Title
People vs. De Gracia
Case
G.R. No. 112984
Decision Date
Nov 14, 1996
Three brothers convicted of murdering Crispin Almazan in 1992; self-defense claims rejected. Bonifacio's sentence reduced for voluntary surrender, Cresencio's upheld. Witness credibility affirmed despite minor inconsistencies.
credibility of prosecution witnesses
sentencing
prision mayor
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 112984)

Facts Leading to the Death of Crispin Almazan

The evidence established that on the evening of February 19, 1992, around 7:00 p.m., Anita Almazan was in her yard in Barangay Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija when she observed the brothers Cresencio, Dalmacio, and Bonifacio De Gracia hurl invectives against the Almazan family. Crispin Almazan, her brother-in-law and seventy years old, went out toward the yard. As the parties approached, Crispin admonished the brothers for uttering unsavory words when drunk or after taking intoxicating liquor. According to the narration presented at trial, Cresencio responded by hooking Crispin’s neck with a bamboo, while Bonifacio stabbed Crispin with a sharp pointed bolo about a foot long, causing him to fall. Bonifacio then continued with further blows, and Dalmacio struck Crispin twice on the right shoulder with a spear.

The assailants then pulled Crispin toward the door of their house and took turns in stabbing him, after which the three brothers fled. The testimony further showed that Anita and Aries Almazan witnessed the incident from different vantage points. Aries was guarding tomatoes on a field about ten meters away and later informed persons at the De Gracia house of the fatal attack. Police authorities responded after receiving information from Barangay councilman Benedicto and the victim’s daughter Lita Almazan. Investigators recovered weapons at the crime site, including a blood-stained spear, a chisel, and other items described in the investigation report, and they photographed the victim where he was found. Anita executed a sworn statement describing the participation of the appellants.

Medical Findings in the Autopsy Report

The Autopsy Report (Exhibit F-3) recorded multiple injuries. It stated that Crispin sustained (1) a compound fracture of the nasal bone possibly caused by a blunt instrument; (2) a stab wound on the right side of the neck caused by a sharp-edged object with a pointed tip; (3) a stab wound on the right nasolabial fold similarly caused by a sharp-edged, pointed instrument; (4) a stab wound on the left side of the neck caused by a pointed sharp-edged instrument; (5) a stab wound on the left chest at the mid-clavicular line; and (6) a stab wound on the left chest below the shoulder bone in the sub-clavicular area. The injuries described were consistent with repeated stabbing from sharp pointed instruments and supported the prosecution’s account of a sustained assault.

Information, Arraignment, and Trial Result

An Information dated April 10, 1992 charged the brothers Cresencio De Gracia, Dalmacio De Gracia, and Bonifacio De Gracia with murder for the act of attacking Crispin with bladed weapons with intent to kill, with alleged evident premeditation, treachery, and taking advantage of their superior strength, and with conspiracy and mutual help in stabbing and hacking Crispin. Upon arraignment, Cresencio and Bonifacio pleaded not guilty, while Dalmacio was at large.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Cresencio and Bonifacio of the crime charged and sentenced each to reclusion perpetua. The court ordered them, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of Crispin Almazan in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay P29,250.00 as actual damages and expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The Supreme Court later reviewed this conviction upon the accused-appellants’ appeal.

Issues on Appeal and the Appellants’ Assigned Errors

The accused-appellants sought reversal and raised four principal grounds, namely: first, that the trial court erred in convicting them based on alleged inconsistent and improbable testimonies of prosecution witnesses; second, that the trial court failed to consider their alleged exculpatory imputations of motive on the part of the victim and the victim’s relatives who testified; third, that the trial court erred in failing to acquit them on the grounds of self-defense and defense of a relative; and fourth, that the trial court erred in not crediting voluntary surrender in the case of Bonifacio, and consequently in not applying the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Evaluation of Alleged Inconsistencies in Prosecution Witnesses

The appellants stressed purported contradictions between the testimonies of Aries Almazan and Anita Almazan. They claimed that Anita testified that Crispin was met by the brothers at the victim’s house, and that the weapon used was a spear, whereas Aries allegedly testified that the meeting happened at the ricefield and that the weapon was a bolo. The Court rejected these assertions. It held that Aries and Anita observed the incident from different locations and angles, making variations in perception expected. The Court further found the alleged discrepancy regarding where the appellants met the victim negligible because Crispin’s yard formed part of the rice field.

As to the weapon discrepancy, the Court found it insignificant in light of the overall testimony that Bonifacio stabbed Crispin with a bolo and that Dalmacio used a spear, and in light of admissions attributed to Bonifacio that he used a spear and a chisel. The Court also relied on the autopsy report, which described injuries caused by a “sharp edged object with pointed tip” and “pointed sharp edge instrument.” It reasoned that both a spear and a bolo fall within that description. The Court emphasized that witnesses need not testify harmoniously to every detail so long as they agree on material points; slight differences in recollection do not negate credibility. It declared that the alleged inconsistencies were therefore inconsequential to the material facts establishing the attack and participation of the appellants.

Self-Defense and Defense of a Relative: Failure of Requisites

The appellants also invoked self-defense and defense of a relative. The Court reiterated that when an accused invokes self-defense, the burden rests on the accused to prove justification by clear and convincing evidence. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence rather than on weaknesses in the prosecution’s evidence. It stated that for self-defense to prosper, three requisites must concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The Court held that the appellants failed to discharge this burden. It found the first and crucial element, unlawful aggression, wanting. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger to the life and limb of the person. The Court held that the alleged shouting incident, even if it showed hostility, did not amount to actual unlawful aggression. It also observed that Crispin was seventy years old at the time of the killing, whereas Cresencio and Bonifacio were twenty-five and twenty-three, respectively, when they testified in court. Given the victim’s age and the accused’s youth and vitality, the Court found it implausible that Crispin unlawfully attacked younger, stronger accused brothers.

Even assuming arguendo that Crispin initiated unlawful aggression, the Court ruled that the stabbing by Bonifacio to death was not a reasonable necessity of the means employed. It pointed out that Bonifacio could have pushed aside or disarmed the elderly victim, consistent with the trial court’s observation and the physical disparity implied by age. As the evidence showed that not all essential elements were present, the Court rejected the self-defense theory. It further held that the physical evidence undermined both self-defense and defense of a relative. Crispin suffered no less than five stab wounds on different parts of his body, together with a compound fracture on the nasal bone. The Court reasoned that the presence and severity of multiple wounds disproved claims of defensive action and instead indicated a determined effort to kill. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of self-defense and defense of relative.

Deference to the Trial Court’s Credibility Assessment

The Supreme Court held that the appellants’ first three assignment of errors, to the extent they depended on perceived inconsistencies, essentially challenged the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility. It reiterated that factual findings of the trial court on credibility are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal. It found no cogent reason to disturb the trial court’s finding that the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies were “natural, probable, straightforward, and credible.” It observed that the trial court was in the best position to determine the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment during trial.

Voluntary Surrender and the Indeterminate Sentence Law for Bonifacio

On the matter of sentencing, Bonifacio claimed entitlement to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The Court recognized that Bonifacio had surrendered and was accompanied by his uncle to the police station, although he remained silent. The Court held that his silence could not negate the act of voluntary surrender. It stressed that voluntary surrender contemplates that the accused spontaneously, voluntarily, and unconditionally placed himself at the disposal of the authorities. It treated this act as reflecting repentance and respect for the law, thus meriting consideration of the mitigating circumstance.

The Court explained that, for murder committed prior to the enactment of the Death Penalty Law, the applicable penalty ranged from reclusion temporal maximum to death. It held that because there were no aggravating circumstances, but there was one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty imposable on Bonifacio under Art. 64 (2) of the Revised Penal Code should be the minimum period, i.e., reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the In

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