People vs. Gozo

Factual Background

Appellant purchased a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the existing structure and constructed a new house without obtaining a building permit from the City Mayor. Appellant asserted that she was told by Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayor’s office, and by neighbors that a building permit was unnecessary. On December 29, 1966, a building and lot inspector and a patrolman apprehended four carpenters working on appellant’s house and the carpenters were brought to the Olongapo City police headquarters for interrogation. After investigation appellant was charged with violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964.

Trial and Appellate Proceedings

The City Court of Olongapo City found appellant guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 and sentenced her to one month imprisonment and costs. On appeal the Court of First Instance of Zambales found appellant guilty and imposed a fine of P200.00 and ordered the demolition of the house. Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and, having raised constitutional questions regarding the ordinance and its applicability because the property lay within the naval base, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court.

Issues Presented

The case raised whether Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 was constitutionally infirm for denial of due process or otherwise oppressive in its application to appellant and whether the ordinance was inapplicable to appellant because her house stood within the naval base leased to the United States armed forces, thereby allegedly removing municipal administrative jurisdiction.

Defendant's Contentions

Appellant contended that the ordinance violated due process, invoking People v. Fajardo as authority that an ordinance may be void when its application is oppressive. She argued alternatively that seeking a permit would have been futile because the Mayor would not have granted it and that the municipal authority could not validly exercise administrative jurisdiction over property located within the American naval reservation.

Government's Position and Lower Courts' Findings

The prosecution and the lower courts treated the ordinance as a valid exercise of municipal power to regulate building construction under the general welfare/ police power. The lower courts found appellant guilty on the undisputed facts that she built without securing the required permit. Appellant herself had conceded in brief that the ordinance could be justified under the general welfare clause, but maintained its application to her was precluded by the naval reservation setting and by alleged oppressive operation.

Supreme Court's Analysis

The Court distinguished People v. Fajardo, explaining that in Fajardo the ordinance was applied oppressively because the applicants had sought permits and were denied, and construction was necessary for shelter after a typhoon; by contrast appellant in this case never sought a permit, so she could not rely on Fajardo’s vindication against oppressive application. The Court invoked Primicias v. Fugoso as authority to adopt an interpretation of ordinances that avoids constitutional infirmity and to construe the permit requirement as not an arbitrary or unregulated denial of rights by the Mayor. The Court reaffirmed the long-standing power of municipal governments to require building permits, citing the early precedent of Switzer v. Municipality of Cebu and numerous subsequent decisions sustaining local regulatory measures.

Sovereignty, Military Bases, and Jurisdiction

The Court rejected appellant’s contention that the leased naval reservation removed municipal administrative jurisdiction. The Court relied on People v. Acierto and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue to state that the bases remained part of Philippine territory, that the Philippines retained sovereignty and jurisdiction except as expressly and specifically ceded by treaty, and that any grant of jurisdiction to the United States under the Military-Bases Agreement was preferential or prior but not exclusive and was a matter of comity between contracting parties. The Court emphasized that treaty privileges inure to the contracting parties and could not be invoked by an offender to defeat domestic jurisdiction, and it noted that there was no showing that American authorities claimed administrative jurisdiction over appellant’s case.

Ruling and Disposition

The Court affirmed the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 insofar as it found Loreta Gozo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 and imposing a penalty of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The Court modified the demolition order by giving appellant thirty days from the finality of the decision to obtain the required permit; only upon her failure to secure such permit would the demolition order be enforced. Costs were assessed against the accused. The opinion noted concurrence by Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court grounded its conclusion on three interrelated propositions drawn from precedent and principle. First, municipalities possess authority under the general welfare or police power to require b