Title
People vs. Mendoza
Case
G.R. No. 132923-24
Decision Date
Jun 6, 2002
Marcelo Mendoza convicted of simple rape for June 25, 1995 incident, acquitted for August 11, 1995 due to insufficient evidence; deadly weapon not proven.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-6969)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

Alleged offenses: June 25, 1995 and August 11, 1995.
Informations filed: May 31, 1996.
Arraignment: June 18, 1996 (plea: not guilty).
RTC decision convicting appellant of two counts of rape qualified by use of a deadly weapon and sentencing him to death: February 10, 1998 (decretal portion reproduced in the record).
Automatic review by the Supreme Court (decision summarized here) resulted in partial reversal and modification: one conviction reduced to simple rape with sentence of reclusion perpetua and civil damages; the other count acquitted.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

Constitutional framework: 1987 Philippine Constitution governs (decision date is 2002).
Statutory and doctrinal authorities invoked: Article 335, Revised Penal Code (simple rape); provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 concerning circumstances warranting death penalty (as discussed in the decision); Rule 110, Section 9 (requirements for alleging aggravating or qualifying circumstances in the Information); Article 63, Revised Penal Code (rules for application of indivisible penalties). Controlling precedents cited in the decision (e.g., People v. De la Cuesta, People v. Onabia) establish that aggravating/qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged and proved and that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense graver than that charged.

Charged Offenses and the Informations

Two separate Informations charged Marcelo Mendoza with rape: (a) Criminal Case No. TG-2597-96 alleged rape on or about June 25, 1995 (victim then 13) by means of force, violence, intimidation, and advantage of superior strength; (b) Criminal Case No. TG-2598-96 alleged rape on or about August 11, 1995 of the same victim, explicitly mentioning her age (13). Neither Information alleged the use of a deadly weapon nor otherwise pleaded qualifying circumstances that would elevate simple rape to qualified rape.

Prosecution’s Factual Theory and Evidence

The prosecution’s factual narrative, largely based on the victim’s testimony and medical examination, describes two incidents in Ben Salazar’s coffee plantation. On June 25, 1995, the victim was allegedly accosted, dragged into the plantation, threatened with a bolo carried by the assailant, stripped of shorts and panties during a violent struggle, and subjected to penile-vaginal penetration. The victim reported shouting and being unable to summon help because the location was isolated; she later disclosed the incidents to her mother in December 1995 and underwent medical examination. The physician (Dr. Garcia dela Cruz) testified that internal examination showed resistance on the vaginal canal and an admission of two fingers, which the physician interpreted as an indication of sexual intercourse.

Defense Version and Alibi Evidence

The defense presented testimony attempting to place the accused at religious gatherings in Marikina/Marikina Sports Complex and Rodriguez Sports Complex on the dates in question (June 25 and the overnight of August 11–12, 1995), with attendance lists and witness testimony describing his participation (playing guitar, singing). Family witnesses suggested motives for fabrication (allegations that the complainant stole money, family pressure to extort payment from the accused). The accused testified that he was away or at religious services on the relevant dates and denied the charges.

Trial Court Findings and Sentence

The RTC credited the victim’s testimony as straightforward and credible and found that the assailant was armed with a bolo which he used to compel the victim’s submission. The RTC convicted Mendoza of rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon in both cases and sentenced him to death for each count, and awarded P30,000 as actual damages to each victim.

Issues Raised on Appeal

Appellant’s primary assignments of error were: (1) the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty (qualified rape) despite Informations charging only simple rape; and (2) the trial court erred in giving decisive weight to the complainant’s testimony when it was unconvincing, improbable, and inherently incredible.

Supreme Court’s Analysis — Legal Principle on Notice and Degree of the Offense

The Court reaffirmed established doctrine that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense graver than that for which he was charged because that would violate the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and would deny due process. Aggravating and qualifying circumstances that elevate a crime must be categorically alleged in the Information (Rule 110, Section 9); absent such allegations, the court may not appreciate them to impose a heavier penalty. The Court cited People v. De la Cuesta and related authorities to conclude that Mendoza could not be convicted of rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon where the Informations charged only simple rape.

Supreme Court’s Analysis — Whether a Deadly Weapon Was Used

Beyond the pleading defect, the Court examined the record facts regarding the bolo. The victim’s testimony indicated the bolo was at the assailant’s side and that he threatened her with it, but she also stated he did not use it or hold it actively when he undressed her and raped her. The Court observed that mere being armed or in possession of a bolo is insufficient to qualify rape as committed with a deadly weapon unless the weapon is actually used or actively employed to threaten or compel. Thus, even on the factual record, the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was not established in the degree necessary to sustain a conviction for qualified rape.

Supreme Court’s Analysis — Credibility, Sufficiency of Evidence, and Distinction Between Counts

On credibility, the Court reiterated the principle that the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is entitled to great respect because the trial court personally observes witnesses. The Supreme Court found no compelling reason to overturn the RTC’s acceptance of the victim’s detailed account of the June 25, 1995 incident: her narrative of struggle, the tearing/damage to garments, the force used, and the physician’s findings of penetration provided corroboration sufficient to establish the elements of simple rape for that date. By contrast, the alleged August 11, 1995 incident was supported only by the victim’s bare assertion that she was raped on that date without detailed narrative or corroborating proof. The Court emphasized that a witness’s mere conclusion that she was raped on a specific date is not sufficient; the fact of carnal knowledge and force or intimidation must be proven by evidence. Applying the standard that prosecution evidence must stand on its own strength, the Court concluded that the August 11 allegation did not meet the required quantum of proof and therefore ordered acquittal on that count.

Application of Indivisible Penalty Doctrine and Reassessment of Sentence

Because the Informations did not plead qualifying circumstances and the record failed to establish the use of a deadly weapon, the Court held that Mendoza could not be punished with the death penalty for either count. The Court modified the conviction: Criminal Case No. TG-2597-96 (June 25, 1995) was downgraded to simple rape, for which the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua; Criminal Case No. TG-2598-96 (August 11, 1995) resulted in acquittal for failure of proof. The Court also rejected application of the “uninhabited place” aggr

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