Title
People vs. Herdez
Case
G.R. No. 67690-91
Decision Date
Jan 21, 1992
A 1979 shooting in Quezon led to two deaths; the accused were acquitted due to insufficient evidence, unreliable testimony, and credible alibis.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 67690-91)

Factual Background of the Shootings

On the night in question, the residents of the Mendozas’ house had retired to bed. Elena testified that, while her husband Buenaventura and other family members were inside, a male voice from outside the house asked in Filipino whether the persons outside were allowed to inquire, stating that they were agents of the law. Elena rose to rouse her husband. She observed Buenaventura already awake and opening a window in the living room to look out, after which he shut the window. Shortly thereafter, two gunshots rang out. Buenaventura fell, and additional gunshots were fired in a burst. Elena and Narciso were struck; Narciso was hit in the breast and died instantly. Elena heard an outside voice say, “Eddie, tayo na, patay na sila,” and she saw Buenaventura lying on the floor, covered with blood.

Elena tended to the wounded Buenaventura by giving him water. She testified that Buenaventura asked for water, drank it, and then she asked whether he recognized the persons who had shot him. Buenaventura identified Merlito and Eduardo Hernandez as the brothers who shot him and stated that the gun was held by Maximo Hernandez alias “Putol.” Buenaventura drank more water and then expired. The prosecution also established through physical and forensic testimony that numerous empty .30 caliber carbine bullet shells were recovered outside the house, while .30 caliber slugs were recovered inside. Several bullet holes were found in the house and in the mosquito net and victims’ clothing. The autopsies performed by Dr. Domingo Alcala showed that Buenaventura died from a .30 caliber gunshot wound that penetrated his right lung and caused internal hemorrhage, and that Narciso died from a chest wound that injured a lung, with additional wounds in the right shoulder.

The Prosecution’s Theory: Identification, Motive, and Circumstances

The persons identified by Buenaventura were known to Elena. She stated that Eduardo and Merlito had once been neighbors in another locality, and that she became acquainted with Maximo at Eduardo’s house in Candelaria. Elena further supplied motive by testifying to an alleged prior homicide. She said that about five months earlier, on December 27, 1978, Leonides Mendoza, her brother-in-law, had killed Carlos Hernandez, a brother of the defendants. She testified that a police blotter entry existed but no prosecution proceeded because the parties allegedly settled, with the Mendozas receiving P4,600.00. Elena added that she later learned the defendants had deposited the amount in a bank, supposedly intending to repay later, while waiting for Buenaventura near the spring where he usually fetched water in Bukal Norte.

The prosecution also called Gelacio Mendoza, a brother of the slain victims. Gelacio testified that at around 11:00 P.M., he heard his dog bark and saw three men walking by the northern side of his house. He did not make out their faces, but he identified two of them by build or general physical appearance as Eduardo Hernandez and Merlito Hernandez. He stated that the three men proceeded toward the west and then directly south in the direction of his parents’ house. About five minutes later, he heard gunfire. He soon learned that Buenaventura and Narciso had been shot and found them dead at the parents’ house. He also testified that, from the episode and Elena’s revelations, he believed revenge motivated the killings.

Trial Court Proceedings and Conviction

The Provincial Fiscal filed two separate informations for murder against the Hernandez brothers and their uncle, Maximo Hernandez alias “Putol,” both alleging that the accused acted in conspiracy and that the killings were aggravated by alevosia and evident premeditation. All three accused pleaded not guilty and were tried jointly. Elena testified as the prosecution’s first witness, followed by testimony of the police investigators and the medical expert regarding their observations and autopsy findings. The defense denied complicity and presented an alibi for Maximo Hernandez.

In its decision dated March 8, 1984, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder in both criminal cases—Criminal Case No. 3375 for the death of Buenaventura and Criminal Case No. 2620 for the death of Narciso. It sentenced each accused to life imprisonment (Reclusion Perpetua) for Buenaventura’s death and similarly imposed Reclusion Perpetua for Narciso’s death. The court also ordered proportional indemnity of P24,000.00 to the heirs of the victims in Criminal Case No. 2620 and ordered the payment of costs.

Although the record was transmitted to the Supreme Court under an erroneous view that automatic review applied, the Supreme Court nevertheless proceeded with the appeal.

The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal

On appeal, the Hernandez appellants attacked multiple evidentiary and factual rulings of the trial court. They argued that the trial court erred in: (one) rejecting the defense Exhibits 1 and 2; (two) admitting and giving full credit to the alleged dying declaration of Buenaventura based on Elena’s testimony; (three) finding sufficient circumstantial evidence proving that the appellants were the perpetrators; (four) taking revenge as motive despite the absence of direct evidence tying the appellants to the crime; and (five) allegedly refusing due credence to the accused and defense witnesses’ testimonies. The Supreme Court emphasized that the prosecution’s entire case substantially depended on the identification made by Buenaventura to Elena shortly before his death.

Legal Issue: Admissibility and Credibility of Ante-Mortem Identification

The Supreme Court focused on whether Buenaventura’s identification statements were admissible as a dying declaration under the Rules of Court. It reiterated the requisites for admissibility of dying declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule: the declaration must be made under the consciousness of impending death; the declarant must be competent at the time; the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of death; and it must be offered in a criminal case where the declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry. The Court treated the decisive factor as the existence of the declarant’s consciousness of impending death. It discussed the evidentiary rationale for the rule, explaining that the law assumes trustworthiness when a person speaks in extremis, and that the controlling question is not the speed with which death follows the statement, but the declarant’s awareness that death is imminent.

Application: Why Dying Declaration Was Not Properly Established

The Supreme Court found the record of Elena’s testimony “unfortunately barren” of circumstances that could reasonably show whether Buenaventura made the identification under a consciousness of impending death. It examined the portion of Elena’s testimony set forth in the People’s brief and noted that it established that after the gunshots stopped, Elena approached Buenaventura, gave him water, asked if he recognized those who shot him, and received the names of the assailants, with Buenaventura later expiring. However, the testimony did not furnish predicate facts showing that Buenaventura believed he was dying at the time he made the identification.

For that reason, the Supreme Court held that Buenaventura’s statements may not qualify as a dying declaration for lack of the required predicate.

Alternative Theory: Res Gestae, and the Remaining Evidentiary Concerns

The Court nevertheless considered whether the statements could be admitted as part of the res gestae. It referred to Section 36, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which allows statements made while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, relating to the circumstances of the occurrence. The Court reasoned that being shot with a rifle on vital parts should qualify as a startling occurrence. It explained the principle that statements made as part of res gestae are generally admissible because they are natural and spontaneous, unreflected and instinctive, made before there is an opportunity to devise or contrive a false account, with the event rather than the declarant speaking through the declaration.

Given that Buenaventura’s statements were allegedly made moments after receiving his fatal injury, the Court found it “entirely reasonable” to conclude that the statements were likely made without opportunity to contrive. The Court then shifted to the more significant question: whether the statements attributed to Buenaventura regarding the identity of his assailants were actually uttered under the circumstances described in Elena’s testimony.

The Supreme Court’s Assessment of Why Reliability Failed

The Supreme Court found the circumstances surrounding disclosure highly problematic. It noted that a barangay councilman and three police officers arrived at Elena’s home around seven hours after Buenaventura’s death, stayed for several hours, surveyed and studied the scene, took photographs, collected evidence, and interviewed witnesses. The Court reasoned that the investigators would have asked the principal question of who the perpetrators were and whether the victims or witnesses recognized them. It further reasoned that Elena and the victims’ relatives, including Gelacio, would have been among those asked.

However, the Court held that neither Elena nor Gelacio ever divulged the alleged “dying declaration” to the barangay councilman or any of the three police investigators during the several hours they were present. The evidence showed that Elena allegedly revealed the identification for the first time only when she testified at trial. The Court

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