G.R. No. L-29532 - People vs. Oandasan

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-29532)

Factual Background

The Court of First Instance found, based on the accused’s testimony, that the accused saw the deceased Quirino Duldulao chasing the accused’s son. The accused reported that Duldulao failed to catch the son, then threw a wooden club at the son without hitting him. The accused approached Duldulao, asked why he was chasing the son and why he had thrown the club, and according to the testimony, Duldulao instead struck the accused on the left shoulder with the wooden club. The accused then drew a sharp-pointed knife he had on his person. The accused stated that Duldulao again struck him on the head with the club, after which the accused stabbed Duldulao on the front. The deceased sustained two wounds, one at the epigastric region and another on the right hand.

Procedural History and Arraignments

Initially, the criminal complaint for homicide was filed with the municipal court of Flora. During the preliminary investigation, the accused was arraigned and pleaded “not guilty.” The case was elevated to the court of first instance, where a formal indictment for homicide was filed by the prosecuting attorney. At arraignment in the court of first instance, the accused entered a plea of “guilty.” Before sentence, the accused presented evidence to support mitigating circumstances, specifically invoking incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender, in addition to the plea of guilty.

Trial Court’s Approach to Mitigating Circumstances and Sentence

In its decision dated September 27, 1967, the trial court treated the plea of guilty as not deserving mitigating weight on the ground that the accused had previously pleaded “not guilty” in the municipal court of Flora. The trial court also did not appreciate incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance. Instead, it accorded the accused benefits of provocation together with voluntary surrender as ordinary mitigating circumstances. With those findings, the trial court sentenced the accused for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, imposing an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, together with the accessories of the law. It also ordered indemnity of P6,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and directed payment of costs.

The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal

On appeal, the accused contended that the penalty imposed was incorrect. He argued that his plea of guilty should have been considered in mitigation. The Solicitor General agreed with this position. The accused also pressed that the trial court erred in refusing to appreciate incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance.

The Court’s Resolution on the Plea of Guilty as a Mitigating Circumstance

The Court recognized the general rule that when an accused, charged with an offense cognizable by the municipal court, pleads “not guilty” therein and, upon appeal to the court of first instance, changes the plea to “guilty” upon rearraignment, he is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt. The Court explained that the rule is grounded on the absence of the spontaneous willingness to admit the commission of the offense, since the earlier plea and the subsequent change on appeal invite speculation rather than reflect genuine confession.

The Court then found a decisive feature that took the case outside the general principle. The municipal court where the accused first pleaded “not guilty” was not exercising jurisdiction to render judgment on the homicide charge; it was conducting only a preliminary investigation. The Court held that, for purposes of the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt, the plea of not guilty at a preliminary investigation before a municipal court is not a plea that can bar the later mitigating effect of the accused’s plea of guilty in the proper court of competent jurisdiction. The Court also stated that the accused could not be deprived of the statutory right to a preliminary investigation, since withholding it would transgress constitutional due process. The Court reasoned that the accused should be entitled to know whether probable cause existed to require elevation of the case to the court of first instance, and therefore the preliminary “not guilty” plea could not be used against him for mitigating purposes.

Applying Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court held that a mitigating circumstance exists when the accused “had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.” The Court found that the accused pleaded guilty upon arraignment before trial at the court of first instance, which fell before the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence. Accordingly, the Court held that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt before the court should be counted in favor of the accused.

The Court’s Resolution on Incomplete Self-Defense

On the second principal contention, the Court treated as erroneous the trial court’s characterization of the facts as mere provocation. It recalled that the Solicitor General urged that the facts established an act of unlawful aggression by the deceased, together with lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused, which together would carve out a case of incomplete self-defense.

The Court agreed. It observed the chain of events found by the trial court: Duldulao chased the accused’s son; the accused approached to question the chase and the earlier throwing of the club; Duldulao then struck the accused on the left shoulder with the club; the accused drew a sharp-pointed knife; Duldulao again clubbed the accused on the head; and the accused stabbed Duldulao. The Court emphasized that the only element missing to exempt the accused entirely from criminal liability under Article 11(1) was reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel unlawful aggression. As that element was absent, the circumstances constituted the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense rather than mere provocation under Article 13(4).

Legal Basis and Reasoning on the Proper Penalty

Having determined the applicable mitigating circumstances, the Court assessed the penalty accordingly. It held that the accused deserved the benefit of Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires that the deed is not wholly excusable or exempt by reason of lack of some conditions required for justification or exemption, with the “majority” of the conditions present. The Court then considered that, in view of the plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, and the absence of any aggravating circumstance, the accused also qualified under Article 64(5) for a penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period the court deemed applicable, according to the number and nature of mitigating circumstances.

The Court rejected the idea of only a single reduction. It discussed prior cases where incomplete self-defense had been accompanied by other circumstances, noting that in those instances the Court had reduced the penalty by two degrees, including one degree under Article 69 for incomplete justification or exemption and another degree under Article 64(5) for the presence of privileged and generic mitigating circumstances. Applying the same approach, the Court held that the accused should receive a two-degree reduction of penalty—one degree under Article 69, and another under Article 64(5)—bec

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-29532)

The case arose from the conviction of Mariano Oandasan for homicide.
The People of the Philippines sought affirmance of the judgment, while the accused appealed and focused on the alleged error in the penalty imposed.
The Supreme Court modified the penalty and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Parties and Procedural Posture

The People of the Philippines appeared as plaintiff-appellee.
Mariano Oandasan appeared as defendant-appellant.
The criminal complaint was filed with the Municipal Court of Flora, Mountain Province for homicide.
At the municipal court proceedings, the accused was arraigned and pleaded “not guilty.”
The matter was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cagayan for trial on the merits.
At the Court of First Instance, a formal indictment for homicide was filed by the prosecuting attorney.
Upon arraignment before the Court of First Instance, the accused pleaded guilty.
Before sentence, the accused presented evidence to prove mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender.
The trial judge rendered a decision on September 27, 1967, and sentenced the accused with a penalty range reflecting homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, while appreciating provocation as an ordinary mitigating circumstance along with voluntary surrender.
The accused appealed, assigning as its sole substantial claim of error that the penalty imposed was incorrect.

Key Factual Antecedents

The accused testified that he saw the deceased, Quirino Duldulao, chasing the accused’s son.
The deceased threw a wooden club at the accused’s son, but the son was not hit.
The accused approached the deceased and asked why he was chasing the son and why he threw the club.
Instead of answering, the deceased clubbed the accused on the left shoulder.
The accused stepped back and remembered that he had a sharp-pointed knife, then he drew it.
The deceased then clubbed the accused on the head.
The accused stabbed the deceased on the front.
The deceased sustained two wounds, one at the epigastric region and the other on the right hand.

Charge and Legal Characterization

The information and the case posture reflected that the charge was homicide.
The Supreme Court treated the trial court’s failure to appreciate incomplete self-defense as an error in the assessment of the mitigating circumstances that affected the penalty.
The penalty for the crime was tied to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides the base penalty for homicide.

Issues on Appeal

The first issue was whether the accused’s guilty plea should qualify as a mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt despite the earlier not guilty plea at preliminary investigation in the municipal court.
The second issue was whether the facts established the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense instead of only the ordinary mitigating circumstance of provocation.
The third issue was whether, given the mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be recalibrated using the combined effects of Articles 69 and 64(5) and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Contentions of the Accused

The accused argued that his plea of guilty should be considered in his favor as a mitigating circumstance.
The accused, supported by the Solicitor General, contended that the trial court erred in disregarding the plea of guilty as mitigating.
The accused also argued that the circumstances proved incomplete self-defense, not merely provocation.

Court’s Analysis: Confession Mitigating Effect

The Supreme Court acknowledged the general rule that when an accused pleads not guilty in a court of preliminary jurisdiction and later changes the plea to guilty upon rearraignment before the court of first instance, the accused should not benefit from the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt.
The Court explained that the underlying rationale of the general rule is the absence of spontaneous willingness to admit the offense at the time the mitigating circumstance contemplates.
The Court rejected a contrary approach because it would allow an accused to “speculate” by pleading not guilty first and then pleading guilty only to secure the mitigating circumstance after conviction and appeal.
The Court identified a decisive exception: the municipal court at which the accused pleaded not guilty was only conducting a preliminary investigation and had no jurisdiction to render judgment for homicide.
The Court held that, for purposes of applying the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt, the plea of not guilty at the preliminary investigation stage in the municipal court was “no plea