Case Summary (G.R. No. L-33304)
Facts of the Incident
At about 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant was seen breaking bottles near his house while holding a G.I. pipe and expressing a desire to “get even.” He allegedly threatened to burn his house. At approximately 6:35 p.m. neighbors discovered smoke from the appellant’s house. Neighbors attempted to extinguish the fire, but the appellant—carrying a traveling bag and a gun—allegedly told them not to interfere, fired three shots in the air, and threatened to kill anyone who would put out the fire. Fire marshals later concluded the fire started in the appellant’s house and was intentional; the conflagration spread to adjoining dwellings.
Defense Version and Witnesses
The appellant testified that he lived in the two‑storey house owned by his sister, denied owning a gun, and claimed he was asleep when the fire began; he attributed reported gunshots to firecrackers. Defense witnesses (a cousin and a brother‑in‑law) corroborated that the appellant was asleep before the fire and that they did not see him with a revolver or fire a shot. The appellant admitted anger over a stolen cassette earlier in the day but denied threatening to burn the house.
Procedural History
The prosecution charged the appellant with destructive arson. The appellant pleaded not guilty. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposed reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment in toto, giving weight to the RTC’s factual findings. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue Presented
Whether the evidence, primarily circumstantial, sufficiently established the appellant’s guilt for the charged offense and, if so, whether the appropriate crime and penalty are destructive arson under Article 320, Revised Penal Code, or simple arson under P.D. No. 1613.
Standard for Circumstantial Evidence Applied
The Court reiterated the settled test for conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (a) there must be more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are drawn must be proven; and (c) the combined circumstances must produce moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of others, committed the crime. The circumstances must form an unbroken chain leaving no reasonable doubt as to guilt.
Application of Circumstantial Evidence to the Case
The Supreme Court identified an unbroken chain of circumstances: the appellant’s violent conduct and threats earlier the same day; his stated intention to burn his house; discovery of fire in his room about two hours after his conduct; his prevention of neighbors from extinguishing the fire; his firing of shots and threats against intervening persons; his carrying of a traveling bag during the fire; and the Bureau of Fire Protection’s finding that the fire started deliberately in the appellant’s house. The Court found it contrary to human nature for an owner to thwart efforts to put out his own burning dwelling and to carry a bag and fire shots unless complicit in causing the fire. The Court thus concluded the circumstantial evidence established the appellant’s culpability to the exclusion of others.
Determination of the Proper Offense: Simple Arson vs. Destructive Arson
Although the CA convicted under Article 320 (destructive arson), the Supreme Court modified the crime to simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613. Article 320 punishes malicious burning of certain public or specially designated structures and specifically enumerates circumstances of greater perversity and social impact. P.D. No. 1613 covers other cases of arson, including the burning of an inhabited house or dwelling. The Court found both elements of simple arson proven: intentional burning and that the property burned was an inhabited house. The fact that the fire affected many families did not automatically elevate the offense to destructive arson because the appellant’s act appeared directed at burning his own house, and the resultant spread did not demonstrate the greater degree of perversity characteristic of offenses under Article 320. The Court relied on precedent distinguishing the greater wickedness required for destructive arson from the lesser degree of perversity of P.D. No. 1613 offenses.
Penalty Determination and Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
Under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613, the penalty range is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court fixed an indeterminate penalty with a minimum term within the next lower penalty degree (prision mayor: 6 years and 1 day to 12 years) and a maximum term equal t
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Case Caption and Decision
- Supreme Court decision reported at 715 Phil. 666, Second Division, G.R. No. 188708, dated July 31, 2013, authored by Justice Brion.
- Appeal by Alamada Macabando challenging the February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA‑G.R. CR HC No. 00208‑MIN.
- The Court of Appeals had affirmed in toto the August 26, 2002 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, which found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of destructive arson and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
- Supreme Court denied the appeal but modified the conviction and penalty: appellant found guilty of simple arson under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613 and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
- Opinion concurred in by Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas‑Bernabe, JJ.
Procedural History
- Information charging destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, filed in the RTC (Records, p. 4).
- Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment (Records, p. 12).
- RTC rendered judgment on August 26, 2002 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposing reclusion perpetua (Records, pp. 453‑460; penned by Judge Noli T. Catli).
- Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in its February 24, 2009 decision (Rollo, pp. 5‑16; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren).
- Supreme Court review resulted in modification of conviction from destructive arson to simple arson and adjustment of penalty, while affirming the finding of guilt.
Prosecution’s Factual Narrative and Evidence
- Timeline of events on December 21, 2001:
- At around 4:00 p.m., appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe and loudly declared he wanted to “get even” (TSN, January 28, 2002, p. 6).
- The appellant then allegedly uttered that he would burn his house (TSN, March 4, 2002, p. 8).
- By 6:35 p.m., neighbors shouted that there was a fire; Cornelio Feliciano saw smoke coming from appellant’s house, fetched a pail and poured water into the fire (TSN, January 28, 2002, pp. 8‑9).
- Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was approximately 10 meters from appellant’s, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher (TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 8‑10).
- Upon approaching, Eric encountered the appellant carrying a traveling bag and a gun; the appellant told him not to interfere and fired three shots in the air (TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 8‑10).
- The appellant warned that whoever would put out the fire would be killed (TSN, March 4, 2002, pp. 7‑8).
- Hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurried home to save his nephews and nieces (TSN, January 28, 2002, p. 9); Eric returned home to save his belongings (TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 19‑20).
- Official investigation and community impact evidence:
- Fire Officer II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation and concluded the fire started in the appellant’s house and had been intentional (Records, pp. 99‑101).
- Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas testified that the fire gutted many houses in the barangay and that he assisted the City Social Welfare and Development Department personnel in assessing the damage (TSN, April 12, 2002, pp. 5‑11).
- The Information alleged the appellant set fire to his own house and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses (Records, p. 4).
Defense’s Version and Witnesses for the Accused
- Appellant’s testimony and assertions:
- Appellant lived in a two‑storey house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, owned by his sister Madji Muslima Edemal (TSN, June 3, 2002, pp. 3‑4).
- He admitted anger at about 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001 because a radio cassette for sale had been stolen (Id. at 7‑8).
- Claimed he slept after looking for the missing radio cassette and that the fire had already started when he woke up (Id. at 9‑11).
- Denied making a threat to burn his house and denied owning a gun; asserted that the gunshots neighbors heard came from explosions of firecrackers he intended for the New Year celebration (Id. at 9‑11).
- Defense witnesses:
- Lomantong Panandigan, appellant’s cousin, testified he did not see the appellant carry a revolver or fire a shot on the relevant date (TSN, May 2, 2002, p. 8).
- Dimas Kasubidan, appellant’s brother‑in‑law, testified that he and appellant lived in the same house and that the appellant was asleep in his room on the ground floor before the fire (TSN, May 2, 2002, pp. 27‑28).
Trial and Appellate Findings Emphasized by the Courts
- RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of destructive arson and imposed reclusion perpetua (Records, pp. 453‑460).
- Court of Appeals affirmed in toto, giving weight to the RTC’s factual findings on the basis that they were supported by unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence and concluding that the totality of circumstantial evidence established guilt.
- Supreme Court reviewed the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence, particularly because no direct eyewitness saw the appellant set fire to the house; courts relied on circumstantial evidence.
Standard for Conviction by Circumstantial Evidence
- Supreme Court reiterated the established test for circumstantial evidence convictions:
- There must be more than one circumstance.
- The facts from which inferences are drawn must be proven.
- The combination of all circumstances must produce a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, committed the crime.
- The combination of circumstances must be interwoven so as to leave no reasonable doub