G.R. No. 48811 - People vs. Nartea

Case Summary (G.R. No. 48811)

Factual Background and the Killing

The record showed that Benito Graban sustained four bolo wounds: one on the back in the lumbar region eight inches long; one on the left hand amputating or wounding all the fingers except the thumb; one on the right wrist; and one at the left inguinal region. The attack occurred while Gaudiosa Balais, wife of Benedicto Naagas, and Fernanda (alias Alexandra) Canete, Benito’s common-law wife, were present in the house.

Within about an hour after the wounding, Sergeant of Police Benito Arintok arrived in response to the report made by Gaudiosa Balais, who had run to the municipal building. At the scene, Sergeant Arintok interrogated the wounded Benito, who identified his assailants by their names. Benito stated that he did not know whether he would die, and when asked why he was wounded, he responded that he was not guilty of anything and merely “kept looking for my means of living” because he was too old.

On the way to the municipal building, Justice of the Peace Rufino A. Astorga met the sergeant and also interrogated the wounded man. In that second interrogation, Benito again identified the assailants by their pet names. The decision treated Didoy as Aguedo, Igoy as Domingo, and Potin as Potenciano.

That same day, in the evening, Benito Graban died of hemorrhage. The Court further noted an antecedent killing: on September 24, 1940, just two days earlier, Edefonso (also referred to as Alfonso) Nartea, the appellants’ father, was killed by Fidel Naagas, brother of Benedicto Naagas and nephew of Benito. A nephew of Benito, Porfirio Graban, had been accused together with Fidel Naagas in connection with that earlier killing.

Trial Court Findings and the Nature of the Evidence

The trial court credited testimony from Gaudiosa Balais and from another eyewitness, Potenciana Dandan, and it also relied on the deceased’s transcribed declarations to the sergeant and the justice of the peace. The trial court concluded that the four accused, including Jesus Nartea, inflicted the wounds on Benito in a coordinated assault. The Court quoted the narration of the manner of attack, describing how Domingo entered the house seeking Benedicto Naagas, how Aguedo responded that the visit was for a fight, how Domingo struck Benito while he was on the steps, how Benito ran toward a window and received another bolo wound from Aguedo while escaping, how Potenciano inflicted a wound in the left inguinal region, and how Jesus Nartea inflicted a final wound on Benito while Benito was already seated, raising his hands in surrender.

Issues Raised on Appeal

Counsel de oficio assigned three alleged errors: (one) the trial court erred in admitting Exhibit E as part of the res gestæ; (two) the trial court erred in failing to find that Potenciano Nartea and Domingo Nartea did not participate in the fight with Benito; and (three) the trial court erred in failing to find that Aguedo Nartea acted in self-defense.

Appellants’ Contentions and the Defense Theory

On the merits, appellants advanced a defense theory insisting that only Aguedo Nartea had inflicted the mortal blows after Benito, though old, had furiously attacked him with a bolo without provocation, and that the other three accused were at a place about one-half kilometer away at the time of the fight—at the house of Luciana Faraor. To support that theory, the defense presented testimony from Aguedo and Domingo, and called witnesses Vicente Makabenta, Luciana Famor, and Rufino Graban, who was Benito’s brother.

The defense also sought to undermine identification by portraying the deceased’s declarations as not spontaneous and by insinuating possible revenge-motivation. Finally, the defense attempted to cast the encounters as a self-defense episode centered on Aguedo.

The Court’s Ruling on the Res Gestæ Issue

On the first assigned error, the Court examined whether the deceased’s statements to Sergeant Arintok and Justice of the Peace Astorga were admissible as part of the res gestæ. Counsel for the appellants argued that more than one hour had elapsed, thus preventing contemporaneity, and counsel also pointed to the deceased’s statement that he was not guilty of anything as showing reflection and an effort to exculpate himself.

The Court explained the evidentiary concept that res gestæ includes a startling or unusual occurrence that produces a spontaneous reaction and produces statements made without forethought or deliberate design. It emphasized that whether a declaration is part of the res gestæ depends on whether the declarant was the “facts talking through the party,” or whether the party was talking about the facts. The Court rejected any arbitrary fixed time limitation and treated admissibility as a matter of trial court discretion, generally conclusive on appeal absent clear abuse.

Applying those principles, the Court found no error in admission. It stressed that Sergeant Arintok was the first to talk to Benito after he had been severely wounded and while he lay helpless. The Court held that the deceased’s comment that he was not to blame did not necessarily imply deliberation. It reasoned that a man bleeding out from life-sustaining injuries would have little occasion to devise excuses, and would more plausibly fear imminent death than anticipate prosecution. The Court also noted that the deceased repeated the same exculpatory theme to the justice of the peace, after identifying the assailants, which the Court considered consistent with truth and not inconsistent with spontaneity.

Accordingly, the Court sustained the trial court’s ruling and overruled the first assigned error.

Credibility Determinations on Participation and Self-Defense

The Court addressed the second and third assigned errors together because both attacked the factual basis of identification and the claimed defense narrative.

The Court found credible the prosecution version and rejected the defense claim that only Aguedo fought Benito while the other accused were elsewhere. It relied on several considerations. Benito Graban was about seventy years old and had poor eyesight, and the Court inferred that his youth-like combativeness was absent. It found it unlikely that Benito attacked Aguedo without provocation, given that Benito’s nephew Fidel Naagas had killed Aguedo’s father only two days before. The Court instead inferred motive in the accused: the three appellants were in their twenties, their father had been killed recently, and they were looking for Benedicto Naagas, the brother of the killer.

Aguedo’s own testimony did not persuade the Court. The Court found it inconsistent with the physical facts. It observed that Benito received four serious wounds, including one on the back in the lumbar region. It matched that fact with Gaudiosa Balais’s account that Aguedo inflicted the back wound while Benito was running through the kitchen to escape from Domingo’s assault. The Court also noted the absence of a bolo attributed to Benito: Sergeant Arintok found no such weapon on the premises after the fight, and the accused did not present any bolo at trial supporting their version that Benito had armed himself and attacked Aguedo.

The Court accorded decisive weight to the identification statements of the dying victim. It reasoned that if Domingo, Potenciano, and Jesus were not present, it was improbable that Benito could identify and name them as coauthors of his wounds. It rejected the suggestion that Benito named them out of revenge, particularly as to Jesus Nartea, who was only a fifteen-year-old cousin and not a brother of the deceased. The Court considered it unreasonable that the deceased would choose a boy cousin for revenge when the other accused were not present.

The Court also found the testimony of Rufino Graban, Benito’s brother, unnatural and incredible. It found it implausible for a brother to defend the murderers of the victim. The Court observed that Rufino claimed to have witnessed an encounter between Benito and Aguedo but also asserted that he did not see the other accused. Yet his narrative failed to account for Benito’s wounds in the lumbar region and the right wrist. It further questioned why Rufino and his brother Pablo did not overtake Benito at the place where Benito lay wounded, particularly because the house of Pablo Graban was described as only a short distance from the scene and Benito remained unaided for at least one hour before being taken to the municipal building. The Court contrasted that with Gaudiosa Balais’s testimony that Rufino was fishing at sea an

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 48811)

The People of the Philippines prosecuted Aguedo Nartea, Domingo Nartea, and Potenciano Nartea for murder, with Jesus Nartea also indicted but not part of the appeal.
The Court of First Instance of Leyte convicted the brothers and imposed reclusión perpetua on Domingo Nartea and Potenciano Nartea, and an indeterminate penalty of from fourteen years, eight months, and one day to twenty years of reclusion temporal on Aguedo Nartea.
The trial court additionally ordered the accused to indemnify the heirs of Benito Graban in the amount of P2,000, jointly and severally, and to pay three-fourths of the costs.
The trial court also ordered Jesus Nartea, a minor of fifteen, to be confined in Welfareville until he reached the age of majority, and Jesus Nartea did not appeal.
The brothers appealed, while the record before the Court focused on the propriety of the evidence, the participation of each accused, and the claim of self-defense.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Aguedo Nartea, Domingo Nartea, and Potenciano Nartea were the appellants convicted for murder.
The People of the Philippines remained the plaintiff and appellee, defending the judgment of conviction.
The case proceeded on appeal to review alleged evidentiary and credibility errors, including the admission of a prosecution exhibit as res gestæ.
The Court affirmed the appealed sentence in toto, finding it in accordance with the facts and the law.
The Court noted that Jesus Nartea was already final as he did not appeal.

Key Factual Allegations

On the morning of September 26, 1940, at about eight o’clock, Benito Graban, about seventy years old, received four bolo wounds.
The wounds included one on the back in the lumbar region, about eight inches long; one on the left hand amputating or wounding all fingers except the thumb; one on the right wrist; and one on the left inguinal region.
The aggression occurred inside the house of Benidecto Naagas, in sitio of Tangnan, barrio of Bislig, Carigara, Leyte.
At the time of the wounding, Gaudiosa Balais, wife of Benedicto Naagas, and Fernanda (alias Alexandra) Canete, Benito’s common-law wife, were present.
Police arrived after a report made by Gaudiosa Balais, who had run to the municipal building immediately after the wounding.
Sergeant of Police Benito Arintok responded first and found Benito lying flat behind the kitchen.
The Court treated the deceased’s on-scene identifications and explanations as pivotal, including his naming of multiple assailants and his statements about the lack of blame on his part.
Benito later died of hemorrhage in the evening of the same day.
Two days before, on September 24, 1940, the appellants’ father, Edefonso (also referred to as Alfonso) Nartea, had been killed by Fidel Naagas, brother of Benedicto Naagas and nephew of Benito Graban.
Another nephew, Porfirio Graban, had been accused together with Fidel Naagas for the killing of the appellants’ father.

Prosecution Evidence

The prosecution relied on eyewitness testimony and, more importantly, on the deceased’s declarations to police and a justice of the peace.
The Court credited testimony of Gaudiosa Balais and Potenciana Dandan as eyewitness accounts of how the attack unfolded.
The trial court found that the four accused, including Jesus Nartea, inflicted the wounds described.
The narrative attributed to the trial court described a coordinated assault: Domingo Nartea entering and asking for Benedicto Naagas, Aguedo Nartea responding that the visit was to provoke a fight, and Domingo striking Benito while Benito was on the stairs.
The narrative continued that Benito fell, ran toward a window used by the family as comedor and cocina, and before he could escape he was struck again, including a wound on the back and a further wound inflicted as Benito was in the act of leaving through the window.
Sergeant of Police Benito Arintok interrogated Benito immediately after the wounding.
Benito’s responses named Didoy Nartea, Igoy Nartea, Potin Nartea, Jesus Nartea as those who wounded him, and the Court treated “Didoy,” “Igoy,” and “Potin” as pet names for Aguedo, Domingo, and Potenciano, respectively.
When asked why he was wounded, Benito stated that he was “not guilty of anything,” and he also expressed uncertainty as to whether he would survive.
On the way to the municipal building, the Justice of the Peace Rufino A. Astorga met the sergeant and also interrogated Benito, who again identified the assailants and reiterated that he was not to blame.
The Court emphasized that the deceased’s identifications repeated to both a police officer and a justice of the peace were decisive.

Declarations and Res Gestæ

The appellants’ first assigned error attacked the admission of Exhibit E as part of res gestæ.
The trial court found that Benito’s declarations naming the assailants to Sergeant Arintok were spontaneous, not inspired by a desire for revenge, and not suggested by anyone.
Appellants argued that more than one hour had elapsed before Arintok took the statements, so the declarations were not spontaneous.
Appellants also contended that Benito’s statement that he was not guilty showed an inclination to exculpate himself and therefore reflected deliberation.
The Court defined res gestæ as a startling or unusual event producing a spontaneous and instinctive reaction during which statements are made without forethought or deliberate design.
The Court stressed the standard that the declaration must reflect “the facts talking through the party” rather than “the party talking about the facts.”
The Court rejected any arbitrary fixed time rule for determining res gestæ coverage and held that the factual circumstances control.
The Court recognized a trend to extend, rather than narrow, the scope of declarations admitted as res gestæ.
The Court treated whether specific statements are admissible as res gestæ as generally within the trial court’s discretion and ordinarily conclusive on appeal absent clear abuse.
The Court held that the declarations were properly admitted becaus