Title
People vs. Macabando
Case
G.R. No. 188708
Decision Date
Jul 31, 2013
Appellant intentionally set fire to his house, threatening neighbors and causing damage to neighboring properties; convicted of simple arson, not destructive arson.
destructive arson
simple arson
circumstantial evidence

Case Summary (G.R. No. 188708)

Factual Background

At around four o’clock in the afternoon of December 21, 2001, the appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe and shouted that he wanted to get even (“manabla ko”). Shortly thereafter, he uttered that he would burn his house. Around six thirty-five in the evening the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard neighbors shout that there was a fire. When Cornelio went out to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant’s house. He immediately got a pail of water and poured it into the fire.

Eric Quilantang, whose house was about ten meters away, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant—carrying a traveling bag and a gun—told him not to interfere. The appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air. The appellant also told the crowd that anyone who would put out the fire would be killed. Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly returned home to save his nephews and nieces. Eric also went back to save his belongings. Fire Officer II Victor Naive and Fire Officer I Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation, and concluded that the fire started in the appellant’s house and that it was intentional. Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in the barangay and that he assisted city social welfare personnel in assessing the damage.

Appellant’s Defense

The appellant denied culpability and offered a different narrative. He testified that he lived in a two-storey house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal. He admitted that he felt angry around two o’clock in the afternoon because one of his radio cassettes for sale was stolen. He claimed he went to sleep after looking for his missing cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied threatening to burn his house and maintained that he did not own a gun. He explained that the gunshots heard by others came from the explosion of firecrackers he intended to use for the New Year celebration. He also presented testimony from his cousin, Lomantong Panandigan, who stated that he did not see the appellant carry a revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001, and from his brother-in-law, Dimas Kasubidan, who stated that they lived in the same house and that the appellant was asleep in his ground-floor room before the fire broke out.

RTC and CA Proceedings

The prosecution charged the appellant with destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended. The appellant pleaded not guilty. After trial, the RTC Branch 25 found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposed reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings grounded on evidence it considered unrebutted and found that the totality of circumstantial evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

The Court underscored that no one saw the appellant set the house on fire. For that reason, the trial and appellate courts relied on circumstantial evidence, which may sustain conviction when: there are more than one circumstance; the facts from which inferences are drawn are proven; and the combined circumstances lead to moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, committed the crime. The Court reiterated that the circumstances must form an unbroken chain that leaves no reasonable doubt.

Applying these standards, the Court found a chain of circumstances pointing to the appellant as the arsonist. First, while holding an iron lead pipe, the appellant acted violently and broke bottles near his house around four o’clock in the afternoon of December 21, 2001. Second, in the same fit of rage, he said he would get even and threatened to burn his own house. Third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellant’s room about two hours after the appellant returned to his house. Fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and others from putting out the fire. Fifth, during the fire, the appellant fired shots in the air and threatened to kill anyone attempting to put it out. Sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire. Finally, the investigation by Bureau of Fire Protection fire marshals concluded that the fire started in the appellant’s house and that it was intentional.

The Court found it unnatural for a person whose house is burning to prevent neighbors from extinguishing the fire or to threaten them if he had nothing to do with the incident. It held that the appellant’s conduct during the fire—hostile interference and readiness to repel attempts to quell the blaze—was inconsistent with his claim that he slept through the incident. The Court also emphasized that carrying a traveling bag during the fire indicated planning and preparation to flee, which contradicted the appellant’s statement that the fire was already big when he woke up. Further, the appellant failed to show any improper motive to falsely testify against him, and the Court noted that he did not impute a misunderstanding with the prosecution witnesses before the incident. Thus, the Court concluded that the circumstantial evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Crime Committed: Destructive Arson vs. Simple Arson

While the CA affirmed conviction for destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, the Court reclassified the offense. Article 320, as quoted in the decision, punishes the malicious burning of structures and establishments, including buildings and other specified properties, with reclusion perpetua to death when the burning falls within its enumerated categories and circumstances. The Court characterized destructive arson as requiring a higher degree of perversity and wickedness.

The Court contrasted this with P.D. No. 1613, which governs simple arson. Citing Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613, the Court noted that the penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the property burned is, among others, an inhabited house or dwelling. The Court explained that P.D. No. 1613 punishes malicious burning of public and private structures not included in Article 320 of the RPC, and it imposes a lesser penalty because it reflects a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness, with correspondingly less significant social and national implications.

The Court found that the elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) were present: first, there was intentional burning; and second, the thing intentionally burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. It noted that the information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, with the fire spreading to other inhabited houses. It sustained the trial and appellate courts’ conclusion that the allegation was established by credible prosecution testimony and by a Bureau of Fire Protection report stating that the damaged houses were residential and that the fire was intentional. It also relied on a certification from the City Social Welfare and Development Department indicating that the burned houses were used as dwellings, and the appellant’s own testimony that his two-storey house had been used as a residence.

The Court rejected the argument that the spreading of the fire to multiple houses necessarily converted the crime into destructive arson. It held that the established evidence showed only that the appellant intended to burn his own house, and the resulting spread to neighboring houses did not, on the record, amount to a degree of heinousness greater than that contemplated under simple arson. In support, the Court invoked Buebos v. People, which distinguished destructive arson and simple arson by the offender’s degree of perversity and viciousness, and explained that Article 320 describes heinous conduct while P.D. 1613 punishes less vicious conduct with a lesser penalty.

The Proper Penalty

Having reclassified the conviction to simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613, the Court determined the penalty as reclusion temporal, which carries a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court fixed the indeterminate sentence with the minimum term in the range of the penalty next lower in degree, prision mayor (six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years), and the maximum term as the medium period of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua (sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years). Since the decision noted the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it imposed the indeterminate pe

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