Title
People vs. Maquil y Laredo
Case
G.R. No. L-35574
Decision Date
Sep 28, 1984
Woman convicted of parricide after pouring gasoline on husband, causing fatal burns; court upheld voluntary confession and direct causation of death.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-35574)

Factual Background

On the night of March 6, 1965, appellant went to the NAWASA building in Pasay City where her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, worked as a security guard. Appellant had purchased ten centavos worth of gasoline and, according to the prosecution, poured it on the victim and ignited his polo shirt. The victim sustained burns and was hospitalized at the Philippine General Hospital and later at Trinity General Hospital, where he died on March 10, 1965. The necropsy report listed the cause of death as “pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2 secondary.”

Procedural History

Appellant was initially charged by an information alleging frustrated parricide but the information was later amended to accuse her of parricide. She pleaded “not guilty,” was tried, convicted by the trial court and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, ordered to indemnify the heirs P12,000.00, and to pay costs. Appellant appealed; because the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, the appeal was referred to the Supreme Court.

The Parties’ Contentions

The prosecution argued that appellant deliberately poured gasoline on and set fire to her husband, and that the resulting burns contributed to his death by pneumonia. Appellant contended that her written extrajudicial statement admitting the act was not voluntary, that she did not understand its Tagalog contents, and that she signed it only upon promise of police release; she further argued that pneumonia, not the burns, caused death and thus exculpated her from criminal liability for the death.

Evidence and Extrajudicial Statement

Sgt. Leopoldo Garcia of the Pasay City Police took a written Question-and-Answer statement in Tagalog from appellant, which was reduced to writing as Exhibits “A” and “A-1.” Appellant later subscribed and swore to the statement before Fiscal Paredes. The statement contained detailed admissions that she bought gasoline, went to the NAWASA building, poured gasoline on her husband and set his shirt aflame. At trial, appellant testified to a different account, claiming dizziness, unconsciousness of her acts, lack of Tagalog comprehension, and that she signed the statement only because of a promise of release.

Trial Court Findings

The trial court accepted appellant’s written statement as voluntary and truthful and convicted her. The court found that the burns were a proximate cause of death and that pneumonia was a complication secondary to the burns. The trial court ordered indemnity of P12,000.00.

Issues on Appeal

Appellant principally raised two issues: first, that her extrajudicial confession was involuntary and therefore should not have been the basis for conviction; and second, that the burns did not cause the victim’s death and that pneumonia was the primary cause, thereby negating criminal liability for the death.

Supreme Court’s Assessment of the Extrajudicial Confession

The Court examined the circumstances of the taking and the contents of Exhibits “A” and “A-1.” It found that appellant understood Tagalog despite not being Tagalog by birth, as shown by her own admissions at cross-examination that she had lived in Manila since 1951, conversed in Tagalog daily, and could read Tagalog. The Court noted that appellant made no contemporaneous complaint of coercion to the police or to Fiscal Paredes when she signed and swore to the statement. The Court also emphasized the level of detail in the statement and its proximity in time to the incident, reasoning that the statement was unlikely to be a concoction. Applying the established rule that an extrajudicial confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proven and that the burden rests on the confessor to overcome that presumption, the Court held that appellant failed to rebut the presumption and that the trial court did not err in relying on the statement.

Supreme Court’s Assessment of Causation and Criminal Liability

The Court addressed appellant’s argument that the victim’s consumption of alcohol and subsequent pneumonia broke the causal link between the burning and death. Relying on medical testimony that alcohol did not cause the pneumonia and on the necropsy showing second degree burns covering about 62% of the body, the Court concluded that pneumonia was a complication of the burns and not an efficient supervening cause that absolved appellant. The Court applied Art. 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, holding that criminal liability attaches where the wrongful act is the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed even if the precise manner of death was different from what the actor intended. The Court cited the principle that one who inflicts injury that contributes to death remains responsible even though other causes cooperate in producing the fatal result.

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