Title
People vs. Marquez
Case
G.R. No. L-24373-74
Decision Date
Nov 28, 1969
Five defendants convicted in two separate robbery cases—one involving homicide, the other multiple rape—appealed jurisdictional and procedural issues, with the Supreme Court affirming life imprisonment for one and remanding the other for review.
mental capacity
witness credibility
defense of alibi
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-24373-74)

Appellate-Jurisdiction Issue Raised by a Consolidated Trial

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the two criminal cases involved distinct offenses committed in different places and on different dates. Nevertheless, it declined to recognize a split in appellate jurisdiction and refused to review criminal case 7054, notwithstanding its claimed duty and power to do so. The Court of Appeals was persuaded by three practical considerations: the trial court had kept a single consolidated record because the hearings were simultaneous; the defendants presented a single body of proof supporting defenses common to both offenses; and the same errors were assigned in the appeals. The Court of Appeals therefore certified the cases to the Supreme Court for review, correctly viewing criminal case 7050 as within the Supreme Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction because the penalty imposed was life imprisonment.

Supreme Court’s Ruling on Jurisdiction and Its Limited Review

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals could not validly avoid the statutory jurisdictional boundaries through the exigencies of trial proceedings or the physical consolidation of the expediente. The Court explained that the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed in criminal case 7050 placed that case within the Supreme Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction under Section 17, par. (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended—which covers criminal cases involving offenses where the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.

As to criminal case 7054, the Court held that because it involved a different offense, committed about a month earlier in a different municipality, and the maximum penalty imposed was reclusion temporal, the case fell within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 29 of the same Act. The Court distinguished an alternate scenario where the two offenses arose from the same occurrence or were committed on the same occasion as the more serious offense, because then the Supreme Court would be bound to take cognizance of both. Since the circumstances here showed stark separation in time and locality, the Supreme Court declined to expand its jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Court limited its review to criminal case 7050 and remanded criminal case 7054 to the Court of Appeals for proper review.

Arraignment, Plea of Guilty, and the Request to Change the Plea

In criminal case 7050, the information was read to the accused—Manuel Marquez, Tomas Navasca, Andres Alcontin, Rogelio Alcontin, and Florencio Geraldez—at arraignment on January 17, 1962. All pleaded not guilty, except Navasca, who admitted his guilt in open court. The defendants’ common counsels (with Marquez separately represented) moved for reconsideration of Navasca’s plea, claiming that Navasca had previously agreed with counsel not to plead guilty. The trial court directed re-arraignment, after which Navasca reiterated his confession of guilt.

Counsel did not abandon the motion. They instead sought examination of Navasca by a psychiatrist, alleging that he had become mentally deranged while in prison. Dr. Manuel Celis of the Davao General Hospital testified and issued a report diagnosing Navasca with “simple and hebephrenic schizophrenia” or schizophrenic reaction. The defense contended that Navasca was insane and thus incapable of entering an effective plea. The trial court was not persuaded and rejected the demand to change the plea from guilty to not guilty.

Determination of Legal Sanity at the Time of Plea

The Supreme Court addressed the assigned error first. It held that if Navasca were truly insane, the remedy would have been the annulment of his plea and suspension of arraignment, not a change of the plea to not guilty. The Court reasoned that an insane accused cannot understand the full import of either plea.

The Court noted that Navasca was examined by a competent psychiatrist and that Dr. Celis testified he was not of sound mind. However, the Court focused on whether the mental condition legally incapacitated Navasca from entering an efficacious plea when the indictment was read to him. The psychiatrist, while describing abnormal behavior and hallucinations, also stated that the effect of schizophrenic reaction on comprehension was merely superficial. Dr. Celis testified that Navasca could understand the meaning of inquiries and properly appreciate the proceedings. The trial judge’s own observation supported the conclusion that Navasca was legally sane, since Navasca even served as a witness for the other defendants and gave intelligent and responsive testimony.

The Supreme Court thus concurred in the trial court’s finding that Navasca had the mental capacity required in law to plead at arraignment. It found no basis to modify the conviction on the ground that he was convicted without trial.

Evidence for the Prosecution: Robbery in Band, Homicide, and the Presence of Appellants

On May 14, 1961, at around six o’clock in the afternoon, the prosecution’s witnesses—particularly Regina Butay and Crisanta But-ay—narrated the events in New Visayas, municipality of Matanao, Davao. A band of robbers—five in all—arrived, each wielding a firearm, and invaded the house of Diosdado But-ay. Four entered through the front door and warned occupants not to resist or shout under pain of harm. Regina, the wife of Diosdado, seized her four-year old son and ran toward the kitchen door, but the fifth armed robber blocked her.

Crisanta was taken to the second floor by Rogelio Alcontin, who forced her to lie face down. She observed that Andres Alcontin, described as having wide facial features, was already ransacking a trunk owned by Regina’s aunt. While Crisanta lay on the floor, Rogelio Alcontin increased the volume of the radio. Meanwhile, Regina was ordered upstairs by Florencio Geraldez, whom Crisanta recognized as the robber who moved with maong attire.

At this point, shots were heard from the direction of the kitchen. Soon after, a robber demanded additional bullets, explaining that he had expended them on someone who resisted. Regina and Crisanta identified this robber as Manuel Marquez. The robbers seized a large cloth bag containing coins of various denominations from trunks inside the house. Andres Alcontin asked Regina for more money, but she could only produce a one-peso paper bill from her wallet. Marquez then pressed Regina for the rest of her money and she pointed to a bodega outside the house. Andres Alcontin and Marquez escorted Regina to the bodega.

When Regina reached the kitchen door, she saw Nicolas Amaba dead on the floor. An autopsy doctor testified that Amaba suffered several gunshot wounds that caused massive internal hemorrhage, shock, and death. Marquez ordered that Nicolas’s body be turned over, stating that he had killed him. At the bodega, Marquez asked where Regina’s husband was. Regina answered that he had likely fled. Finding no money in the bodega, Marquez struck Regina with a stool. While carrying her child, she jumped from the bodega and escaped. The robbers left together at about seven o’clock in the evening, taking money and valuables, including pieces of jewelry. The total assessed value of the taken items was P856.

Inculpation of Navasca and Evaluation of the Guilty Plea

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the narration of events from the witnesses did not expressly mention Navasca’s individual participation during the robbery and killing. It explained that Navasca’s guilty plea, which the trial court accepted after a mental examination inquiry, was apparently treated by the prosecution and court as conclusive as to his participation.

The Court did not treat the omission as fatal to the convictions of the other accused. It held that the identification by Regina and Crisanta of Marquez, Andres Alcontin, Rogelio Alcontin, and Florencio Geraldez, and their positive testimony that these four were present at the scene, did not show any factual or legal infirmity. The Court found no bias in the witnesses. For that reason, it did not find it necessary to resolve arguments raised on the voluntariness of extrajudicial confessions by those defendants, because the Court effectively eschewed those confessions in its disposition.

Alibi of Rogelio Alcontin

Rogelio Alcontin asserted alibi as his defense. The Supreme Court reiterated that alibi is among the weakest defenses and requires clear proof not only of presence elsewhere but also of physical impossibility to be at the scene at the time of the crime. Vicenta Argao, presented in support of the alibi, testified only that Rogelio stayed at her house in the mountain of Boob for over a month. The Court held that this did not overcome Crisanta’s positive identification placing Rogelio at the situs of the crime.

Denial of Motion for Continuance as Academically Moot

The final assigned error involved the trial court’s denial of a request for continuance at the last hearing. The appellants sought time to present Natividad Alcontin and a physician to corroborate Andres Alcontin’s claim of being maltreated by policemen of Bansalan into signing an extrajudicial confession. The Supreme Court observed that the other witnesses invoked in the appellants’ brief were not earlier presented when the motion was made, even though the trial court required the appellants to state the names of witnesses and their availability.

The Court further held that the corroborative testimony would now be superfluous because it had already disregarded the confessions admitted in evidence. Thus, any issue on whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying continuance was deemed academic.

Proper Penalty: Robbery with Homicide in Band and Application of Article 63

The Supreme Court addressed the applicable penalty. It cited People vs. Apduhan, Jr. and explained that, under the present wording of Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code, there is no separate crime cal

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