Title
People vs. Fajardo
Case
G.R. No. L-12172
Decision Date
Aug 29, 1958
A 1950 ordinance requiring building permits was deemed invalid and unconstitutional for granting arbitrary discretion to the mayor, unreasonably restricting property rights, and lacking legal authority, leading to the acquittal of appellants.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 191002)

Factual Background

During his incumbency as municipal mayor, JUAN F. FAJARDO presided when the municipal council enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, which required a written permit from the municipal mayor before any person could construct or repair a building and prescribed fees and penalties, including removal of any structure that "destroys the view of the Public Plaza." Years later, after Fajardo's term had expired, Fajardo and his son-in-law, PEDRO BABILONIA, sought a permit from the incumbent mayor to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on land registered in Fajardo's name along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The incumbent mayor denied the request on January 16, 1954, because the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. A renewed request on January 18, 1954, received the same denial. The appellants proceeded to construct without a permit, explaining that they urgently needed a residence after their prior house had been destroyed by a typhoon.

Trial Court Proceedings

The appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao for violation of the municipal ordinance. They appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, imposed a fine of P35 on each appellant plus costs, and ordered demolition of the building on the ground that it destroyed the view of the public plaza by hindering the view of travelers from the national highway.

Procedural History on Appeal

The appellants appealed from the judgment of the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals. Because the appeal challenged the constitutionality of the municipal ordinance, the Court of Appeals forwarded the records to the Supreme Court for resolution of the constitutional and legal questions thus presented.

Issues Presented

The Supreme Court framed and resolved whether Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950 was a valid exercise of municipal power and whether the appellants' conviction under that ordinance could stand. The specific legal questions were whether the ordinance unlawfully vested absolute and unregulated discretion in the municipal mayor; whether the ordinance, as construed to prohibit any structure that destroyed the view of the public plaza, operated as an unreasonable and oppressive regulatory taking without just compensation; and whether the ordinance rested upon the authority granted by Sec. 2243(c), Revised Administrative Code.

The Parties' Contentions

The municipal authorities and the trial court treated the ordinance as a valid exercise of municipal discretion under Sec. 2243(c), Revised Administrative Code, and they justified denial of the permit on the ground that the proposed building would destroy the view of the public plaza. It was contended by proponents of the ordinance that the mayor's refusal was permissible when the structure would destroy the view or occupy public property. The appellants relied on the absence of standards in the ordinance and on the claim that, as applied, the ordinance would deprive them of the beneficial use of their property without compensation.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, declared Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950 null and void, and acquitted the appellants with costs de oficio. The Court held that the ordinance fell beyond the authority of the municipality to enact for multiple, independent reasons.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

First, the Court found that the ordinance conferred arbitrary and unrestricted power upon the municipal mayor by requiring a written permit without stating any policy or standards to guide the mayor's action; the ordinance provided no conditions for grant or refusal and thereby vested an unregulated discretion to allow or prevent otherwise lawful property use. The Court relied on the settled rule against such unlimited delegation and cited authorities including People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71; and Schloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392, and quoted the principle in City of Richmond vs. Dudley via Schloss that municipal restrictions upon lawful conduct must specify rules and conditions and must admit equal exercise by all who comply. Second, the Court held that even if the ordinance were read to permit refusal only when a structure "destroys the view of the public plaza," the measure was unreasonable and oppressive because it would operate to permanently deprive the owner of the beneficial use of urban land and thus amounted to a taking without just compensation. The Court observed that the State, exercising its police power, may regulate for the general welfare and may prohibit offensively sightly structures, but it may not, under that guise, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of property without compensation. The Court cited authorities on regulatory takings, including Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580; Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110; Sundlum vs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; Eaton vs. Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114; and Tews vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 Ill. 212, 185 N.E. 827, to demonstrate that a regulation which substantially deprives an owne

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