Title
People vs. Moran
Case
G.R. No. 17905
Decision Date
Jan 27, 1923
Accused convicted of Election Law violation; Supreme Court ruled crime prescribed under retroactive Act No. 3030, dismissing case and absolving them.
falsifying election returns
prescription of crime
retroactive application
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 188467)

Factual Background

The three defendants were convicted in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for an offense against the Election Law as defined in section 2639 of the Administrative Code. On appeal this Court rendered a decision, published March 31, 1922, affirming the conviction but increasing the term of imprisonment to six months. After the appeal had been briefed, argued and submitted, and while a petition for reconsideration and rehearing was pending, the accused filed, on May 2, 1922, a special motion asserting that the offense had prescribed under the provision of section 71 of Act No. 3030, which the Legislature had approved on March 9, 1922, and which declared that offenses resulting from violations of that Act “shall prescribe one year after their commission.” The Attorney-General filed answers and supplemental answers opposing that motion; the accused filed replies and supplementary replies. The record did not show that the plea of prescription had been raised in the trial court.

Procedural History

The case began with criminal charges prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted the defendants. The defendants perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court. Following briefing and hearing, the Supreme Court published a decision on March 31, 1922 affirming the conviction but increasing the term of imprisonment. The defendants timely sought reconsideration. Pending that petition, they presented a new and distinct motion on May 2, 1922, asserting that the crime had prescribed under Act No. 3030. The Attorney-General opposed the motion and the parties fully argued their positions. The majority of the Court entertained the motion, concluded that prescription under section 71 of Act No. 3030 applied and had the retroactive effect favoring the accused, set aside its prior decision of March 31, 1922, and dismissed the action with costs de oficio, cancelled the bond previously given for provisional release, and declared that release final. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Araullo, C.J., with Justices Street, Avancena, Villamor, and Romualdez concurring. A dissenting opinion by Malcolm, J., joined by Johnson and Johns, JJ., was filed.

Issue Presented

The principal issues were (a) whether the prescription provided in section 71 of Act No. 3030 applied to the offenses with which the defendants had been charged under the preexisting Election Law as amended by Act No. 3030, and (b) whether that prescription provision must be given retroactive effect so as to extinguish the State’s right to prosecute offenses committed before March 9, 1922. Subsidiarily, the Court addressed whether article 22 of the Penal Code — which declares that “Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony or misdemeanor” — applied to special penal statutes such as the Election Law and its amendment by Act No. 3030, and whether a court must apply prescription sua sponte where a subsequently enacted law favors the accused.

The Parties’ Contentions

The defendants contended that, by enacting section 71 of Act No. 3030, the Legislature prescribed a one-year period of prescription for offenses resulting from violations of the Election Law and that this provision operated to bar prosecution of their offenses committed more than one year prior to the commencement of the action. The Attorney-General resisted that contention, arguing, as reflected in the dissent, that the phrase “This Act” in section 71 should be read literally as meaning Act No. 3030 itself and not the prior Election Law or pending prosecutions; that prescription provisions are not to be given retrospective effect unless clearly made so; that article 7 of the Penal Code excludes special laws from application of the Penal Code; and that article 22’s retroactivity should not be extended to special election legislation that fixes procedural or remedial periods. The Attorney-General also relied on the procedural posture of the case and on authoritative American decisions and treatises that favor prospective application of statutes of limitation in criminal matters.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Court, through Araullo, C.J., held that section 71 of Act No. 3030 referred to offenses arising from the Election Law as amended by that enactment and that the one-year prescription it fixed was favorable to the accused and therefore retroactive under article 22 of the Penal Code. The Court found that, by virtue of that retroactive prescription, the criminal action had prescribed. The Court therefore set aside its earlier decision of March 31, 1922, dismissed the criminal action with costs de oficio, annulled the provisional-release bond, and declared the defendants’ release final.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Majority

The Court reasoned that the phrase “This Act” in section 71 must be read in the context of Act No. 3030 as amendatory legislation: the Act expressly amended numerous sections of the Administrative Code comprising the Election Law and thus, when read as a whole, Act No. 3030 and the Election Law as amended constitute the effective Election Law. The one-year prescription in section 71 therefore applied to the offenses which the defendants had been charged with under the prior Election Law as amended.

The Court grounded its conclusion on the proposition that prescription of crime extinguishes the State’s right to prosecute and punish, and that article 22 of the Penal Code mandates that penal laws favorable to the accused have retroactive effect. The Court rejected the contention that article 22 does not apply to special laws, citing prior Philippine decisions, notably United States vs. Parrone, where the Court had applied article 22 to a special law later than the Penal Code and had given a more favorable penalty retroactive effect. The Court further relied on decisions of the supreme court of Spain interpreting comparable provisions, and on authorities such as Fiore and Wharton to support the view that statutes of limitation in criminal matters are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused and that, where a later law shortens or creates a period of prescription favorable to an accused, the later law must be applied to pending prosecutions. The Court rejected Anglo-American precedents that hold statutes of limitation prospective unless clearly made retroactive, on the ground that article 22 supplies an express rule of retroactivity for penal laws in the Philippine system and that the Legislature, composed in part of members of the Philippine Bar aware of article 22, could be presumed not to intend any limitation on that rule.

The Court also held that prescription may be substantive and procedural in character; regardless of its classification, a provision favorable to the accused must be applied retroactively. The Court emphasized that a judicial duty exists to apply laws favorable to the accused sua sponte, and it cited the Court’s prior practice in which it itself had declared prescription where applicable even though no party raised the point, notably United States vs. Rama. Applying those principles to the facts — noting that the action had been commenced on December 20, 1920, and thus fell outside the one-year period fixed by section 71 — the Court concluded that the offense had prescribed and ordered dismissal.

Authorities and Analytical Materials Considered

The majority surveyed a wide array of authorities. It relied on prior Philippine precedents, expressly citing United States vs. Parrone and United States vs. Rama, and it examined decisions of the supreme court of Spain that gave retroactive effect to Penal Code provisions favorable to accused persons under special laws. The opinion discussed treatises and comparative jurisprudence, quoting Fiore’s analysis of the retroactivity of prescription provisions and citing Wharton on the liberal construction of statutes of limitation in criminal matters. The Court contrasted these authorities with American decisions and compilations (Corpus Juris and Ruling Case Law) that generally presume prospective operation of statutes of limitation, and explained why article 22 of the Penal Code controlled the issue in the Philippine context.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Malcolm, joined by Justices Johnson and Johns, dissented. The dissent emphasized procedural objections and substantive construct

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