G.R. No. 45198 - People vs. De Jesus y Javier

Case Summary (G.R. No. 45198)

Factual Background

The prosecution’s charge stated that the accused committed theft on April 28, 1936, involving an umbrella and a buri hat with a combined value of P2.65. The Court of First Instance convicted the accused and imposed the principal and additional penalties provided for the offense and for habitual delinquency.

The record, as narrated in the decision, indicated that the lower court acted leniently on the accused’s principal penalty because the accused made a voluntary confession before the prosecution presented its evidence. That confession was treated as a mitigating circumstance under art. 13, subsec. 7, Revised Penal Code. The Court also noted the “apparent absence” of any allegation in the information of an aggravating circumstance that would compensate for the mitigating circumstance, in accordance with the framework of art. 63, rule 1, Revised Penal Code.

Separate from the facts of the theft itself, the information included an allegation that the accused was a habitual delinquent, stating that he had been convicted by final judgments of prior crimes. Specifically, it alleged that he was convicted on January 4, 1933, of theft and sentenced to one month and one day of imprisonment; and that on November 13, 1935, he was convicted of qualified theft and sentenced to two months and one day of imprisonment, with the date of the last release being January 10, 1936.

The decision also emphasized that, by virtue of his admission of guilt and his confession, the accused effectively admitted the material facts alleged in the information, including the allegations bearing on his status as a habitual delinquent. The Court relied on settled doctrine that a plea or confession includes admissions of the material facts alleged, including those referring to former convictions.

Trial Court Proceedings and Sentence Imposed

The trial court set the principal penalty for theft as arresto mayor, and imposed one month and one day, which the decision treated as the minimum of the minimum period for the statutory range applicable to the value involved. The Court explained that, under art. 309, subsec. 6, Revised Penal Code, the theft charged was punishable with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, covering a duration of one month and one day to four months. Within that range, the decision treated the imposed penalty of one month and one day as the lowest possible because the mitigating circumstance did not justify a further reduction below the statutory minimum.

For the additional penalty, the trial court treated the accused as a habitual delinquent and imposed an additional penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correctional, with corresponding accessory penalties, pursuant to art. 62, rule 5, paragraph (a), Revised Penal Code. That additional penalty, as later stated in the decision, was prescribed by law in prision correctional in its medium and maximum periods, which corresponded to two years, four months and one day to six years; thus, the trial court had imposed the minimum within the statutory additional penalty range.

Post-Appeal Position of Counsel and the Solicitor-General

The accused’s de oficio counsel recommended affirmance, reasoning that the appealed sentence was in accordance with law and that the short brief favored sustaining the conviction and penalties as imposed by the trial court.

In contrast, the Solicitor-General took advantage of the information’s allegation of habitual delinquency and recommended a modification in favor of a higher principal penalty. Specifically, the Solicitor-General urged that the principal penalty of one month and one day of arresto mayor be increased to two months and one day of arresto mayor, which would be the minimum of the medium period. The Solicitor-General justified the increase by asserting that recidivism had been established and should be treated as an aggravating circumstance for purposes of the principal penalty, even if it would be compensated by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession.

More particularly, the Solicitor-General argued that habitual delinquency necessarily implies recidivism or prior convictions, and that the accused’s confession admitting commission of theft for the third time within the period prescribed for habitual delinquency meant recidivism must be considered. The Solicitor-General then raised the more intricate question whether recidivism could be taken into account twice—first as an aggravating circumstance (compensated by voluntary confession), and second as a qualifying or inherent circumstance in habitual delinquency that would affect the imposition of the additional penalty.

The Solicitor-General also advanced the premise that there was no express legal prohibition against such dual consideration, given that the penalty and the rules on aggravating and mitigating circumstances were designed to prevent arbitrariness, and given the doctrines cited in the decision regarding recidivism’s effect in application of the principal penalty.

The Court’s Analysis: Recidivism and the Additional Penalty

The Court addressed the question whether recidivism could be treated as both (1) an aggravating circumstance in fixing the principal penalty, and (2) again in fixing the period of the additional penalty in habitual delinquency.

The Court reasoned that recidivism is generally an aggravating circumstance that increases criminal responsibility. The Court cited prior rulings (including People vs. Aguinaldo and People vs. Melendrez) stating that recidivism, even in cases of habitual delinquency, should be considered in the application of the principal penalty in the corresponding period. The Court then examined the nature and purpose of the additional penalty under article 62.

The Court explained that the purpose of the additional penalty under habitual delinquency was to prevent those committing the crimes enumerated in the last paragraph of article 62 from relapsing further during the period fixed by law. The Court portrayed this as a legislative policy that, upon relapse, the penalty for the last offense is imposed in addition to an additional penalty ranging in periods according to the degree and recurrence of the delinquency.

At the same time, the Court stressed that the additional penalty’s period selection must consider the circumstances present in the case, and that it would be arbitrary to impose the maximum additional penalty without any circumstance justifying it, and equally arbitrary to impose the minimum when circumstances would justify a higher period.

Against this backdrop, the Court held that the rationale that recidivism should be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the principal penalty does not justify considering the same fact as aggravating again for the additional penalty. The Court reasoned that, unlike other circumstances (such as treachery or evident premeditation), recidivism is, by its nature, an aggravating circumstance. Yet, in habitual delinquency, recidivism becomes part of the very circumstance that constitutes the status of habitual delinquency. The Court emphasized that habitual delinquency is not treated as a distinct crime; it is a legal circumstance arising when the accused has former convictions meeting the statutory conditions. Thus, in the habitual delinquency context, recidivism functions as an inherent or qualifying circumstance for the additional penalty.

The Court drew an analogy to the legal maxim non bis in idem, observing that certain circumstances can qualify the offense and then no longer operate as separate aggravating circumstances once they have already qualified the crime. Using that reasoning, the Court concluded that recidivism, once treated as an inherent circumstance in habitual delinquency (to justify and qualify the additional penalty), cannot again be treated as an aggravating circumstance for the selection of the period of the additional penalty.

Consequently, the Court ruled that the accused’s additional penalty should be fixed at the minimum of the statutory additional penalty range, because, with the exception of recidivism, no other circumstance or fact justified imposing the additional penalty in a higher period.

The Court further rejected the contrary view that habitual delinquency’s inherent qualification should imply recidivism cannot be considered at all in the principal penalty. It said that the Solicitor-General’s proposition rested on an erroneous assumption that habitual delinquency is a crime, and it reiterated that the law itself provides that the habitual delinquent must be sentenced to the penalty for the last crime plus the additional penalty corresponding to the status, with recidivism serving as the factual basis for both the principal penalty’s period adjustment and the qualification for habitual delinquency, but without duplication of recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the additional penalty’s period.

Modi

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 45198)

Parties and Procedural Posture

The parties were The People of the Philippine Islands as plaintiff-appellee and Basilio de Jesus y Javier as defendant-appellant.
The Court of First Instance of Manila convicted the appellant in criminal case No. 52270 for theft of an umbrella and a buri hat.
The appellant appealed from the sentence “for the review of his case,” and counsel de oficio recommended affirmance based on the appealed sentence being in accordance with law.
The Solicitor-General recommended a modification increasing the appellant’s principal penalty within the statutory period, while accounting for mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
The Court modified the principal penalty while affirming the sentence in all other respects, and it imposed costs to the appellant.

Key Factual Allegations

The information charged theft committed on April 28, 1936.
The stolen items were an umbrella and a buri hat, with the umbrella valued at P2.65 and not recovered.
The Court sentenced the appellant to indemnify Francisco Liwanag in the amount of P2.50 representing the value of the umbrella not recovered.
The information further alleged that the appellant was a habitual delinquent under subsection 5, paragraph (a), of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code.
The information specified prior convictions: on January 4, 1933, the appellant was convicted of theft and sentenced to one month and one day, and on November 13, 1935, he was convicted of qualified theft and sentenced to two months and one day.
The information alleged that the date of the appellant’s last release was January 10, 1936, and it described the habitual-delinquency basis as the commission of the theft within the statutory period after prior convictions.

Trial Court Rulings

The trial court imposed the principal penalty of one month and one day of arresto mayor with the corresponding accessory penalties.
The trial court applied the provisions on habitual delinquency, imposing the additional penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correctional with corresponding accessory penalties.
The trial court indemnified Francisco Liwanag with P2.50 for the value of the umbrella not recovered.
The trial court’s choice of the principal penalty reflected leniency based on mitigating circumstances, while it also applied the qualifying structure created by the allegation of habitual delinquency.

Statutory Framework

The penalty for the theft charge depended on the value involved and was governed by art. 309, subsection 6, Revised Penal Code, which fixed the relevant range of arresto mayor.
The Court treated the relevant principal penalty range as one month and one day to four months, and it treated the minimum period as one month and one day to two months.
The Court treated the voluntary confession as a mitigating circumstance under art. 13, subsection 7, Revised Penal Code.
The Court treated the lack of alleged aggravating circumstances as relevant under art. 63, rule 1, Revised Penal Code for determining whether mitigation is compensated.
The Court treated habitual delinquency as governed by article 62, specifically rule 5, paragraph (a), and it required imposing the prescribed additional penalties.
The Court treated recidivism as an aggravating circumstance in general under the Revised Penal Code’s structure, and it evaluated how it operates within habitual delinquency.
The Court discussed the role of periods under art. 64, Revised Penal Code, including the rule that when only an aggravating circumstance is present, the former (principal) penalty is imposed in its maximum period.
The Court also referenced rules 1 and 2 of article 62 in relation to the temporal application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining the period of the penalty.

Issues on Appeal

The first issue concerned whether the appellant’s recidivism could be considered and applied twice—first for purposes of the principal penalty, and again for purposes of the additional penalty imposed under habitual delinquency.
The second issue concerned the correct period to apply for the additional penalty under article 62, rule 5, paragraph (a) given the role of recidivism as either aggravating or inherent in habitual delinquency.
The third issue concerned the correct determination of the principal penalty period for theft, considering the mitigating effect of voluntary confession and the presence or absence of compensating aggravating circumstances.
The Court also addressed whether the appellant’s admission of guilt on habitual delinquency could exempt him from the additional penalty.

Arguments of the Parties

The appellant’s counsel de oficio argued for affirmance because the appealed sentence was allegedly in accordance with law.
The Court’s analysis recognized that the trial court’s leniency for the principal penalty was linked to the mitigating circumstance of the appellant’s voluntary confession.
The Solicitor-General urged modification of the principal penalty by increasing it from one month and one day to the minimum of the medium period of arresto