoriety of a criminal does not eliminate the right to life or authorize precipitate killing when arrest could be effected without lethal force. The majority reiterated principles that an officer may use only reasonably necessary force to effect an arrest and is not exempt from criminal liability for unnecessary or wanton violence; reckless or intentional killing where identity could have been ascertained is not excused by mere notoriety of the intended target.

Majority’s Legal Analysis and Holding

The majority held that the defendants did not merely commit criminal negligence; rather, their conduct amounted to intentional killing of a sleeping person and therefore constituted murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia (killing of a person while asleep). The majority rejected the claim of innocent mistake of fact on the ground that the appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain identity and effect a bloodless arrest; there were no circumstances pressing them to immediate lethal action. The majority also found that the incomplete justifying circumstance of Article 11 No. 5 applied in part (the appellants acted in the performance of a duty), but the second requisite for full justification— that the injury be a necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty—was lacking. Because not all requisites for full justification were present, Article 69 (penalty reduced by one or two degrees where the crime is not wholly excusable because some conditions required for justification are lacking) applied. On that basis the Court modified the judgment: appellants were declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance described (incomplete justification) and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correccional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with legal accessories, and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased P2,000, with costs.

Distinctive Observations on Criminal Characterization

The majority distinguished reckless imprudence from intentional unlawful acts, emphasizing that where an intentional unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake as to the identity of the intended victim does not reduce the crime to reckless imprudence. The majority relied on prior rulings (People v. Nanquil; People v. Bindor; People v. Gona) for the principle that deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with reckless imprudence.

Dissenting Opinions — Overview and Reasoning

Two dissenting opinions took contrasting positions in favor of acquittal or reversal:

  • Dissent by Justice Paras: He argued that appellants acted pursuan

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