G.R. No. L-16379 - People vs. Lao Wan Sing

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-16379)

Case Background and Conviction in the Trial Court

The Supreme Court’s later narration established that the trial court based its finding of guilt on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses: Jose Narce, Guillermo I. Vidal, Coronacion Penaflor, and Dr. Iluminado P. Motus. The gist of Jose Narce’s testimony during trial was that while he helped evacuate goods from the Laserna Drug Store, which was contiguous to the New Plaza Bazar reportedly burned intentionally by the appellant, he saw the accused pick up a lighted kerosene lamp from the drugstore’s compounding room. Narce claimed he followed the appellant to the appellant’s store, where the appellant allegedly manipulated the lamp by removing the glass funnel, raising the wick, and placing the lamp near boxes of shoes. Narce further testified that after bringing shoes to the plaza, he approached the appellant’s kitchen and saw the appellant pour kerosene from the lamp and set fire to a pile of firewood.

Guillermo Vidal testified that as he approached the appellant’s kitchen while going to the drugstore to assist in evacuating its contents, he saw the appellant bending over a pile of firewood. He stated that flame and smoke rose suddenly from the firewood. Coronacion Penaflor testified that while evacuating things from the adjacent Chin Cuan store, she heard a voice from the appellant’s kitchen, which she recognized as that of the appellant, then noticed fire and smoke in the kitchen and immediately ran outside, shouting that the appellant burned again his kitchen. Dr. Iluminado P. Motus, the owner of the burned Laserna Drug Store, testified that there was a lighted kerosene lamp on the sink in the compounding room and that the lamp disappeared during his trips while evacuating their personal belongings.

On the strength of these testimonies, the trial court convicted the appellant of arson, appreciated the aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, with indemnity to the victims and the corresponding penalties and costs.

First Appeal and the First Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration

After appeal and submission on the merits, the Supreme Court rendered a decision on December 17, 1966, affirming the trial court’s judgment in all respects. Before that final affirmance, the appellant, through counsel, filed on May 5, 1965 a motion for new trial grounded on newly discovered evidence. The motion was supported by affidavits of Guillermo I. Vidal and Jose Narce, executed on February 18, 1965 and April 8, 1965, respectively. The Supreme Court deferred action on the motion for new trial “until the case is taken on the merits” by resolution dated May 17, 1965.

Subsequently, a motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed on January 30, 1967 by former counsel Atty. Vicente J. Francisco. The Solicitor General was ordered to comment and filed a comment on April 21, 1967, praying for denial. The Solicitor General also sought the declaration of counsel in contempt for allegedly using disrespectful language toward the Court in the motion. By resolution dated May 24, 1967, the Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration or new trial.

Filing and Grant of the Second Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial

After denial of the first motion, new counsel Atty. V.E. del Rosario filed on June 6, 1967 a petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration or new trial. The Supreme Court granted the petition by resolution dated June 15, 1967. The Court also deferred resolution on the contempt incident involving Atty. Vicente J. Francisco until after the filing of the new motion by the new counsel, by a resolution dated June 16, 1967.

The second motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed on June 27, 1967. It emphasized the retraction of the testimonies of Jose Narce and Guillermo Vidal, and alleged that the facts and circumstances surrounding the second fire were caused by the first fire rather than by the appellant. It further argued that the evidence for the defense established the appellant’s innocence.

Recantations and the Supreme Court’s Re-evaluation of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

The Supreme Court undertook a careful study of the evidentiary impact of the recantations. It described Jose Narce’s affidavit as a full repudiation of his trial testimony. Narce declared that he did not see the appellant in the premises of Dr. Iluminado P. Motus’ drugstore at any time before or during the fire, did not see the appellant carry a lighted kerosene lamp to his store, and did not see him set fire in the kitchen to a pile of firewood and papers. He also stated that the damaging portions of his trial testimony were given upon instruction of the Motuses, and that the prosecution witnesses had been coached together several times by those who suffered losses in the conflagration.

The Supreme Court also summarized Guillermo Vidal’s affidavit of recantation, stating that his assertion at trial that he saw the appellant inside the kitchen setting fire to a pile of firewood and papers was a mere guess. Vidal further stated that his identification of the appellant was based on the urgings of the Motuses whom he claimed he could not refuse because of favors they had allegedly extended to him.

Based on these recantations, the Supreme Court found that if the affidavits were accepted as true, there was “little, or almost nothing,” left on which to base a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reasoned that once Narce and Vidal’s inculpatory accounts were eliminated, there remained no credible and positive identification of the appellant as the person who set fire to the kitchen. It held that Coronacion Penaflor’s testimony could not supply the missing identification because she did not state that she saw the appellant inside the kitchen. Instead, she testified only that she heard a voice she recognized to be that of the appellant. The Supreme Court further found that her testimony contained contradictions and inherently improbable statements, rendering her testimony unreliable standing alone for conviction.

On this evidentiary recalibration, the Supreme Court concluded that eliminating Narce and Vidal’s testimonies left no evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It thus stated that it became necessary to ascertain the truthfulness of the recantations.

Standards for Granting a New Trial and Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules

The Supreme Court acknowledged that recanting testimony is often regarded as unreliable, particularly when the recantation may imply a confession of perjury. It also noted that motions for new trial grounded on subsequent retraction are not generally favored. Nevertheless, it held that where, aside from the retracting witnesses, there was no other evidence to support the judgment of conviction, a new trial may be granted. It relied on People vs. Bocar, 97 Phil. 398, and also emphasized the State’s interest in acquittal when the accused is innocent, quoting U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil. 416, 419.

The Supreme Court further reasoned that in passing on the prayer for a new trial, the procedural rules should be construed and applied liberally. It articulated that liberal application was warranted in a manner that could demonstrate that the State’s evidence was weak or unsatisfactory, and that the retractions might tip the scales toward the appellant and produce at least a reasonable doubt as to guilt.

It classified the retractions as newly discovered evidence. The Court observed that the statements of Narce and Vidal were made after the lower court’s trial and decision, and while the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court. Because the appellant could not have secured those statements during trial, the Court regarded them as newly discovered evidence properly presented in a new trial.

The Court also invoked its own practice of granting new trials only in very exceptional instances, such as when there was no evidence sustaining conviction other than the testimony of a witness proven to have made contradictory statements on material facts, and where the circumstances indicated that the trial judge would likely reach a different conclusion if apprised of the post-trial variations. It cited U. S. vs. Dacir, et al, 26 Phil. 504-508.

Disposition: Grant of New Trial and Setting Aside Prior Rulings

Applying these standards and considering the possibility that the recantations undermined the proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court resolved, “in the interest of justice,” to grant the new trial as prayed for in the second motion for reconsideration or new trial.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside: the trial court’s decision in Criminal Case No. 964-K dated July 31, 1959; the Supreme Court’s decision in G.R. No. L-16379 dated December 17, 1966; and the Supreme Court’s resolution dated May 24, 1967 that denied the first motion for reconsideration or new trial. The Court then remanded the case to the court of origin for a new trial. The Court expressly cautioned that the resolution should not be construed as reflecting any opinion on the value and force of t

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-16379)

The case arose from Criminal Case No. 964 in the Court of First Instance of Aklan, where Lao Wan Sing (alias Co Tiok, alias Wasing) was prosecuted for arson.
The appellant challenged his conviction after the Supreme Court’s earlier affirmance on appeal through a sequence of motions for reconsideration and new trial culminating in a grant of a new trial.
The Supreme Court also resolved a contempt matter against appellant’s former counsel, Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, after requiring him to show cause.

Parties and Procedural Posture

The plaintiff-appellee was The People of the Philippines, represented in proceedings before the Supreme Court through the Solicitor General.
The defendant-appellant was Lao Wan Sing, who was convicted by the trial court and later appealed to the Supreme Court.
After appellate briefing and submission for decision, the appellant filed, through counsel, a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence on May 5, 1965.
The Supreme Court deferred action on that motion on May 17, 1965 “until the case is taken on the merits.”
The Supreme Court rendered its decision on December 17, 1966, affirming the trial court “in all respects.”
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial on January 30, 1967, which was commented upon by the Solicitor General on April 21, 1967.
On May 24, 1967, the Supreme Court denied the first motion for reconsideration or new trial.
On June 6, 1967, a petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed, and it was granted on June 15, 1967.
The Supreme Court granted leave on June 15, 1967, deferred action on the contempt incident involving Atty. Vicente J. Francisco pending filing of the second motion, and then proceeded to resolve the second motion.
The Supreme Court resolved to grant the second motion for reconsideration or new trial, set aside prior dispositions, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Charged Offense and Trial Judgment

The appellant was charged with arson in Criminal Case No. 964 in the Court of First Instance of Aklan.
The trial court found the appellant guilty of arson and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court considered aggravating circumstances under paragraph 7 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, which applies when the crime is committed “on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.”
The trial court imposed the accessory penalties provided by law and ordered the appellant to indemnify “various persons who suffered losses in the fire.”
The trial court further ordered the appellant to pay the costs and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Supreme Court Appellate Decision

On appeal, the parties filed their respective briefs, and the appellant submitted a memorandum in lieu of oral argument.
The Supreme Court, through its decision rendered on December 17, 1966, affirmed the trial court’s conviction “in all respects.”
After that affirmance, the appellant pursued reconsideration and a subsequent request for a new trial based on post-trial witness retractions.

Motions for New Trial Timeline

The appellant’s original motion for new trial on May 5, 1965 was grounded on newly discovered evidence supported by affidavits of two prosecution witnesses, namely Guillermo I. Vidal and Jose Narce.
Guillermo I. Vidal’s affidavit of recantation was executed on February 18, 1965.
Jose Narce’s affidavit of recantation was executed on April 8, 1965.
The Supreme Court deferred action on that original motion on May 17, 1965 pending disposition “until the case is taken on the merits.”
The appellant’s first motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed on January 30, 1967 by Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, former counsel.
The Solicitor General was required to comment and filed a comment on April 21, 1967, praying for denial of the motion and incidentally praying for contempt sanctions against the appellant’s counsel for disrespectful language.
The Supreme Court denied the first motion for reconsideration or new trial on May 24, 1967.
After the denial, a petition for leave to file a second motion was filed on June 6, 1967, and the Supreme Court granted the petition on June 15, 1967.
In the second motion, filed on June 27, 1967, new counsel emphasized witness retraction and the allegedly incorrect basis of conviction.
The Supreme Court’s resolution granted the second motion, set aside prior rulings including the December 17, 1966 appellate decision and the May 24, 1967 denial, and remanded the case for new trial.

Trial Evidence Against Appellant

The trial court’s decision relied on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Jose Narce, Guillermo Vidal, Coronacion Penaflor, and Dr. Iluminado P. Motus.
Jose Narce’s incriminating testimony was that during evacuation from the Laserna Drug Store adjoining the New Plaza Bazar—which he claimed was intentionally burned by the appellant—he saw the appellant pick up a lighted kerosene lamp from the drugstore’s compounding room.
Narce testified that he followed the appellant to the appellant’s store, where the appellant allegedly removed the lamp’s glass funnel, increased the flame by raising the wick, placed the lamp on a shelf where shoes boxes were stored, and later poured kerosene in the kitchen.
Narce testified that he saw the appellant set fire to a pile of firewood as well as related materials in the kitchen area.
Guillermo Vidal’s testimony was that as he approached the appellant’s kitchen on his way to the Laserna Drug Store to help evacuate, he saw the appellant bending over firewood and that flames and smoke rose suddenly from the firewood.
Coronacion Penaflor testified that while evacuating from the Chin Cuan store adjacent to the appellant’s store, she heard a voice from the appellant’s kitchen saying “o-o-o-h,” which she recognized as the appellant’s voice.
Penaflor testified that she noticed fire and smoke in the appellant’s kitchen and then shouted that the appellant had burned his kitchen again.
Dr. Iluminado P. Motus, owner of the Laserna Drug Store, testified that a lighted kerosene lamp was on the sink in the compounding room and that the lamp disappeared in his trips while evacuating t