Title
People vs. Gregorio Jr.
Case
G.R. No. 174474
Decision Date
May 25, 2007
Father convicted of raping his 14-year-old daughter twice; court upheld reclusion perpetua due to insufficient qualifying circumstances in charges.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 174474)

Facts as Alleged by the Prosecution

In the court of origin, the prosecution presented XXX, the examining physician, Dr. Wynne Gubuan, and additional witnesses, including Eugenio Oquindo and Estrella Tuazon, the victim’s aunt. The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the prosecution narrative as follows: On the night of September 18, 1998, XXX was in their farm in Liyang, Pilar, Bataan when she woke in the middle of the night after feeling a hand on her “private part.” She identified the hand as that of her father, appellant Leodegario G. Gregorio, Jr., who allegedly fondled her and then succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. The prosecution further alleged that when she attempted to remove his hand, appellant warned her that she had no right to refuse because she was “just his child,” and threatened that if she resisted, he would place her in the oven (“isasalang niya ako sa pugon”). After the act, appellant allegedly told her that before he goes to jail, he would kill her first.

As to the second charge, the prosecution alleged that on the night of July 27, 2000, appellant raped XXX again in their house in Bagac, Bataan. According to her account, appellant went to where she was sleeping, removed her blanket and clothes, and placed himself on top of her. She struggled, but she alleged that he succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina while punching her thighs and kissing her, and then left the house afterward. After the assault, she allegedly ran to a friend’s house in Ibis, Bagac. She stayed there, eventually remaining under the custody of the DSWD after September 2000, and the incident was reportedly brought to the police on September 19, 2000, when the police accompanied her to Bagac Medical Hospital for examination.

Appellant’s Denial and Alibi

Appellant’s defense centered on denial and alibi. He denied having raped his daughter on September 18, 1998. For the incident charged on July 27, 2000, appellant testified that from about 8:00 p.m. of July 27, 2000 until 5:00 a.m. of the next day, he went fishing with Medardo Dapitan at the river in Sitio Caragman, Barangay Banawang. Appellant then claimed that they went to the house of his cousin, Gloria Mendoza, where they segregated fish and shrimp until he returned home, while Gloria continued selling the catch. Upon reaching home at about 9:00 a.m., appellant allegedly learned from his common-law wife, Marlene Gregorio, that his daughter left the night before and had not returned since. Appellant stated that only two days later they found XXX at her friend’s house in Sitio Alambre, Barangay Ibis and that she asked to stay there for two more days. He further asserted that after learning of the charges around September 26, 2000, he suspected that Estrella Tuazon may have instigated the filing of the accusations because of alleged ill will between families arising from a prior separation and a claimed unpaid debt of P22,000.00. His other defense witnesses purportedly corroborated the fishing trip.

RTC Ruling and Sentencing

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape on two (2) counts. It held him liable as principal under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and qualified under Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the same Code, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. The RTC also awarded civil damages and ordered submission of the record to the Supreme Court for automatic review within the time required under Rule 122.

The CA Disposition and Modification

Upon review, the Court of Appeals affirmed conviction but reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. It based the modification on the failure of the informations to allege properly the qualifying circumstance of the relationship between the victim and the accused. The CA treated the omissions as prejudicial to the accused’s right to be informed of the nature of the accusation. Dispositively, it ruled that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of simple rape and imposed reclusion perpetua for each count. It also reduced the civil awards to P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages per count, with P25,000.00 exemplary damages per count, for totals consistent with that modification.

The Supreme Court’s Issues

The Supreme Court addressed appellant’s sole assigned error that the CA gave undue weight to the victim’s testimony in disregard of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Underlying this error, the controversy required the Court to evaluate (a) the credibility of XXX as the witness to incestuous rape, (b) the effect of delay in reporting and the medical evidence presented through Dr. Gubuan, (c) the sufficiency of appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi, and (d) the legal propriety of the death penalty under RA 7659 given the pleading defects in the informations. The Court also determined the proper civil indemnities, moral damages, and exemplary damages to be awarded.

Credibility of the Victim and Rejection of Appellant’s Claims

The Supreme Court sustained the trial court and CA in accepting the testimony of XXX. It emphasized that the trial judge had observed the demeanor of the witness and that appellate courts would not generally disturb such credibility determinations absent overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded facts. The Court reviewed the victim’s account and found it clear, direct, and categorical. It also noted that the victim reportedly broke down and cried during testimony, which the trial court treated as indicative of sincere distress.

The Supreme Court rejected appellant’s theory that the victim fabricated the rape story due to a grudge. It held that the victim’s willingness to undergo a humiliating medical examination and to submit to public trial did not support the claim of concoction. The Court further reasoned that incestuous rape is not easily fabricated because of the parties involved and the social scandal and humiliation it would generate, which should deter false accusation in the circumstances described. It also found no merit in the alleged ill-motive imputed to Estrella Tuazon, stating that motive was too petty a cause to induce a niece to accuse her own father, and that in any case motive was not necessary where the identity of the offender was positively identified by the victim.

The Court also addressed the victim’s delay in reporting. It held that failure to immediately disclose the rape was not, by itself, an indication of fabrication. It explained that young girls may conceal the assault due to threats by the rapist, and it accepted the victim’s testimony that appellant threatened to kill her if she reported his acts. Thus, the delay was deemed understandable and not destructive of credibility.

Medical Evidence and Proof of Rape

Appellant challenged the victim’s timing by pointing to the physician’s testimony that lacerations were about two to three weeks old at the time of examination on September 19, 2000, implying doubt that the rape occurred on July 27, 2000. The Supreme Court was not persuaded. It reiterated that medical examination is merely corroborative and not an essential element of rape. It emphasized that a conviction may rest even on the lone testimony of the victim if it is clear, positive, and credible. It further stated that the existence of vaginal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, constituted the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.

Denial and Alibi Considered and Discredited in Part

As to the incident on September 18, 1998, the Supreme Court held that appellant’s bare denial could not prevail over the victim’s unequivocal testimony. It reiterated that unsubstantiated denial is negative and self-serving and carries no weight.

On the incident on July 27, 2000, the Supreme Court considered appellant’s alibi. It applied the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must show not only that he was in another place at the time of the offense, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. It found that the alleged fishing place in Banawang, Bagac and the victim’s home in Bagumbayan, Bagac were in the same town, and the testimony of appellant’s live-in partner reportedly showed that the distance could be negotiated in twenty minutes by tricycle. For that reason, appellant’s alibi was not physically impossible and could not exculpate him.

Correct Penalty: Death Not Properly Imposed Due to Pleading Defects

While the Supreme Court agreed with the RTC on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, it modified the penalty. It affirmed that qualified rape under Section 11(1) of RA 7659—which authorizes the death penalty when the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim—depends on the qualifying circumstance being alleged and proved. The Court reiterated its jurisprudential stance that these circumstances are qualifying circumstances and cannot be treated as established unless properly alleged in the information, because imposing the death penalty without such allegation violates the accused’s constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

The Supreme Court noted that although the informations allegedly alleged the victim’s age or minority, they did not properly and specifically allege appellant’s relationship in the manner required. It recognized that the informations contained, under “CONTRARY TO LAW,” the statement that “the accused is the father of the

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