Case Summary (G.R. No. L-31195)
Procedural Posture and Disposition Below
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Cabanatuan City, convicted Joselito del Rosario of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as a co-principal, sentenced him to death, and ordered payment of actual and moral/exemplary damages to the victim’s heirs. The case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review of that conviction and sentence.
Facts as Found by the Prosecution and the Accused’s Version
Prosecution evidence, primarily the eyewitness testimony of Paul Vincent Alonzo, described an incident on the evening of 13 May 1996 in which two men and a woman grappled for a lady’s bag; an armed man chased the lady’s helper and then returned and shot the lady in the head while she was on the ground; the stolen bag was taken to a tricycle and the occupants fled. Alonzo identified the tricycle driver and obtained its plate number and reported the incident to police. Del Rosario’s account admitted driving the tricycle after being hired by “Boy” Santos to convey passengers; he claimed he was unaware of any prearranged plan to rob or kill, that Marquez and Dodong alighted and committed the robbery and that Jun Marquez shot the victim; further, he asserted that Boy Santos, who remained inside the tricycle, pointed a gun at him, threatened him and his family, prevented him from leaving or seeking help, and ordered him to drive them away after the shooting.
Issues Raised on Appeal
Del Rosario presented four principal contentions: (1) the presence of a threat and irresistible force (duress) employed by co-accused that exempted him from criminal liability; (2) lack of proof of conspiracy or common design linking him to the robbery with homicide; (3) violations of his constitutional rights during custodial investigation, including the right to remain silent and to counsel; and (4) unlawful warrantless arrest in violation of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Legal Standard for Exemption: Compulsion by Irresistible Force (Art. 12, par. 5, RPC)
The court restated the governing principle that a person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force—i.e., under an impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury—is exempt from criminal liability because the act is not volitional (actus me invito factus non est meus actus). The force must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument, present, imminent and impending, inducing a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. Threats of future injury are insufficient; there must be no reasonable opportunity for escape or for self-defense in equal combat. Jurisprudence cited in the record (e.g., People v. Lorena) supports this formulation.
Application of the Duress Standard to the Facts — Acceptance of the Defense
Applying this standard, the Supreme Court found the defense of irresistible force established by clear and convincing evidence. Key factual findings supporting that conclusion were: (a) del Rosario was unarmed; (b) an armed person (as the record and del Rosario’s testimony indicate, Boy Santos possessed a firearm) remained in del Rosario’s tricycle and pointed the gun at del Rosario when del Rosario attempted to flee or seek help; (c) the gun was pointed directly at del Rosario and accompanied by explicit threats to kill him and harm his family if he attempted to interfere or report; (d) the eyewitness testimony of Alonzo, when read together with del Rosario’s account, indicated that Marquez (not Boy Santos) ran after the lady’s helper and that Marquez was the shooter, while Boy Santos stayed in the tricycle and received the bag; (e) the sidecar’s opaque back limited Alonzo’s ability to observe threats made inside the vehicle, lending credence to del Rosario’s assertion that a gun had been pointed at him inside the tricycle; and (f) del Rosario had a family and limited means, so his natural concern for personal and familial safety supports his claim he yielded to the threatened force. The court concluded that del Rosario’s fear was real, imminent and left him no practical opportunity for escape or resistance; thus he was effectively an instrument coerced into driving the offenders away, making him exempt from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5.
Trial Court’s Finding on Conspiracy and the Supreme Court’s Reassessment
The RTC had convicted del Rosario in part on the theory of conspiracy and joint participation, reasoning that the tricycle under his control had been used in the commission of the offense and that he failed to report the incident. The Supreme Court reiterated the law on conspiracy: it requires concurrence of wills or unity of action and purpose; an implied conspiracy may be inferred from circumstances but mere presence, knowledge or acquiescence without intentional cooperative participation in a common design is insufficient. Conspiracy must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove an agreement or concerted design between del Rosario and his passengers to commit the robbery and homicide. Del Rosario’s presence as the driver and his subsequent silence (attributable to fear and self-preservation) did not establish intentional participation in the common design. Because the prosecution did not satisfy the requisite proof beyond reasonable doubt, the conspiracy theory could not sustain his conviction.
Custodial Investigation, Rights under RA 7438 and the Bill of Rights
The Supreme Court examined the circumstances of del Rosario’s custodial interrogation. RA 7438 and constitutional protections require that a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation be informed, in a language understood by him, of the right to remain silent and the right to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice; if he cannot afford counsel, a competent and independent counsel must be provided. The record showed that del Rosario was “invited” for questioning at the barangay captain’s house and thereafter detained and interrogated without being informed of those rights; the police allegedly already knew his identity as the tricycle driver and regarded him as a suspect. The Court treated the “invitation” and subsequent deprivation of freedom as custodial investigation within the expanded concept under RA 7438. Because the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario validly waived these rights, verbal admissions and statements obtained during that custodial phase were inadmissible. The Court thus found a transgression of statutory and constitutional safeguards, reinforcing the exclusion of incriminating admissions obtained in custody.
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...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-31195)
Procedural Posture
- Decision under automatic review from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Cabanatuan City, Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura, convicting accused Joselito del Rosario y Pascual as co-principal of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide, sentencing him to death and ordering payment of actual damages P550,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages P100,000.00.
- Case reported at 365 Phil. 292, En Banc, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999; decision penned by Justice Bellosillo for the Court.
- Only Joselito del Rosario was tried; co-accused Virgilio “Boy” Santos and John Doe “Dodong” remained at large, and Ernesto “Jun” Marquez was killed in a police encounter.
- On appeal (automatic review), accused raised multiple contentions seeking reversal or acquittal.
Factual Background
- Date and place: Incident occurred on 13 May 1996, between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., near Nita’s Drugstore, General Luna Street (also referred to Juan Luna/Gen. Tinio St.), Cabanatuan City.
- Victim: Virginia Bernas, 66-year-old businesswoman, robbed of P200,000.00 cash and jewelry and thereafter shot in the head and killed.
- Actors: Joselito del Rosario (tricycle driver, accused-appellant), Virgilio “Boy” Santos (co-accused), Ernesto “Jun” Marquez (co-accused, later killed), John Doe alias “Dodong” / “Dodong Bisaya” (co-accused).
- Sequence as proved by testimony and accounts: two men and a woman grappled over a bag; one man (armed) chased the victim’s helper and returned to shoot the victim while she lay on the ground; the bag was brought to the tricycle of del Rosario and handed to someone inside; the armed man sat behind the driver; the tricycle fled; eyewitness Alonzo chased and obtained the plate, recognized the driver, and reported to police.
Eyewitness Testimony (Paul Vincent Alonzo)
- Alonzo stopped his tricycle near Nita’s Drugstore and observed the incident from about one and a half (1½) meters away.
- He saw two men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag; one man armed with a gun chased a helper of the woman, and the other kicked the woman causing her to fall.
- The armed man returned and shot the woman in the head while she lay on the ground.
- The bag was brought to the tricycle driven by del Rosario; someone inside that tricycle received the bag.
- The armed man sat behind the driver; the other man entered the sidecar; the tricycle sped away.
- After giving chase, Alonzo obtained the plate number and personally recognized the driver; he then went to the police to report.
- On an ocular inspection and continued questioning, Alonzo reaffirmed that the man who chased the helper and who shot the victim returned and sat behind the driver; he consistently identified the gunman as the runner-chaser.
Accused’s Account (Joselito del Rosario)
- Del Rosario stated he was hired around 5:30 p.m. for P120.00 by “Boy” Santos to drive to a cockpit at Blas Edward Coliseum, but Santos redirected him to the public market to fetch “Jun” Marquez and “Dodong” Bisaya.
- Marquez and Bisaya boarded at Merced Drugstore parking lot; the tricycle stopped at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Streets where Bisaya alighted under the pretext of buying a cigarette and then accosted the victim.
- Marquez alighted to help Bisaya; Bisaya succeeded in taking the bag; before boarding, Marquez shot the victim in the head while she lay prone.
- Del Rosario attempted to leave and seek help but was prevented by Boy Santos, who stayed inside the tricycle and threatened to shoot him and his family; Boy Santos pointed a gun at del Rosario.
- Del Rosario described seeing two firearms at the scene: one with Marquez and one with Boy Santos; he said Boy Santos stayed inside to threaten him and thereby prevent his escape.
- After the shooting, Bisaya boarded the sidecar and Marquez rode behind del Rosario; they directed del Rosario to drive toward Dicarma; upon arrival the three alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police; del Rosario went home and did not report due to the threat.
- Later, del Rosario voluntarily identified himself to police during their investigation, provided information about the bag and lunch kit location and where hold-up men might be found; he was then detained and his statement was taken and subscribed on varying dates (investigator took statement on May 14, 1996; statements signed May 16, 1996; subscribed May 22, 1996, per the record).
Trial Court Findings and Sentence
- The court a quo found del Rosario guilty as co-principal in Robbery with Homicide.
- The trial court’s rationale included that del Rosario’s tricycle was hired and used by his co-accused in the commission of the crime, that he facilitated their escape, that the engine of his tricycle was running during the grappling, chasing and shooting, and that he did not deny failure to report the incident.
- The trial court’s quoted narration attributed the shooting to Boy Santos in its factual synopsis (decision excerpted), but the court ultimately found del Rosario criminally liable and imposed the death penalty plus civil damages against him.
Issues Raised on Automatic Review
- Accused contended the trial court erred in:
- (1) Failing to find that present threat and irresistible force (duress) from his co-accused relieved him of criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, RPC.
- (2) Failing to consider his defense that he was not part of any conspiracy with his co-accused to commit robbery with homicide.
- (3) Violations of his constitutional rights as an accused, specifically rights during custodial investigation (right to remain silent and right to counsel).
- (4) Failing to consider that his arrest was not a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court.
Legal Standard: Irresistible Force / Duress
- Principle: A person who acts under compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because the act is not done with freedom (actus me invito factus non est meus actus).
- Requirements for the duress/irresistible force defense:
- Force must be so formidable as to