G.R. No. 133917 - People vs. Molina y Manamat

Case Summary (G.R. No. 133917)

Factual summary of the seizure and arrest

Police testimony established that in June–July 1996 an informer identified an alleged marijuana pusher (later identified as Mula) to SPO1 Marino Paguidopon. On August 8, 1996, Paguidopon received information the pusher would pass by NHA, Ma-a, Davao City. A police team positioned near Paguidopon’s house. At about 9:30 A.M. a trisikad carrying the accused-appellants passed; Paguidopon pointed them out to the waiting officers. The team overtook the trisikad; when ordered to stop, Mula allegedly handed a black bag to Molina. SPO1 Pamplona identified himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag. Molina said, “Boss, if possible we will settle this.” Pamplona insisted and opened the bag, revealing dried marijuana leaves. The accused-appellants were then handcuffed.

Trial testimony and defense motions

The prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses. The defense filed a demurrer to evidence arguing the seized marijuana was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures; the trial court denied the demurrer and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and filed a joint memorandum. The trial court found the prosecution evidence sufficient and sentenced the accused to death.

Issues raised on automatic review

The accused-appellants raised three principal issues before the Supreme Court: (1) that the marijuana was inadmissible because the seizure violated their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (2) that, assuming admissibility, the prosecution nevertheless failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) that, assuming guilt, the proper penalty absent aggravating circumstances was life imprisonment rather than death.

Constitutional protection and the exclusionary rule

The Court emphasized the constitutional guarantee in Article III, Section 2 that the people be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the complementary exclusionary rule that any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provisions is inadmissible. The Court reiterated that these protections are fundamental and serve to prevent state abuses; without the exclusionary rule the constitutional guarantee would be ineffectual.

Exceptions to the warrant requirement and standards for in flagrante delicto

The Court summarized recognized exceptions permitting warrantless searches and seizures (search incident to lawful arrest, moving motor vehicle, plain view, consent, stop-and-frisk/Terry search, and others) and focused on the in flagrante delicto exception. For an in flagrante arrest to be valid, the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of an overt act showing that the person has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. The Court stressed that reliable information from an informer alone, without overt acts within the officer’s view or personal knowledge establishing probable cause, is insufficient to justify an in flagrante arrest.

Precedent and the required concurrence of elements for in flagrante arrests

Drawing on precedent cited in the record, the Court explained that a valid in flagrante arrest requires concurrence of two requisites: (1) an overt act by the accused indicating commission or attempted commission of a crime; and (2) that overt act occurred in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Mere suspicious behavior or equivocal conduct has been held insufficient in prior cases to establish probable cause for immediate warrantless arrest and subsequent search.

Application of law to the facts: insufficiency of probable cause

Applying these principles, the Court found the circumstances of the arrest and search in this case insufficient to meet the in flagrante standard. Holding a bag while riding a trisikad and the equivocal statement by Molina (“Boss, if possible we will settle this”) did not constitute an overt act demonstrating that a crime was being committed in the officers’ presence. Critical to the Court’s analysis was the limited and unreliable identification by SPO1 Paguidopon: he had seen Mula only once, identified him by the informer while Mula was on a motorcycle, and admitted he learned the names and addresses of the accused only after the arrest. Paguidopon’s alleged recognition was therefore tenuous. The Court also found SPO1 Pamplona’s cla

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 133917)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines.
Accused-Appellants: Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy."
Case elevated on automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court.
Decision under review: Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, Decision dated April 25, 1997 (penned by Judge Renato A. Fuentes), finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act and sentencing them to death.
Ultimate disposition by the Supreme Court: Decision in the present record reversing and setting aside the trial court decision, acquitting and ordering the release of the accused-appellants for lack of evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Information and Charge

Information filed August 10, 1996, alleging that on or about August 8, 1996, in Davao City, accused-appellants, in conspiracy with each other, were found in their possession of 946.9 grams of dried marijuana, prohibited items, contrary to law.
Statutory basis of charge: Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; Section 20 of the Act sets the applicable ranges and thresholds (notably 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana triggers the heavier penalty).

Arraignment, Plea and Trial

Arraignment: September 4, 1996; both accused-appellants pleaded not guilty.
Prosecution witnesses presented at trial included Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr.
Accused-appellants, through counsel, filed a Demurrer to Evidence on December 6, 1996, asserting that the marijuana was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Demurrer to Evidence was denied by the trial court; motion for reconsideration also denied.
Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and filed a joint memorandum.

Facts as Adduced at Trial (Prosecution Version)

Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, assigned to PNP Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received information about an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City; he personally saw the alleged pusher during the first week of July 1996 when an informer pointed out a motorcycle driver, identified as accused-appellant Mula.
SPO1 Paguidopon had no prior occasion to see accused-appellant Molina before the arrest; names and addresses of the accused-appellants were learned by SPO1 Paguidopon only after their arrest.
On the morning of August 8, 1996, at about 7:30 A.M., SPO1 Paguidopon received information that the alleged pusher would be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City that morning.
Around 8:00 A.M., SPO1 Paguidopon called for assistance from PNP Precinct No. 3; a team was dispatched to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon to wait for the alleged pusher. The dispatched team included SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona.
At about 9:30 A.M., while the team was at SPO1 Paguidopon’s house, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by; SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers; the team overtook the "trisikad."
SPO1 Paguidopon remained in his house about thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were accosted; the arresting officers ordered the "trisikad" to stop.
At the time the trisikad was stopped, accused-appellant Mula, holding a black bag, handed it to accused-appellant Molina; SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag.
Molina allegedly replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted and opened the bag, revealing dried marijuana leaves inside; both accused-appellants were then handcuffed.
Quantity of seized marijuana: 946.9 grams of dried marijuana.

Trial Court Disposition and Sentence

The trial court found the prosecution evidence sufficient, noting accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence.
Decretal portion (trial court): Found both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Section 8; sentenced Nasario Molina and Gregorio Mula to suffer the supreme penalty of death through lethal injection under Republic Act 8176, to be effected as provided by law, in relation to Section 24 of RA 7659.
The trial court ordered immediate elevation of the entire records to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Accused-Appellants’ Contentions on Appeal (as stated in record)

I. That the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence for having been seized in violation of appellants' constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
II. That, assuming admissibility, the government has otherwise not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
III. That, assuming guilt proved beyond reasonable doubt, the imposable penalty for violation of Section 8 of RA No. 7659, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, is life i