Title
People vs. Lamsing y Jabon
Case
G.R. No. 105316
Decision Date
Sep 21, 1995
A security guard was killed, and a witness identified the accused, who denied involvement. The court convicted him of homicide and theft, rejecting his alibi and ruling the killing was not robbery-related.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 105316)

Offense and Arrest

The prosecution evidence showed that on November 1, 1989, at dawn, Elizabeth de los Santos, an eighteen-year-old student working as a dishwasher at a canteen across from the construction site, was roused by cries of a distressed person. She partially opened the door and saw, from about a meter away, two male persons: one held Winnie Cabunilas, while the other stabbed him. She immediately closed the door and peeped through a hole, later observing from an open window.

De los Santos identified the stabber as accused-appellant. She testified that she saw accused-appellant holding Cabunilas’s firearm and pointing it at persons who came to the guard’s rescue. She further stated that after stabbing Cabunilas, accused-appellant and his companion fled, taking Cabunilas’s gun with them. The medical evidence established that Cabunilas died of hemorrhage, based on the autopsy conducted by Dr. Roberto Garcia of the NBI.

Prosecution Witnesses and Identification

Apart from De los Santos, the prosecution presented witnesses to strengthen the identification and circumstances surrounding the attack. Pfc. Restituto de Leon testified that in a police lineup, two construction workers—Ronald Bon and Artemio Jabaan—and De los Santos identified accused-appellant as one of those who attacked Cabunilas. Cpl. Conrado Lara testified regarding how accused-appellant’s whereabouts were learned through a telephone call. Daisy Felizer, the victim’s sister, testified on the burial expenses she incurred.

Accused-appellant, although arrested four days after the incident, was linked to the crime through the testimony of witnesses during the investigation, including De los Santos’s identification.

Accused-Appellant’s Version and Defense

Accused-appellant denied involvement. He invoked alibi, claiming that on October 31, 1989 he and his common-law wife stayed at his uncle’s house in Quezon City, where foodstuffs were prepared for sale at La Loma Cemetery on All Saints Day. He claimed that at about three-thirty in the morning of November 1, 1989, he hailed a taxi and went with his uncle to La Loma North Cemetery, staying there the whole day selling food until they returned home at about nine o’clock in the evening.

His uncle, Romeo Lamsing, corroborated the claimed staying together and averred that accused-appellant could not have left because he was with him “all the time.” Accused-appellant also admitted that he used to sell mangoes and “baluts” in front of the Quezon City Medical Center, which was near the Synergy construction site where Cabunilas was assigned.

Trial Court’s Appreciation of Evidence

The Regional Trial Court found De los Santos credible and rejected the alibi. It reasoned that De los Santos’s account was reliable because (a) the crime occurred at a distance less than a meter from where she was staying; (b) nothing blocked her view; (c) she already knew the victim from prior work at the site and had previously seen accused-appellant pass by the canteen; (d) accused-appellant himself admitted frequented the Synergy site to sell goods; and (e) the defense did not show any improper motive to make false accusations.

The trial court also gave weight to the circumstance that De los Santos went to police headquarters shortly after the killing—about four o’clock in the morning on November 1, 1989—and explained that she feared to give a statement until accused-appellant could be arrested. The court held that the testimony remained sufficient even if not corroborated by another witness because it was intrinsically credible and not shown to be maliciously motivated.

Issues on Appeal

On appeal, accused-appellant assigned errors that, in substance, challenged (first) the credibility of De los Santos on the ground that there was no light in the area, and (second) the sufficiency of proof of robbery as the principal felony and of the accused’s intent to rob, asserting that there was no evidence showing robbery preceded the killing or that he intended to take property.

Supreme Court’s Evaluation of Credibility and Identification

The Supreme Court held that De los Santos’s testimony warranted full faith and credit. It emphasized that the witness had an unobstructed line of sight because the scene and the space leading to the canteen were not separated by a wall. It also found persuasive the factors relied upon by the trial court, including proximity, prior familiarity with both the victim and the accused, and accused-appellant’s admission of frequenting the Synergy construction site.

While De los Santos admitted there was no light at the specific area in front of the canteen, she explained that illumination came from inside the canteen when she opened the door. The Court treated this as sufficient to support her claim of seeing and identifying accused-appellant. It also addressed the “statues” remark: accused-appellant pointed to the description that the protagonists stood still for about three minutes. The Court found that De los Santos’s subsequent statement showed she did not mean an immobilized stance, but rather that one person held the victim by the mouth while accused-appellant continued stabbing, and therefore the observation was not inconsistent with human behavior under the circumstances.

The Supreme Court further rejected the alibi. It reiterated the weakness of alibi, particularly against positive identification by a credible witness. It noted that it was not physically impossible for accused-appellant to have been at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time.

Flight and Arrest Near the Scene

Accused-appellant also argued that his arrest near the scene negated guilt, reasoning that flight indicates guilt while non-flight indicates innocence. The Supreme Court rejected the syllogism. It observed that guilt could coexist with remaining near the crime because a suspect might believe the crime would not be reported, or that the eyewitness could not identify him. Thus, arrest proximity did not erase the probative value of the positive identification and the witness’s testimony.

On the Crime: Robbery with Homicide vs. Separate Offenses

The Court’s disposition turned on the correct qualification of the offense. It acknowledged that accused-appellant and his companion took the guard’s gun as they fled, a fact supported by De los Santos’s testimony. Yet it distinguished the situation from robbery with homicide as a special complex crime.

The Court reminded that, for robbery with homicide, it must be established with certitude that the killing was a mere incident of the robbery and that homicide occurred “by reason or on the occasion” of the robbery, with robbery as the main purpose and objective of the criminals. It then addressed the trial court’s basis for convicting accused-appellant of the special complex crime.

The Supreme Court held that, even assuming the firearm was taken for gain, the record did not show that depriving the victim of the thing taken was the principal purpose. It concluded that the principal purpose appeared to be to kill the guard, while taking the gun was merely an afterthought. Applying the requirement that the violence must be employed as a means of depriving a person of property, the Court ruled that the circumstances did not support robbery with homicide.

As a result, it treated the proper outcome as separate crimes: homicide (instead of the complex crime) and theft of the firearm.

Penalty for Homicide and Theft

In modifying the judgment, the Supreme Court sentenced accused-appellant to an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with corresponding penalties for the crime of homicide.

For the theft of the firearm, it imposed an indeterminate penalty of three months and eleven days of arresto mayor to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and ordered accused-appellant to indemnify Allen Security & Investigation Agency, Inc. in the amount of P500.00. The valuation was based on the firearm being a .38 Cal. Smith and Wesson SN?7485, and the Court treated it as reasonably worth P500.00 by reference to Art. 309, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, which applies to theft where the value exceeds P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00.

Police Lineup and the Right to Counsel

Although not made an assigned error, accused-appellant questioned the police lineup identification on the ground that he was made to join a lineup without the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court rejected the claim in light of Gamboa v. Cruz, holding that the right to counsel under Art. III, Sec. 12(1) of the Constitution does not extend to police lineups because they a

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