Title
People vs. Maravilla
Case
G.R. No. L-47646
Decision Date
Sep 19, 1988
A lawyer allegedly committed acts of lasciviousness, later amended to unjust vexation; Supreme Court ruled the prescriptive period was interrupted, allowing trial.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-47646)

Timeline of Legal Proceedings

On May 10, 1977, Gomboc filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness against Gadon, which was recorded as Criminal Case No. 1995 in the municipal court of San Andres, Romblon. A preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal mayor resulted in a warrant of arrest. However, on July 1, 1977, the case was dismissed due to procedural errors in the preliminary investigation. Following this, Gomboc re-filed her complaint on July 13, 1977, leading to the case being changed to unjust vexation and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 2000. Gadon was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

Dismissal of Charges

Gadon subsequently filed a motion to quash the case, arguing that the crime had prescribed. In an order dated October 11, 1977, the respondent judge granted the motion, stating that the period for prescription had elapsed. The petitioner contested this decision through a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on November 9, 1977.

Applicable Law on Prescription

The relevant statute is Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which delineates the calculation of the prescription of offenses. It states that the period of prescription begins from the discovery of the crime by the offended party or the authorities and includes interruptions during judicial processes. It also specifies that the prescriptive period does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines.

Arguments Regarding Prescription

The respondents maintained that the period of prescription should be calculated from April 29, 1977, the date the alleged unjust vexation occurred, and stated that by the time the amended complaint was filed on July 21, 1977, 83 days had elapsed, thereby barring prosecution. They argued that previous proceedings concerning acts of lasciviousness did not interrupt the prescription period for unjust vexation.

Court's Ruling on Interruption of Prescription

The Court rejected the respondents’ argument, explaining that the filing of the original complaint with the municipal mayor constituted a valid act that effectively suspended the period of prescription as per Article 91. It established that the municipal mayor was acting within his authority in the absence of a municipal judge.

Clarifying the Nature of the Offenses

The Court further clarified that while unjust vexation and acts of lasciviousness are separate offenses, the nature of the acts committed by Gadon fell within the parameters of both, thus the prosecution of one offense could preserve the right to prosecute the other. The mere designation of the offense in the complaint does not invalidate the proceedings, as long as the situation described therein supports an actionable offense.

Conclusion on Pres

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