Case Summary (G.R. No. L-4213)
Factual Background
The information charged that on or about September 23, 1949, in Pasig, Rizal, SERAFIN HERNANDEZ willfully and feloniously attacked and assaulted Amador Palor, inflicting physical injuries in different parts of his body which required medical attendance for twenty-five days and incapacitated him from his customary labor for twenty-five days, and that, as a consequence of said injuries, the offended party lost the power to hear of his right ear.
Trial Court Proceedings
SERAFIN HERNANDEZ pleaded not guilty. He was tried jointly with Apolonio Velasco, who was accused in a separate information for serious physical injuries committed on the same occasion, with the parties agreeing to a joint trial. Witnesses testified and the trial judge found that both accused had inflicted physical injuries. The court convicted Apolonio Velasco but dismissed the information as to SERAFIN HERNANDEZ, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction because the information charged an offense of less serious physical injuries falling under the first paragraph of Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code and therefore was triable by the Justice of the Peace under Sec. 87-b, Republic Act No. 296. The trial judge further stated that the prosecution had sought to prove the higher offense defined in Article 263, but that a court could not convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged because of the accused’s constitutional right to be advised at the outset of the proceedings as to the precise nature of the charge.
The Parties' Contentions
The prosecution appealed. The Solicitor General argued that the injuries described in the information constituted serious physical injuries under Article 265, paragraph 2, which the trial judge had not applied. The Court quoted that paragraph: "2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person shall have lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was theretofore habitually engaged." The Solicitor General relied on the allegation that the offended party "lost the power to hear of his right ear" and urged that loss of that ear was a serious physical injury triable by the Court of First Instance. The defense and the trial judge had emphasized that the prosecution had attempted at trial to prove a higher offense than that charged and that conviction could not be sustained for an uncharged higher offense.
Issues
The principal issues were whether the injuries alleged brought the offense within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and whether the prosecution’s appeal from the trial court’s dismissal was permissible or barred because it would subject the accused to double jeopardy.
Ruling of the Supreme Court
The Court dismissed the appeal and ordered costs de officio. The majority accepted that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the offense as charged and held that the dismissal by that court was not a judgment from which the prosecution could appeal without placing the accused in a second jeopardy. The opinion noted prior authorities in support of the principle and distinguished other precedents where dismissal had been by consent of the accused. Paras, C. J., Padilla, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concurred. Reyes, J., concurred in the result.
Legal Basis and Reasoning
The Court reviewed the characterizations of physical injuries under Article 265 and acknowledged the Solicitor General’s contention that loss of the right ear could qualify as a loss of the use of a member and thus as serious physical injuries. The opinion observed the semantic difficulty whether loss "of the power to hear of his right ear" equated to loss "of the power to hear" generally, and it noted that under Article 263, paragraph 3, loss of the use of any other part of the body also attracts a specified penalty. The Court, however, rested its disposition on jurisdictional and procedural grounds. Citing ear
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-4213)
Parties and Procedural Posture
- People of the Philippines was the plaintiff and appellant in this appeal.
- Serafin Hernandez was the accused and appellee who pleaded not guilty to the information.
- The information accused the defendant of willfully and feloniously attacking Amador Palor and inflicting physical injuries requiring medical attendance for twenty-five days and resulting in loss of the power to hear of his right ear.
- The accused was tried jointly with Apolonio Velasco, who was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, while the information as to Hernandez was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
- The Solicitor General prosecuted the appeal from the dismissal of the information against Hernandez.
Key Factual Allegations
- The information alleged the assault occurred on or about September 23, 1949, in the municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal.
- The information alleged the offended party sustained injuries in different parts of his body that required medical attendance for twenty-five days.
- The information alleged the offended party was incapacitated from performing his customary labor for twenty-five days.
- The information further alleged that, as a consequence of the injuries, the offended party lost the power to hear of his right ear.
Procedural History
- The accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty and consented to a joint trial with a co-accused.
- Witnesses testified at the joint trial and the trial court found that both accused had inflicted physical injuries.
- The trial court convicted Apolonio Velasco but dismissed the information as to Hernandez on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
- The prosecution appealed the dismissal to the Court that rendered the decision under review.
Issues Presented
- Whether the injuries alleged constituted serious physical injuries cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Article 265, Revised Penal Code, paragraph 2.
- Whether the appeal by the prosecution from the dismissal placed the accused in a second jeopardy and therefore was unappealable.
- Whether a conviction may be sustained for a higher offense proved at trial but not charged in the information.
Contentions of the Parties
- The Solicitor General contended that loss of the power to hear of the right ear amounted to serious physical injuries under Article 265, paragraph 2 because it alleged loss of the power to hear.
- The trial court contended that the information charged an offense of less serious physical injuries falling under the first paragraph of Article 265 and that the prosecution had attempted to prove a higher o