Title
People vs. Lol-lo
Case
G.R. No. L-17958
Decision Date
Feb 27, 1922
Dutch subjects attacked by Moros in Dutch East Indies; piracy, rape, and abandonment led to trial in Sulu. Jurisdiction upheld, Spanish Penal Code applied; death penalty for rape, life imprisonment for piracy.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 188747)

Facts and immediate circumstances

Two small Dutch boats left Matuta for Peta; one boat carried a single Dutch subject and the other carried eleven Dutch subjects including men, women, and children. At about 7:00 p.m., the second boat was intercepted between Buang and Bukid by six vintas manned by twenty-four armed Moros. The attackers first requested food but then boarded, seized cargo, violently assaulted some of the men, and brutally violated two women. The attackers made holes in the Dutch boat and abandoned most persons on it (except for the two women), who survived after eleven days until succored. The two women were taken by the assailants, repeatedly violated, and later escaped at Maruro. Two of the assailants were identified as Lol-lo and Saraw; they later returned to South Ubian where they were arrested and charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with piracy.

Procedural posture and primary legal question

Defendants demurred on the ground that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. The demurrer was overruled, trial proceeded, and the trial court found the defendants guilty, sentencing each to cadena perpetua, ordering restitution for stolen copra, and awarding partial costs. On appeal, the primary legal questions addressed by the appellate court were (1) whether the offense constituted piracy amenable to Philippine courts, and (2) whether the Spanish Penal Code provisions on piracy (Articles 153–156) remained in force and applicable after cession to the United States and during American sovereignty over the Philippines.

Definition and nature of piracy; jurisdictional reach

The court affirmed that the established elements of piracy were present: forcible depredation on the seas without lawful authority, done animo furandi and in universal hostility. The court emphasized that piracy is not merely a crime against a single state but against all mankind (hostes humani generis) and therefore may be punished in any competent tribunal where the offenders are found. The court rejected the jurisdictional objection, holding that piracy’s jurisdictional character is essentially universal and not constrained by territorial or foreign coastal limits — citing U.S. v. Furlong for the proposition that neutral territorial limits are not neutral to crimes like piracy.

Continuity of pre-existing municipal law after transfer of sovereignty

Applying recognized principles of public international and municipal law, the court reiterated that municipal laws of a transferred territory remain in force after cession to the extent they are consistent with the new sovereign’s constitution and laws and until altered by the new government. The Instructions of President McKinley to General Merritt were invoked to show the established administrative practice that municipal laws governing private rights and the punishment of crime continue after occupation unless suspended or superseded. On that basis, the court treated relevant provisions of the Spanish Penal Code as subsisting municipal criminal law applicable in the Philippines, subject to necessary adaptation.

Applicability and interpretation of Articles 153–156 of the Spanish Penal Code

Articles 153–156 of the Spanish Penal Code were treated as designed to include the Philippine Islands and applicable to persons who, under the Spanish constitutional designations, were considered Spaniards. The court reasoned that these provisions embody concepts consistent with the law of nations and with comparable United States statutory and constitutional provisions on piracy. Because the Philippines had been ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris, the court construed the Penal Code provisions adaptively: references to “Spain” and “Spaniards” were to be read as referring to the United States and to citizens of the United States and the Philippine Islands, respectively, insofar as necessary to render the provisions operative under the new sovereignty. This interpretive approach paralleled prior statutory construction in United States v. Smith limiting certain terms of the Penal Code to public officers of the Philippine government.

Legal characterization of the offense under the Penal Code

Applying Articles 153 and 154 as thus adapted, the court held that the attack fell squarely within the first paragraph of Article 153 (piracy committed against citizens/subjects of another nation not at war with the United States/the Philippines) and within the aggravated circumstances enumerated in Article 154. The record showed at least two of the statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) the commission of offenses against chastity (rape and repeated sexual violations) and (2) abandonment of persons without means of saving themselves. These qualifying circumstances made the higher penalties under Article 154 available.

Consideration of aggravating and mitigating

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