G.R. No. 105954-55 - People vs. Fajardo

Case Summary (G.R. No. 105954-55)

The Charges, Trial Outcome, and Appeal

The trial court convicted Ireneo Fajardo and Ruperto Fajardo as co-principals of kidnapping for ransom under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and it considered the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicles without any mitigating circumstance to offset it. Because of the constitutional proscription against the death penalty (Sec. 19(1), 1987 Constitution), the court imposed reclusion perpetua and added the accessories provided by law, plus proportionate costs. It also ordered the return of the amount of $3,000,000.00 allegedly extorted, directing that the same be restored to the victim or friends of the victim. Simpliciano Atienza was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence, with cancellation of his bail bond and relief of his surety.

On appeal, the Court reviewed the trial court’s findings of guilt for kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, but the Supreme Court’s ultimate disposition modified the conviction by deleting the return order and by classifying the offense as kidnapping and serious illegal detention with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Supreme Court also affirmed that the other accused were not before the trial court for lack of jurisdiction because they remained at large, and it noted the death of Bonifacio Dimapilis, leading to dismissal as to him.

Undisputed Circumstances Surrounding the Abduction

The Court found the following undisputed setting. In the early morning of November 15, 1986, several Japanese executives of Mitsui & Co. and other Japanese companies left Makati, Metro Manila for a game of golf at the Canlubang Golf Club in Canlubang, Laguna. They arrived in a convoy of five cars. After about four hours and lunch, the executives left around 3:00 p.m. from the golf club. The convoy was led by the car driven by Emiliano Ordona, with Nobuyuki Wakaoji in that vehicle.

The prosecution evidence established that, shortly thereafter, the convoy was overtaken by two cars that blocked the lead vehicle. Two men emerged and forcibly took Wakaoji out of the car, shoving him into a blue Toyota Cressida. The Cressida then sped away toward the highway.

Evidence on Detention and the Testimony of Key Witnesses

To prove detention, the trial court relied on the testimonies of Mario Palig and Jimmy Lasam. Lasam testified that around 2:00 p.m. on November 25, 1986, while looking for work in Aya, Talisay, Batangas, he saw Wakaoji being escorted by armed men from the house of Benigno Lumbres to a waiting white car. He described Wakaoji as blindfolded with his hands tied behind his back. Palig testified that around 2:00 p.m. on November 25, 1986, in Tarangka, Talisay, Batangas, he saw Ruperto Fajardo at the house of Lumbres. Palig further claimed that a helicopter boarded by Japanese nationals arrived; he said the Japanese nationals spoke with Lumbres and took pictures. Palig stated that Wakaoji was escorted to a white car by Ruperto Fajardo, Lumbres, and Maranan, and that three unidentified armed men boarded a passenger jeep and followed the white car. Based on these accounts, the trial court concluded that another kidnapping group moved the victim from Barangay Tarangka, Talisay, Batangas to Barangay Suplang, Tanauan, Batangas to evade law enforcement.

The Court also considered the testimony of Ernesto Escobar, who described the immediate abduction scene and identified Ireneo Fajardo as standing near the door of the Cressida when Wakaoji was taken.

Appellants’ Assignments of Error

The appellants principally attacked the credibility and admissibility of prosecution evidence. They alleged that the prosecution witnesses were procured, perjured, and rehearsed, and they asserted that the trial court drew conclusions from written statements of persons who were not presented as witnesses. They also argued that conspiracy was inferred from inadmissible evidence and that the identities of the appellants were established only through unreliable testimony. They further raised defenses of alibi and contested the denial of a motion to re-open the case for newly discovered evidence consisting of newspaper reports about confessions by other persons. Finally, they insisted that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Supreme Court’s Treatment of Claims of Procured or Perjured Testimony

The Supreme Court rejected the allegations of fabrication. It held that bare assertions, without supporting proof, did not warrant disbelieving the witnesses. It emphasized that appellants did not substantiate their claim that Escobar, Palig, and Lasam had been motivated to falsely testify. The Court invoked the rule that mere allegations are not equivalent to proof, and that each party bears the burden of proving its affirmative allegations. With no showing of improper motive, the Court treated the testimonies as entitled to full faith and credit.

Admissibility Issues and Reliance on Independent Admissible Evidence

Even assuming that the trial court had erred in considering certain statements, the Supreme Court stated that the convictions could still stand on other admissible evidence. The Court identified the testimonies of Escobar, Palig, and Lasam as sufficient admissible proof.

Positive Identification of Ireneo Fajardo and Participation in the Abduction

On the identity issue, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court’s finding that Ireneo Fajardo was present during Wakaoji’s abduction and kidnapping. While the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court’s characterization of Ireneo Fajardo as the most prominent conspirator lacked basis, it nonetheless pointed to evidence showing that he stood by the car as two other men pulled Wakaoji out of the first car and pushed him into the Toyota Cressida. The evidence further showed that Ireneo Fajardo drove the Toyota Cressida and acted as a look-out.

The Supreme Court relied on Escobar’s identification as categorical and consistent. It quoted Escobar’s testimony that he recognized Ireneo Fajardo as the person standing near the Cressida door when Wakaoji was taken. The Court held that a witness who testifies in a categorical, spontaneous, frank, and consistent manner is credible.

The appellants argued that Escobar had not met Ireneo Fajardo before the investigation on January 12, 1987. The Court ruled that prior personal acquaintance is not a legal requirement for positive identification. It also rejected the contention that Escobar’s distance from the vehicle—about twenty meters—made identification unlikely. It distinguished from cases where long distance alone might create doubt. It cited People vs. Castillo, stating that while a distance of forty to forty-five meters could raise doubts, once familiarity is gained identification becomes easier. Here, the Court found that Escobar had gained familiarity with Ireneo Fajardo while both were in the Canlubang Golf and Country Club parking lot, where Escobar observed Ireneo Fajardo surveying the area for hours prior to the abduction.

Identification of Ruperto Fajardo and Rejection of Alibi

The Supreme Court likewise affirmed that Palig and Lasam categorically identified Ruperto Fajardo as one of the armed men who escorted Wakaoji from Lumbres’ house to a waiting vehicle. The Court found that visibility conditions in Tarangka, Talisay, Batangas on November 25, 1986 were not open to serious doubt.

Given positive identification, the Court rejected the alibi defense. It reiterated that alibi is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over positive identification by an eyewitness absent clear and convincing evidence. The Court also declared that denial and self-serving testimony deserved no weight in law when contradicted by credible identification.

Denial of Motion to Re-open for Newly Discovered Evidence

The Court approved the denial of appellants’ motion to re-open the case for newly discovered evidence in the form of newspaper reports about confessions by other persons. It ruled that such materials were not newly discovered evidence and, in any event, newspaper accounts were hearsay and therefore incompetent and inadmissible. The Court further noted that because appellants were positively identified, admitting the newspaper reports would not change the judgment.

Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Elements of Serious Illegal Detention

The Supreme Court held that appellants’ guilt had been established beyond reasonable doubt. It restated that all elements of the crime charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and that the law requires only moral certainty or the degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

The Court addressed serious illegal detention and discussed its elements. It held that the offender must be a private individual; the offender must kidnap or detain another person or deprive that person of liberty in any other manner; the deprivation must be illegal; and one of the qualifying circumstances must be present—such as detention lasting more than five days, simulation of public authority, serious physical injuries or threats to kill, or that the detained person is a minor, female, or public officer. It cited U.S. vs. Cabanag to emphasize that actual confi

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 105954-55)

Parties and Procedural Posture

The People of the Philippines appealed from, or sought review of, the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna decision in Criminal Case No. 4371-B dated December 20, 1991, which convicted the appellants.
The appellants before the Court were Ireneo Fajardo and Ruperto Fajardo, who were convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
The trial court also acquitted Simpliciano Atienza, and dismissed the case as to Bonifacio Dimapilis due to his death during the pendency of the case.
Several other accused were never arraigned and remained at large, and the trial court declared it had no jurisdiction over them.
The matter before the Court was an appellate review focusing on whether the conviction was supported by competent evidence and whether the elements of the crimes were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Key Factual Allegations

The charges arose from the abduction of Nobuyuki Wakaoji, a Japanese executive of Mitsui & Co. and other Japanese companies.
On November 15, 1986, several Japanese executives left Makati, Metro Manila for a golf outing at Canlubang Golf Club in Canlubang, Laguna.
The executives traveled in a convoy of five cars, with the lead car driven by Emiliano Ordona and Nobuyuki Wakaoji inside it.
After about four hours of play and lunch, the group left the golf club at about 3:00 p.m.
The convoy was overtaken five minutes later by two cars, one described as a blue Toyota Cressida, which blocked the lead car.
Two men approached the lead car and forcibly took Wakaoji, shoving him into the Toyota Cressida.
The account alleged that Ireneo Fajardo remained standing near the door of the Cressida during the abduction, while the Cressida sped toward the highway.
The prosecution also presented evidence, via witnesses, that Wakaoji was later transferred while being detained, blindfolded, and with his hands tied.

Evidence Presented at Trial

The trial court relied on testimonies to establish the abduction and the subsequent confinement that qualified the detention as serious illegal detention.
Ernesto Escobar testified that he saw armed men during the abduction and positively identified Ireneo Fajardo as the man standing near the Cressida door and near the steering wheel.
Mario Palig testified that he saw Ruperto Fajardo at the house of Benigno Lumbres and that Japanese nationals arrived, photographed, and that Wakaoji was escorted to a white car.
Jimmy Lasam testified that he saw Wakaoji escorted by armed men from the house of Lumbres to a waiting white car, with Wakaoji blindfolded and hands tied.
The trial court treated Palig and Lasam’s testimonies as proof of a transfer of the victim after the abduction, which it viewed as an effort to evade law enforcement.

Issues Raised on Appeal

The appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding commission of the crimes based solely on testimonies allegedly procured, perjured, and rehearsed, and on statements from persons never presented as witnesses.
The appellants contended that the trial court seriously erred in considering written statements from persons who were not presented as witnesses and in drawing conclusions and presumptions extensively from inadmissible material.
The appellants challenged the finding of conspiracy, asserting it was based on inadmissible evidence.
The appellants disputed their identities, arguing that the trial court relied on highly incredible, perjured, and unreliable testimony for the prosecution.
The appellants assailed the trial court’s rejection of the defense, particularly the defense of alibi.
The appellants also challenged the denial of their motion for leave to introduce material and newly discovered evidence, alleging that other persons confessed to the crime.
Ultimately, the appellants asserted that the evidence did not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellate Court Reasoning

The Court held that appellants’ first assignment of error failed because the appellants made bare allegations that witnesses were procured and perjured without presenting proof of improper motive.
The Court reiterated that mere allegations are not equivalent to proof, and that each party must prove his affirmative allegations.
The Court ruled that, absent proof of improper motivation, the prosecution witnesses’ testimony deserved full faith and credit.
On the second and third assignments of error, the Court held that even assuming the trial court erroneously considered inadmissible statements, the convictions could still stand based on other admissible evidence, namely the testimonies of Escobar, Palig, and Lasam.
The Court rejected the conspiracy-related and identity-related arguments, holding that appellants were positively identified.
The Court acknowledged that the trial court’s finding about the most prominent conspirator as Ireneo Fajardo lacked basis, but the Court still found Ireneo Fajardo’s participation established by the evidence.
The Court found that Ireneo Fajardo stood by the car while two men pulled Wakaoji out and pushed him into the Toyota Cressida, and that Ireneo Fajardo drove the Cressida and acted as a lookout.
The Court treated Escobar’s categorical, spontaneous, frank, and consistent testimony as credible and suf