Case Summary (G.R. No. 148948)
Key Dates and Applicable Law
Incident: March 2, 1935.
Decision rendered by the Supreme Court: August 3, 1935.
Applicable constitution: 1935 Philippine Constitution (decision predates 1990).
Primary statutory provisions applied: Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 280 (trespass to dwelling), Article 51 (effects on penalty for attempt), and Article 29 (preventive imprisonment credit). The lower court had charged attempted robbery, which the Supreme Court re-examined.
Facts
At dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, while on patrol, discovered Aurelio Lamahang in the act of using an iron bar to make an opening in the wall of Tan Yu’s store. The owner and another person were sleeping inside the store. Lamahang had broken one board and unfastened another when he was observed, arrested, and placed under custody. The prosecution, the trial judge, and the Solicitor-General treated the act as attempted robbery; the Supreme Court reviewed whether that characterization was legally correct.
Issue Presented
Whether the factual circumstances established an attempted robbery or, instead, an attempted trespass to dwelling (entry by force), and what the proper conviction and penalty should be under the Revised Penal Code.
Legal Standard on Criminal Attempt
The Court articulated the legal concept of attempt as requiring overt acts that are the beginning of the execution of a particular, concrete offense and that bear a direct, logical, and necessary relation to the consummation of that specific crime. The acts must be such that, if carried to completion following their natural course (absent external frustration or voluntary desistment), they would necessarily and logically mature into the particular offense charged. Acts that are ambiguous or susceptible of a non-criminal explanation cannot, by themselves, support a conviction for attempt of a specific offense. The overt acts must disclose the criminal objective beyond reasonable doubt.
Application of the Standard to the Facts
The Court found that the established facts proved Lamahang’s intention to enter the store by force but did not support an inference that his definite aim, once entry was obtained, was to commit robbery (or any other specific offense such as violence or theft). The breaking and unfastening of boards showed an intention to effect entrance against the will of the owner, but those acts were not of a nature that necessarily and unambiguously disclosed a further specific criminal objective. Because the nature of the intended action (action fin) cannot be ascertained directly and must be inferred from the means employed (action medio), and because the means here were susceptible of more than one interpretation, the acts could not be equated with an attempted robbery.
Legal Characterization — Attempted Trespass to Dwelling
Given the insufficiency of evidence to prove an intent to commit robbery, the Court held that the appropriate offense was attempted trespass to dwelling under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, as Lamahang had, by force, sought to enter another’s premises against the presumed prohibition of the owner. Precedent and statutory law support the presumption of the owner’s prohibition where entry is attempted by force.
Penalty Assessment
For a consummated trespass to dwelling committed with force, the Revised Penal Code prescribes prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000. Pursuant to Article 51, the penalty for attempt is reduced by two degrees, so the appropriate range for a
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Procedural History
- Appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
- Trial court found defendant Aurelio Lamahang guilty of attempted robbery.
- Trial court sentence: two years and four months of prison correctional and an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prison mayor for being an habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs of the proceeding.
- The provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the trial judge, and the Solicitor-General unanimously treated the facts as constituting attempted robbery; the Supreme Court reviewed that conclusion and reversed as to classification and sentence.
- Supreme Court judgment: revoked the appealed sentence; defendant found guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling (committed by means of force) and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with accessory penalties and to pay the costs. The Court held that the accused is not entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
- Justices Avancena, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Fickers concurred.
Facts
- Date and time: Early dawn on March 2, 1935.
- Location: Delgado and C. R. Fuentes streets, City of Iloilo; specifically a store of cheap goods on C. R. Fuentes street owned by Tan Yu.
- Actor apprehended: Aurelio Lamahang.
- Arresting officer: Policeman Jose Tomambing, on patrol of his beat.
- Conduct observed: Lamahang was caught in the act of making an opening in the wall of the store using an iron bar.
- Extent of act: He had succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall when arrested.
- Inhabitants: The owner, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside the store with another Chinaman.
- Officer’s intervention: Upon hearing the noise produced by the breaking of the wall, policeman Tomambing promptly approached, arrested Lamahang, and placed him under custody.
- Information alleged: The accused, armed with an iron bar, forced the wall of said store by breaking a board and unfastening another for the purpose of entering said store and failed to enter due to the presence of the policeman.
Issue Presented
- Whether the acts of Aurelio Lamahang in breaking and unfastening boards in the wall of Tan Yu’s store constitute attempted robbery as found by the Court of First Instance, or some other offense.
- If not attempted robbery, what offense (and degree) is adequately established by the evidentiary facts and the information.
- Appropriate sentence and application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and credits under the Revised Penal Code.
Legal Standard on Criminal Attempt (as articulated by the Court)
- Fundamental proposition: "The attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation."
- Attempt must have an overt act that begins execution and that act must have an unavoidable connection — a logical and natural relation — to the particular criminal deed sought to be committed.
- It is not sufficient that an act objectively performed constitutes a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection with the deed which, upon consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code.
- The beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course (absent external frustration or voluntary desistance), must logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
- Acts that are susceptible of double interpretation (innocent as well as punishable) cannot by themselves furnish grounds for attempted or frustrated crimes.
- The relation between the facts and the supposed offense must be direct; intention must be ascertained from the facts so that the mind may directly infer the perpetrator’s intention to cause a particular injury.
- Supporting citations and formulations in the decision:
- Quotation: "It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (action fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (action medio). Hence,