Title
People vs. De la Fuente y Mahilum
Case
G.R. No. L-63251-52
Decision Date
Dec 29, 1983
A man killed his common-law partner and her mother in their sleep, later confessing. The court ruled separate murders with treachery, modifying the death penalty to reclusion perpetua.
double murder
separate offenses
extrajudicial confession

Case Summary (G.R. No. 224849)

Factual Background

The Court found no dispute that De la Fuente killed both Elvira and Matilde. The principal evidence was an extrajudicial confession (Exh. A) where the accused admitted the killings. The confession was executed and later ratified by the accused while he was on the witness stand, and the Court treated the confession as admissible under Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution because of such ratification. The Court also noted that the accused’s voluntary plea of guilty operated as a judicial confession, further removing doubt as to his guilt.

The narrative of the night of the crime was supplied primarily through the eyewitness testimony of Imelda Dumapig, corroborated by the medical testimony and other prosecution evidence. At about eleven o’clock in the evening of September 21, 1982, Elvira—along with her one-year-old baby—Matilde, her younger brother Alan, and two nephews were sleeping in Matilde’s house in Barangay Olingan, Dipolog City. De la Fuente suddenly barged into the house. Imelda, who was still awake and combing her hair, saw De la Fuente stab Matilde on the left breast and Elvira on the middle portion of her chest while both victims were asleep. After Matilde and Elvira were wounded, Imelda jumped out of the window, landing on the ground where she was separated from her mother. Outside, the accused stabbed Imelda on the left buttock. Imelda fled to a checkpoint, where she encountered the head teacher of the School of Fisheries, who brought her to the hospital. Her wound was not fatal. Elvira and Matilde died from the stab wounds (Exh. F and H). Matilde had a penetrating wound in the left breast that cut the nipple and areola and fractured her sixth and seventh ribs; Elvira had a three-centimeter wound in the chest. The wounds affected their hearts and lungs (Exh. E and G).

The Court further described circumstances preceding the killings. De la Fuente had previously threatened Elvira with a hunting knife and they had eloped. Elvira and De la Fuente later cohabited without marriage in Dipolog City. The record also showed that De la Fuente had assaulted a person and that the house was surrounded by unknown persons at the time linked to that incident.

Arraignment and Plea of Guilty

At his arraignment on November 23, 1982, the accused, assisted by counsel, first entered a not guilty plea. The trial judge then asked him if he understood the information and, again, the accused was asked as to his plea. He answered “guilty.” The judge explained that the accused faced two murders, which are capital offenses, and that the death penalty might be imposed. The accused confirmed he understood the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty. When the judge asked if he wanted to change his plea to “not guilty,” De la Fuente said: “I will not change my plea, Your Honor.” He later pleaded guilty as well when arraigned on the separate information for frustrated murder, using the same counsel.

Because the case involved capital offenses and the death penalty, the trial judge required the fiscal to present evidence even after the guilty pleas. In addition to the extrajudicial confession, the prosecution presented Imelda’s testimony, the hospital doctor’s testimony, the testimony of Alejandro Dumapig (Matilde’s husband), the testimony of Marcos Sorronda (an intelligence officer who handled the police custody and delivery of the accused), and other evidentiary support tied to the confession.

Evidence on Mitigation and the Accused’s Testimony

The accused’s extrajudicial confession was sworn to before an assistant city fiscal of Dipolog City, who certified that he personally examined De la Fuente and found that the accused voluntarily executed the confession and understood it. The confession was assisted by Manuel P. Abad, a lawyer from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office.

The prosecution treated plea of guilty and voluntary surrender as mitigating circumstances, but it disagreed with the defense view that passion and obfuscation should likewise be mitigating. The trial court required the accused to testify to support the claimed mitigating circumstance.

In his testimony, the accused attempted to establish a mitigating context. He claimed that at about two o’clock in the afternoon, a few hours before the killing, he asked Elvira for twenty pesos and became angry due to Matilde’s intervention, which had allegedly been part of prior occasions when Matilde advised Elvira to leave him. He said he gambled with the money. According to his account at around nine-thirty in the evening, he and Elvira and Matilde were allegedly still awake when Elvira asked him about the twenty pesos and a spat ensued. He claimed that Elvira bit him near the nipple on the left breast, which supposedly provoked him to assault Matilde and Elvira. He then claimed that after assaulting the two women, he jumped out of the window and, in the darkness, stabbed a person whom he did not recognize, whom he later found to be Imelda.

The trial court rejected this testimony and did not appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance. It also ruled against the characterization of the killings and the offense consequences as sought by the defense.

The Parties’ Contentions

The defense counsel de oficio sought only a modification of the trial court’s decision. They argued that the accused should be regarded as having committed only two homicides and an attempted homicide, instead of murders and attempted murder as found by the trial court. They thus challenged the legal characterization of the killings and the attendant aggravating circumstances, as well as the failure to appreciate passion and obfuscation.

The prosecution, through its evidence and the judgment under review, maintained that the killings were properly treated as murder for both fatalities and that the wounding of Imelda constituted attempted murder, subject to appropriate penalties and civil liabilities.

Issues for Resolution

The Court had to determine, among others, the following: first, whether the killings of Elvira and Matilde should be treated as separate offenses or as a complex crime; second, whether the evidence established the legal elements and qualifying circumstances for murder, including treachery, and whether homicide was more accurate; third, whether evident premeditation and dwelling were present; fourth, the correct characterization of the offense committed against Imelda as either attempted murder or attempted homicide; and fifth, the proper appreciation of mitigating circumstances, particularly whether passion and obfuscation could extenuate the accused’s criminal acts.

Ruling of the Court

The Court set aside the death penalty. It ordered that the accused be sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas for the murders of Matilde B. Dumapig and Elvira B. Dumapig. It also imposed civil liabilities in line with the increased amounts fixed by the Court. For the wounding of Imelda, it imposed a penalty of six months of arresto mayor and ordered indemnity in her favor.

The Court’s disposition thus modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua for each murder and adjusted the indemnities and damages for the victims’ heirs and for Imelda.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

On the admissibility of the accused’s admission, the Court held that the extrajudicial confession (Exh. A) was admissible because the accused ratified it while testifying, a circumstance bringing the confession within the ambit of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. It also treated the accused’s guilty plea as a judicial confession, which, together with the confession and the corroborative evidence, removed reasonable doubt.

The Court rejected the defense position that the killings should be considered complex. It held that the killings were separate offenses because they were perpetrated by distinct acts. The Court reasoned that since the victims were asleep, both killings were attended with treachery. It added that treachery absorbed nocturnity. Accordingly, the Court sustained the legal characterization as murders, not homicides.

The Court also rejected the argument that the killings were homicides because the evidence, including the accused’s own testimony, did not support that conclusion. Even in his confession, the accused did not state that he killed the victims while they were awake. The Court instead found support for evident premeditation known. It relied on the accused’s own testimony that he had an altercation at about two o’clock in the afternoon and that he killed the victims about nine hours later on the same evening. The Court held that he had sufficient time for meditation and reflection and ample opportunity for his conscience to overcome his resolution to commit the crime, citing U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530, 547. Hence, evident premeditation was treated as aggravating.

With respect to dwelling, the Court held that it likewise qualified the murders. It treated dwelling as aggravating because the murders were committed in the humble abode of Matilde B. Dumapig, which was not the habitation of the accused.

As to Imelda, the Court held that the offense was attempted murder, not attempted homicide. It found that treachery was present in the stabbing of Imelda. It described the circumstances as a sudden, unexpected assault, and emphasized that Imelda had reason to feel safe after she had jumped out of the window and landed on the ground. The Court further reasoned that the accused did not know he was attacking Imelda because it was dark and he did not recognize her.

The Court held that evident premeditation and dwelling did not aggravate the attempted murder of Imelda. It accordingly treated the attempted murder differently from the murders of the two sleeping victims.

On mitigating circumstances, the Court recognized that plea of guilty and voluntary surrender were mitigating. It denied the claim of passion and obfuscation as extenuating, reasoning that the accused ac

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