G.R. No. L-40330 - People vs. Daniel

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-40330)

Procedural History

A criminal complaint was filed by the minor victim accusing Amado Daniel of rape. The Court of First Instance of Baguio City found the accused guilty and imposed a penalty (as reflected in the trial court record) but not reclusion perpetua. The accused’s motion for reconsideration was denied; he appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals (Tenth Division) sustained the finding of guilt but concluded that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not in accordance with law because Article 335 as amended (RA 4111) prescribes reclusion perpetua for rape (and reclusion perpetua to death when committed with a deadly weapon). The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court for final determination pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12; the Supreme Court then docketed the case.

Preliminary jurisdictional question presented

The certification raised a core procedural question: whether the Supreme Court acquires jurisdiction over a criminal appeal certified by the Court of Appeals when the Court of Appeals has found the accused guilty and expressed that the proper penalty is death or reclusion perpetua but did not itself impose that penalty (i.e., when the Court of Appeals refrains from imposing the higher penalty and instead certifies the case). There was a division among the Justices on whether the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction could be invoked under those circumstances.

Precedential background: People v. Ramos and its import

The Court examined People v. Ramos (1947), where the Court of Appeals had certified a case on the ground that life imprisonment should be imposed. Ramos held that the Court of Appeals must make findings of fact necessary to support its conclusion that life imprisonment or death should be imposed, because the certification is the basis for the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Ramos reflected a concern that a certification should contain factual findings sufficient to justify the elevation of the case and avoid erroneous transfers of jurisdiction. Ramos produced separate and dissenting opinions within the Supreme Court at that time, reflecting differing views on the necessity and effect of findings and the role of the Court of Appeals in certification.

Majority interpretation of Rule 124 / Section 34 of the Judiciary Act

The majority (including the authoring Justice) interpreted the phrase “shall refrain from entering judgment thereon” in Rule 124, Section 12 (and the corresponding provision in the Judiciary Act) to mean that the Court of Appeals must refrain from entering the judgment in the book of entries — not that it is forbidden to render or pronounce its judgment. The majority reasoned that: (a) the Court of Appeals lacks constitutional authority to finally impose death or life imprisonment in the sense that the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments imposing those penalties; (b) the Rule requires that, where a division of the Court of Appeals concludes that death or life imprisonment should be imposed, it should refrain from entering the judgment but may express the opinion and base that opinion on findings of fact; and (c) the Supreme Court, upon certification, will pass upon legal conclusions derived from the Court of Appeals’ findings and then impose the correct penalty. The majority read “entering judgment” as distinct from “rendering judgment” and emphasized that “entry” refers to recording a final and executory judgment in the book of entries (Rule 36), whereas rendition is the act of writing and filing the decision.

Dissenting/separate view (Castro, C.J.) on the preliminary issue

Chief Justice Castro (separate opinion) disagreed with the majority’s construal. He read the constitutional text and the Judiciary Act to require that the Court of Appeals should itself render judgment and impose the penalty it deems proper (including life imprisonment or death), then refrain from entering (i.e., recording as final) that judgment and immediately certify the entire record to the Supreme Court for “final determination.” Castro’s view emphasized (i) the plain constitutional phrases “final judgments” and “the penalty imposed” as determinative of Supreme Court jurisdiction; (ii) that section 34 should not be read to strip the Court of Appeals of power to render the proper judgment; and (iii) practical efficiency — having the Court of Appeals render and impose the proper penalty before certification would prevent shuttling and unnecessary returns of cases. Castro concluded with a directive that henceforth the Court of Appeals should render an explicit judgment imposing the sentence it deems warranted, refrain from entering it, and then certify the record to the Supreme Court.

Facts as found and summarized by the courts

The factual narrative sustained by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court (on the evidence) is: the minor complainant arrived by bus in Baguio during rain; the accused approached and molested her on the bus by trying to take her bag; after subsequent events the accused boarded the same jeep, followed the complainant to her boarding house, dashed into her room before she could close the door, produced an 8-inch dagger, threatened to kill her if she talked, forced her to lie on the bed, gagged her with a handkerchief, removed his clothing, and forcibly achieved penile-vaginal penetration. The victim lost consciousness; when she regained consciousness the accused was gone. The next day she disclosed the incident to her father and sought medical and police assistance.

Medical evidence

The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu, examined the victim on September 23, 1965 and reported: circular-stellate hymen with recent healing lacerations at multiple clock positions and contusions at the base of the hymen; tight vaginal orifice and vaginal wall; vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Micu concluded that defloration was recent and that the hymenal findings indicated the use of force sufficient to effect the sexual act. The doctor also opined the victim had been a virgin prior to the incident.

Defense offered and court’s credibility assessment

Appellant asserted that the acts were consensual, that he and the victim had a prior sexual encounter in a shack and that he had promised to marry her, and he pointed to an NBI lie-detector report purportedly favorable to him. The trial court and appellate tribunal rejected the defense and found the victim’s testimony credible. The Court emphasized the improbability and unlikelihood that a 13-year-old would fabricate such an account given the stigma, humiliation, medical examination, and public exposure involved. The tribunal also discounted reliance on the polygraph report as inconclusive and not dispositive, and it found the timing and circumstances were consistent with the victim being taken by surprise and intimidated by the dagger and threat to life.

Legal standards applied: force, intimidation, dwelling and deadly weapon aggravation

The Court reiterated governing principles: force in rape need not be irresistible — it need only be sufficient to consummate the act, evaluated in light of relative ages, sizes, and strength of the parties; intimidation that causes submission is equivalent to force for the purposes of rape; a dwelling includes places where the victim resides as a renter or boarder, so the offense being committed in the complainant’s room qualifies as dwelling aggravation under Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code; when a rape is committed with a deadly weapon, Article 335 as amended by RA 4111 prescribes reclusion perpetua to death (or increased penalties accordingly). The Court cited precedents (including U.S. v. Villarosa and subs

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-40330)

Procedural History

Original complaint filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City by 14-year old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel (alias "Amado Ato") of rape committed on or about September 20, 1965 in Baguio City.
Trial before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte concluded with conviction on May 30, 1966; trial court sentenced accused to a term described in the record as "not more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal and not less than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the costs."
Motion for reconsideration and new trial denied; accused appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1974 the Court of Appeals (Tenth Division) found guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt but declared the sentence in the trial court not in accordance with law and, invoking Republic Act No. 4111 (amending Article 335, R.P.C.) and Rule 124, Section 12, certified the case to the Supreme Court for "appropriate further proceedings pursuant to law."
Case was docketed by the Supreme Court (Resolution of March 6, 1975) and the Court en banc took up the matter, with a preliminary jurisdictional issue framed concerning the effect of the Court of Appeals' certification.
Final disposition by the Supreme Court (November 20, 1978) affirmed conviction, modified sentence (see Sentencing section), and ordered damages and costs.

Facts of the Case (as found in the record and summarized in the People’s brief)

Victim: Margarita Paleng, born November 20, 1952; at the time of the incident (September 20, 1965) she was approximately 12 years and 10 months old (stated variously as little less than 13).
Location and circumstances: Victim was boarding temporarily at a house in Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City (No. 25 Interior, Pinsao); she was a first year high school student at Baguio Eastern High School.
Sequence prior to entry: On the date in question she arrived in Baguio by Dangwa bus; while waiting inside the bus the accused approached, inquired her name and attempted to take her bag; she called the driver and conductor but they did not intervene; she left the bus, waited to board a jeep about 100 meters away and the accused followed and boarded, sitting beside her.
Arrival at boarding house: When the jeep reached Guisad she alighted and walked toward her boarding house; the accused followed, attempted again to take her bag and insisted on following her to the boarding house.
Forced entry and assault: As she opened the door to her room the accused forcefully entered before she could close it, pulled out an eight-inch dagger and threatened her ("If you will talk, I will kill you"). He seized her hair, forced her to lie on the bed, gagged her with a handkerchief, held the dagger and her neck, removed the buttons of his pants, placed the dagger on the bed, used his thigh to separate her legs, guided his penis, pried open her panty to expose her private parts, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge. Margarita lost consciousness and, upon regaining consciousness, the accused was gone.
Reporting and follow-up: The morning after the incident she told her father, was taken to Baguio General Hospital and examined, then to the police. Statements were given and a formal criminal complaint was signed before the Fiscal’s Office.

Medical and Forensic Evidence

Examination performed by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu (City Medico-Legal Officer) on September 23, 1965; medical report exhibited in the record.
Findings recorded: hymen of circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00 and 11:00 o’clock positions; contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 and 9:00; vaginal orifice tight and hardly admits two fingers; vaginal wall tight with prominent vaginal folds; vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa and negative for gram negative intra/extra-cellular diplococci.
Dr. Micu’s conclusion: "defloration was recent"; hymenal condition indicated victim was a virgin prior to the incident; the number of lacerations and contusions indicated degree of force exerted to effect the sexual act.

Defense of the Accused

Accused claimed prior acquaintance with the victim since 1963; claimed there were occasions when they rode together in a bus.
Accused’s version: the sexual act was consensual, and the incident in the victim’s room on September 20, 1965 was the second time he had carnal knowledge of her (the first purportedly in a shack).
Accused testified he had promised to marry the victim; asserted surprise at the complaint being filed.
Accused presented an NBI lie detector test result reported in his favor, including that he denied forcing sexual intercourse; trial court and later the Supreme Court gave little weight to the lie detector report and the trial judge commented on its limited probative value given circumstances of administration.

Trial Court Findings and Sentence

Trial court (CFI, Baguio City) found the accused guilty after due trial and sentenced him on May 30, 1966 to a term described in the record as consisting of reclusion temporal (not more than 12 years and one day) and prision mayor (not less than six years and one day) and costs. The trial judge’s factual findings credited the victim’s testimony; trial judge discounted the NBI lie detector test report as not conclusive under the circumstances.

Court of Appeals Decision and Certification to the Supreme Court

Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals (Justices Ramon C. Fernandez, Ricardo C. Puno, Sixto A. Domondon; ponente Justice Puno) found the accused’s guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt but concluded the sentence imposed by the trial court was not in accordance with law.
The Court of Appeals cited Republic Act No. 4111 (amending Article 335, Revised Penal Code) which provides that rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, and that when committed with use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Invoking the Judiciary Act (Rule/Section cited), the Court of Appeals refrained from entering final judgment and certified the case to the Supreme Court "for appropriate further proceedings pursuant to law."

Preliminary Jurisdictional Question Presented to the Supreme Court

Central question: Whether the Supreme Court acquires jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case certified by the Court of Appeals wherein the Court of Appeals has made findings of fact and of guilt but did not impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12, paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court.
Split among Justices: Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro (joined by some Justices) took the view that for the Supreme Court to acquire jurisdiction the decision certifying the case must have imposed the heavier penalty (reclusion perpetua or death) as facts warranted; other Justices including the writer of the principal Opinion (Munoz Palma) believed the Court of Appeals’ dispositive statement certifying the case without imposing that penalty was in accordance with the Constitution and law and vested jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.

Precedent Discussed: People v. Ramos (79 Phil. 612)

People v. Ramos (Nov. 28, 1947) dealt with certification to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals without findings of facts but with the appellate court’s opinion that life imprisonment should be imposed.
Ramos held that the Court of Appeals was bound to make its findings of fact necessary to support its conclusion that life imprisonment or death should be imposed, to provide clear and specific grounds in certification to prevent erroneous transmission of jurisdiction.
In Ramos the Court accepted the case due to substantial compliance because the certification referred to the Solicitor General’s recommendation whose brief contained sufficient findings; however Ramos engendered multiple opinions with Justices differing on whethe